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This document contains 13 papers presented by specialists in the philosophy of education. The papers presented were: (1) "Plato's 'Philosopher King': Position Impossible" (V. C. Morris); (2) "The Rhetoric and Reality: Current Research Emphases Concerning Educational Administrative and Organizational Behavior" (E. J. Van Meter); (3) "Education and Alienation: A Development of Marx's Theory of Education" (M. Smith); (4) "The Quest for Individual Power: A Response to Social Ennui" (B. Shoop); (5) "Dewey on Morality and the Morally Educative" (N. Hellman); (6) "Why Dewey's Method Failed as Social Criticism: A Response to Revisionist Positions" (W. R. Miranda); (7) "President's Address: Orthodoxy and Dissent in Religious Affiliated Institutions of Higher Education" (A. M. Dupuis); (8) "Folklore on 'The Self Concept'" (J. Merritt); (9) "'One for All, and All for One' or 'Each Man for Himself?' G. H. Mead's Analysis of Patriotism" (P. A. Torvik); (10) "Playful Gaming" (A. Makedon); (11) "Some Comments on Definitions in Education" (C. Schley); (12) "The Case of the Renegade Principle: Collective Perceptions in the Ethics of School Leadership" (C. Wolf); and (13) "Chariots of the Clods: Philosophy of Education and the A.E.S.A. Standards." The Society's business report and membership list are documented as well. (KM)

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PROCEEDINGS OF THE ANNUAL CONFERENCE OF THE

MIDWEST PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION SOCIETY

1980

Edited

by

Philip L. Smith

The Ohio State University

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ANNUAL CONFERENCE

MIDWEST PHILOSOPHY

OF EDUCATION

SOCIETY

CONFERENCE

NOVEMBER 14-15, 1980

COLLEGE OF EDUCATION

IOWA STATE UNIVERSITY

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The Midwest Philosophy of Education Society has been holding its annual conference for over twenty years. It has been publishing its proceedings for four years, since 1977. We believe this to be a worthwhile endeavor and encourage the widest possible distribution of these materials. It is also our hope that these proceedings will stimulate others to take part in the Society's debates and to contribute to the Society's objective of promoting philosophical inquiry into matters of educational import.

As editor, I would like to thank the members of the Program Committee and the participants at the 1980 conference. Of the first group I must say that they selected some outstanding papers. Of the second group, I must admit that they helped extensively in preparing these papers for publication in addition to writing them in the first place.

It would be unpardonable if I didn't mention a few people by name. First, George Kizer of Iowa State University who provided many of the resources for this publication. Second, my dear friend Charles Litz of Kansas State University who supervised the printing under the most difficult of circumstances. And thirdly, Rosi Hauber and Betty Chapin who between them did all of the typing and most of the editor's work.

Philip L. Smith
Columbus, Ohio
April, 1981

Program for the

1980 Annual Conference

Host Institution: College of Education
Iowa State University

Friday, November 14, 1980

12:00 Luncheon
Green Gander Room, Gateway Center

1:10 Welcoming Remarks

Virgil Lagomarcino, Dean
College of Education
Iowa State University

First General Session
Harvest Room

Presiding: Charles Litz,
Kansas State University

1:30 "Plato's 'Philosopher-King': Position Impossible"

Van Cleve Morris
University of Illinois at Chicago Circle

2:15 "The Rhetoric and Reality: Current Research Emphases Concerning Educational Administrative and Organizational Behavior"

Eddy J. Van Meter
Kansas State University

3:00 Intermission

Second General Session
Harvest Room

3:15 "Education and Alienation: A Development of Marx's Theory of Education"

Michael Smith
University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee

4:00 "The Quest for Individual Power: A Response to Social Ennui"

Bob Shoop
Kansas State University

4:45 Intermission

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Bob Shoop
Kansas State University

4:45 Intermission

Third General Session
Harvest Room

Presiding: Walter P. Krolikowski,
Loyola University of Chicago

5:00 "Dewey on Morality and the Morally Educative"

Nathan Hellman
Columbia University

5:45 "Why Dewey's Method Failed as Social Criticism: A Response to Revisionist Positions"

Wilma R. Miranda
Northern Illinois University

6:30 Cash Bar

Presidential Address
Harvest Room

Presiding: George Kizer,
Iowa State University

8:00 "Orthodoxy and Dissent in Religious Affiliated Institutions of Higher Education"

Adrian M. Dupuis
Marquette University

Saturday, November 15, 1980

Concurrent Session A
124 Ross Hall, Iowa State University

Presiding: David Adams,
Western Michigan University

8:30 "Folklore on 'The Self Concept'"

James Merritt
Northern Illinois University

9:15 "'One For All, and All For One' or 'Each Man for Himself?' G. H. Mead's Analysis of Patriotism"

Patricia A. Torvik
The Ohio State University

Concurrent Session B
115 Ross Hall, Iowa State University

Presiding: Alan Weider,
Northern Iowa University

8:30 "Playful Gaming"

Alex Makedon
The University of Michigan

9:15 "Some Comments on Definitions in Education"

Craig Schley
Wayne State University

10:00 Intermission

Fourth General Session
124 Ross Hall, Iowa State University

Presiding: Philip L. Smith,
The Ohio State University

10:15 "The Case of the Renegade Principle: Collective Perceptions in the Ethics of School Leadership"

Charles Wolf
Loyola University of Chicago

11:00 "Chariots of the Clods: Philosophy of Education and the A.E.S.A. Standards"

Rodney P. Riegle
Illinois State University

12:00 Business Meeting
115 Ross Hall, Iowa State University

1:00 Adjournment

PLATO'S "PHILOSOPHER-KING": POSITION IMPOSSIBLE

Van Cleve Morris
University of Illinois at Chicago Circle

In his master work, The Republic, Plato held out a special place for those individuals who had risen to the top of the political heap and who, through a life-time of service to their countrymen, were finally rewarded with a position of ultimate leadership in the perfect state. He called them "philosopher-kings," and had in mind for them a mode of leadership which combined the characteristics of thoughtful reflection on the one hand and executive decision-making on the other. In this union, thought Plato, was the perfect blend of reason and action so necessary to the functioning of a truly democratic state, the perfect republic.

Alfred North Whitehead once remarked that "all of Western philosophy is but a footnote to Plato." If so, it must be reported that very little thought has been given in either our philosophical or political literature to just how the philosopher-king role would get worked out in practice. Instead, most of our philosophical footnotes to Plato have been directed to his transcendant ideas, to the definition of ideal forms like love, justice and friendship, and sometimes to his bizarre educational ideas. Little has been said about his politics and specifically how the top person, the philosopher-king, would function in the political apparatus.

I have given some thought to this problem over the last several years, largely as an outgrowth of my experience as a middle-level executive in a large university, a dean of a college of education. Since a university is an attempt at a perfect republic--what one might call the academic's paradigm answer to the politics of the wider society--it may be worthwhile to investigate somewhat more closely how philosophy and executive leadership combine in the real world.

Now obviously a dean is not a king, but there is nonetheless a sense in which a dean wields power, however modest it may be. I am using Plato's word 'king' in a metaphoric, generic sense, referring to all administrators from low to high, up to and including the king, who make decisions and carry responsibility for the functioning of the whole. It

is this element of decision-making responsibility which sets this group off from the remainder of the citizenry. Is Plato correct in recommending that philosophers occupy the administrative chair?

I have no idea whether philosophers are suited to this kind of work, nor am I sanguine about Plato's assumption that philosopher-kings are good for the republic. What I have encountered, however, is more disquieting and disturbing, namely, that contradictions between the two roles are unavoidable. In their most extreme form, these contradictions represent a collision of values which Plato may never have thought of. For the present purpose, I would like to focus on three spheres of conflict which seem to me endemic to the marriage of philosophy with educational administration. I will state them briefly, and then comment on each:

First, we need to restudy the anomaly of treating people as both ends and means.

Second, it is important to reexamine the contradiction between open communication in the academic community and closed, restricted information management in the administrative suite.

Finally, we need to look into the possibility that the philosophic temperament itself may be inimical to effective management, and that philosophers can be successful administrators only if they shut down their philosophical tendencies.

People As Ends and Means

We have come to learn, not only from Immanuel Kant but from our liberal heritage, that an ultimate human value is to treat persons as ends and never as means. This notion is driven deep into Western values, and it comes naturally to us and coincides with our sense of fitness in this society. There is hardly a mischief so mean and abhorrent as the attempt to use people.

However, when one becomes an administrator, it turns out that virtually the central feature of the job is precisely that--to use people, their motivations, their drives, their ambitions, not to mention their abilities, skills and services on behalf of the entire enterprise. The function of an administrator is to run an organization. His or her decisions must be measured not by how humane they are, but by a more severe criterion: How effective they are in advancing the interests of the organization as a whole.

A dean, like a baseball manager or a football coach, must treat people as things, as interchangeable parts in a machine. A professor may be given an assignment he doesn't like, may be sent on errands he does not consider part of his job, or may be forced to collaborate with colleagues for whom he has little respect. The dean must enforce these directives for the good of the entire organization. Sometimes, in extremity, the dean may know in advance that a certain decision--for example, a termination for incompetence--will destroy the morale of an individual subordinate, but in spite of this knowledge must proceed with the decision on behalf of the organization over which he or she presides.

It is certainly true that an employee consents to a certain measure of manipulation merely by accepting a contract to work. The signature thereon signifies an acquiesance to a larger purpose, to which one's own personal goals must be subordinated. But that is just the point. By the very fact of this consent, the employee is turned into an instrument of the corporate group. He presents himself to the executive not as a person, but as an operating center of skills and abilities, assignable to various tasks in the organization. Accordingly, the administrator obliges, and deals with him as a functioning piece of a large and intricate mechanism.

What any given individual may want--especially those things which contribute to a sense of self such as salary, status, and intellectual respect--must yield to what everybody else, i.e., the organization, wants. By definition the administrator is the paymaster of these social goods and is put in the position of controlling the psychic income of the employee. I do not mean by this that the dean must be prepared merely to deliver bad news. Rather, the dean must be ready to sacrifice an otherwise whole and healthy human personality to the needs of the larger entity.

Open vs. Closed Communications

Another Western value, perhaps even more troublesome to the practicing administrator, is the commitment to an open communication network. In educational work, especially in academe, we are committed to the free flow of ideas, to freedom of information, and to unrestricted exchange of findings. Choosing an academic career means to devote oneself to the pursuit of truth and to the sharing of whatever one discovers or learns in this pursuit. Among academics, there is something almost holy about the obligation among scholars not to keep secrets from one another.

This mentality, cultivated over years of training, makes it difficult for academics to work with other people. It probably explains why universities and government agencies (especially secret-prone intelligence bureaus and military establishments) have so much difficulty collaborating with one another. In the academic community itself, there is hardly a more heinous sin than withholding relevant information.

Enter the educational administrator. This person is a political functionary. His or her job is to see to it that the interests of the entire organization come first. On behalf of this loyalty, it is sometimes necessary to withhold certain kinds of information and to deal it out, piece by piece, to the people who must have it, deliberately keeping it from others, especially those who may use the information in a disruptive and destructive way. The messages that flow across an administrator's desk are of a special sort. Although not literally personal, they are nevertheless privileged, an adjective which could never be applied to any sort of information in the academic marketplace.

Is the dean's in-box a public place? Absolutely not. Administration is politics, and politics, whatever else it may be, is the exercise of power. And, as we all know, knowledge is power. Hence, the management and control of information is essential to the successful administrator. Contrast this with the ethic out of which the dean has come--an environment in which all information is open, where the term "privileged information" would have no meaning, and where everyone is entitled to know everything that everybody else knows.

The two worlds, one open and accessible, the other closed and restricted, must coexist side by side. In the passage from faculty status to administrative responsibility, this shift in commitments is abrupt and troubling. It means giving up the exhilarating fresh air of intellectual sharing in favor of the cramped quarters of protecting secrets and managing the news. Philosophers don't keep secrets. Deans sometimes must.

The Philosophic vs. the Administrative Temperament

With the foregoing commentary as a backdrop, we can now begin to see that the philosophic temperament as such may not be the ideal qualification for administrative service. The philosopher is the quintessential interrogator, the seeker after alternatives and options, the explorer of the

terrain of other possibilities. In cultivating this approach to life's contingencies, the philosopher's stock in trade is the question. Indeed, in Plato's time, the very definition of philosophy as expressed in his teacher, Socrates, was the art of questioning. For the most part, we cling to this notion today. Philosophy is inquiry into meaning, it is the exploration of understanding, of comprehending the world. The philosopher, by training and disposition, is not interested in making things happen. Too much has happened already. The central task is to comprehend what past and present events mean, not to generate new events which will require their own analysis.

Thus, the Holy Grail of the philosopher is insight and understanding, what we used to call wisdom. It is an awareness of the texture and depth of events, not their consequences. It is a comprehension of how they all fit together into a larger whole, not how they bump into one another or lead on one to the next. The philosopher's attention is fixed on a distant clarity. Even when a philosopher acts, as he or she must in the course of a life, it is tentative and provisional, forever on the lookout for some alternative that might have been chosen instead.

An administrator's life does not lend itself to these requirements. The administrator may have a desire to understand, but there isn't time. Understanding can wait. By definition, the administrator is situational, oriented to a circumstance which calls out for resolution or redefinition. The situation may, in the long future, be understood as part of a larger whole, but right now it is a situation requiring movement to a new condition, a new situation. The administrator's life is focused on this priority of immediacy.

I think this truth was not lost on Plato. Indeed, I think precisely because of this political focus on the immediate, he recommended that his high politicians be capable of the longer view. But in the hurly burly of contemporary administration--educational or otherwise--it appears that the "longer view" may not be all that valuable to us. The world nowadays changes so radically so rapidly that the philosopher's curiosity as to what it all means may turn out to be a kind of metaphysical joke. By the time the "longer view" is in hand, the human condition has changed enough to make that view neither true nor false, but merely irrelevant, and the search for another "longer view" must begin anew. And, says the administrator, if longer views are this perishable, why then must they occupy us so much of the time?

Philosophy, or at least the philosophic temperament, can therefore be seen as an impediment to decisive administration. The administrator is oriented to the situation and its immediate features. And, of course, there must be a gathering of informationon which to act. But once having acted, the administrator does not dwell on--indeed is aggressively not interested in--what would have happened if he had done something else. The second-guessing syndrome, so popular among political pundits and social commentators, is not a good trait in an administrator.

It can possibly be argued that administration itself, as a field of endeavor and as a career specialty, has come into prominence in the twentieth century precisely because our mode of social action requires a different focus. Institutional life in a technological society puts a premium on facility with the foreground of action. Individuals who function well in the foreground are therefore highly valued, and philosophers, more comfortable somewhere out on the horizon of understanding, do not fully qualify.

* * *

In conclusion, as we look back on the anomaly of ends and means, on the collision between open and closed information networks, and on the contradictions between the philosophic and managerial temperaments, it is easy to see why Plato never anticipated any of these difficulties. He rather assumed, I suppose, that everybody in The Republic would be competent and ambitious, hard-working and obedient. No one would have to be treated as a thing because one's personal goals would always coincide with those of the state. No one would be disciplined or fired because no one would have to be disciplined or fired. Everyone would do his or her job well and gladly. There would be no screts, because no one would use information improperly or merely for one's own private gain. Finally, administration, the work of the king, could be made to coincide with philosophy because, in a slowly evolving city-state, where all would know their place, there would be a closer fit between thinking and doing.

In my next life, I want to live there. I think it would be even better than Eden. Meanwhile, I think we must all settle for a world that is not only imperfect, but more explicitly, a world chopped up into ethical spheres. In such a world, traditional values will be expected to operate, but only up to a point. Beyond this point, another code takes over, another set of rules, another catalog of expectations. We need to know when we cross this frontier into the adjoining ethical provice. Given this knowledge,

educational administration can become more comprehensible and manageable, and we will abandon the attempt to be a philosopher and a king at the same time.

THE RHETORIC AND THE REALITY: CURRENT RESEARCH EMPHASES CONCERNING EDUCATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE AND ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR

Eddy J. Van Meter
Kansas State University

A total of 3,029 dissertations pertaining specifically to educational administration have been reported in Dissertation Abstracts International over the approximately two-and-one-half year period from January, 1978 through September 1980. Admittedly this is a relatively short timeframe. It is obviously not a large enough number of years to speak of prevailing research trends in anything approaching a definitive sense. It is, however, a reasonable snapshot of time, or selected frame, which if taken for what it is in terms of limitations can prove to be informative.

My contention is that we can potentially learn a great deal about the present status of educational administration, as an academic discipline and also a professional field of practice, by examining the kinds of questions, topics and issues being researched by people who are just now completing their formal study of the subject. The 3,000 some individuals who have completed their dissertations over the past two-and-a-half years are now or soon will be our superintendents of schools, our school principals, our State Department of Education professional staff, and in some instances our college and university faculty of educational administration and administrators. Certainly their vision of what administration is all about--and what it should be about--is shaped at least in part by their individual research efforts!

I also, however, within the context of this conference want to address a major portion of my comments to one or two issues relating to the current research emphases in educational administration which I see as being particularly germane to those of us gathered here who are more interested in philosophy and philosophy of education than educational administration. Most of my remarks in this regard are merely speculative, and I offer them as "food for thought" and as a stimulus for discussion.

Certainly one of the most striking impressions that

I've gained by examining the dissertations in educational administration reported over the past thirty-three months is the incredibly diverse nature of subject matter being research. The Educational Administration Abstracts classification system, which is used for journal article rather than dissertation abstracting, is organized around six major topical headings (tasks of administration, administrative processes and organizational variables, societal factors influencing education, programs for educational administrators, theory and research, and planning and futurology). A total of 42 subtopic areas are designated within the six major headings (e.g., legal responsibilities, decision making, group behavior, church-state relations, research methods, long-range planning, etc.). As a means of organizing the diversity of dissertation research emphases in some fashion, the EAA classification system was employed in my review, with each dissertation categorized using the EAA system. I used the EAA system rather than the existing DAI subject indexing system because after a preliminary trial effort I found the DAI system less than adequate for the ultimate purpose of the review, which was to develop a useable dissertation research retrieval system which is being made available to faculty members and doctoral students conducting research at my own institution. The dissertation abstracts thus far reviewed have been coded for computer retrieval, by author name, title, school, content focus, date completed, and foreign versus United States content emphasis.

Using the EAA classification system just mentioned as a means of categorizing the dissertations examined, it was possible to classify each of the 3,029 dissertations into one of the 42 subtopic areas. All 42 subtopic areas were utilized. The vast majority of the dissertations thus far reviewed, however, have been classified under what are essentially technical subtopic areas (approximately 2,200 of the 3,029)! These areas, such as finance, legal responsibilities, negotiations, governmental relations, and program evaluation reflect, in effect, where the most attention in terms of research work is being directed.

To provide some flavor of the kinds of dissertations being completed within a given subtopic area, those dissertations reviewed and classified under the subtopic heading of "change and innovation" are identified in Table 1 which is attached to this paper as Appendix A. I have included these particular dissertations in this presentation because in looking over the subtopic areas I might have selected as examples the area of change and innovation may be of greater general interest to the participants of this

conference than would be a subtopic area such as finances.

The first point I would make within the context of this conference is that dissertations focusing on what we might typically think of as philosophical issues are almost nonexistent among the 3,029 dissertation abstracts in educational administration reviewed! There were, of course, any number of dissertations which included some form of philosophical commentary as a peripheral or very limited supplementary portion of the effort. Only three or four of the 3,029, however, were related directly to philosophical per se topics of inquiry.[1]

My reaction to the just mentioned finding, especially in light of the comments of the previous speaker,[2] is really a challenge: I believe it is possible that one important reason for a lack of reflective or philosophical orientation to administration, if in fact that is to some extent the case, may be atributable to the lack of focus in educational administration dissertation research on philosophically related concerns and issues! My challenge is to those of us who may consider our major interests philosophy and philosophy of education. I would suggest that one specific way to influence educational administrators, in terms of their incorporating a sensitivity to philosophical issues and ways of thinking within their administrative frame of behavior, is to set forth a clearly articulated series of problems and issues which address topics of philosophical concern that might be researched by doctoral students in educational administration. I believe it is a moot point to suggest that it is those working in educational administration who should assume this role; the fact is it is simply not being done.

The second issue I want to raise in reference to the review of dissertations completed in this initial phase of what will be a more comprehensive examination of doctoral research in the area,[3] relates to an interpretation about administrative behavior that I would like to posit. It is speculative and perhaps controversial, yet I believe interesting and perhaps worth discussing.

I suggest that the diverse nature of the subject matter being researched in educational administration by doctoral students is reflective of a general procedure of compartmentalizing both the subject matter and the practice of administration! That is, the diverse nature of the subject matter researched in the 3,029 dissertations I have been examining is merely an example of a more fundamental phenomenon going on in the field of educational administration. Educational administration is taught in a manner

that compartmentalizes various aspects of administration. Finance is taught as a separate subject requiring certain administrative behaviors, as is educational law, personnel administration, school and community relations, and so on throughout the total curriculum of the area. As already noted, dissertation research carries through with this same process of compartmentalization. Little wonder then that when an individual assumes an administrative position of responsibility they practice compartmentalization! That is what they have been taught to do.

But I want to go on beyond this recognition of compartmentalization, and suggest another facet of the same phenomenon which also impacts on educational administration and may be one more reenforcing aspect of compartmentalizing and its consequences. I have been interacting over the past several year period with a growing number of women who are entering the field of educational administration. I have been listening to what they have to say about the problems of women entering what has been a predominately male-oriented profession. I am aware of the growing number of workshops, seminars and conferences that have been and are being conducted on issues relating to "women in management." And I am aware that one of the topics often dealt with in such conferences is what is referred to as the problem of compartmentalization: the thesis runds that men through a long process of socialization have learned to compartmentalize their lives--separating their personal from their professional life, learning to deal with different special interest groups in an individualized and sometimes seemingly contradictory manner--and that women have tended not to be subject to this particular process of socialization to the same extent. Thus women moving into management and administrative positions, this line of reasoning runs, must "learn" to compartmentalize their behavior and this is one of several unique circumstances that women face in administration as contrasted with men.

If there is some degree of truth in the "problem of compartmentalization" as I have just touched on it briefly then we may be premature in ruling out the possibility of the 'Philosopher-King.' The situation as it exists may not be a case of the job of administration being totally incompatable with assuming a philosophical orientation, but rather a problem of professional preparation! We train administrators to compartmentalize through both the formal and the 'hidden' curriculum. Furthermore, and even more fundamentally, we may socialize future administrators who are predominately men to compartmentalize through a process of early childhood training and experience, which merely

gets reinforced in later professional preparation programs and in later on-the-job situations. The lesson we might learn from all of this is that perhaps rather than women acquiescing to the necessity of learning to compartmentalize as they move into administration they might instead engage in noncompartmentalized administrative behavior. In turn, men in administration might benefit by "learning" to be less compartmental. It is not to the 'Philosopher-King' that we might look to become more philosophical in administration, but to the 'Philosopher-Queen.'

FOOTNOTES

1. Those studies most closely relating to philosophical issues of inquiry included:

   Ingle, Earl B., Jr. Principal-teacher value congruence and relationship to group satisfaction within elementary schools. Unpublished Ph.D., Purdue University, 1977.

   Orsini-Romano, Clara I. Progressive-traditional beliefs and personal orientations of pre-service, in-service, and reentry teachers. Unpublished Ph.D., Fordham University, 1978.

   Walson, Steven E. A multi-variate analysis of Indiana school board member attitudes concerning controversial educational practices and issues. Unpublished Ed.D., Ball State University, 1978.

   Royse, Phillip N. The Warren Court, the establishment of religion, and schools. Unpublished Ed.D., University of Cincinnati, 1979.

   Barilla, John J. An instrument to identify philosophical preferences in problem solving by elementary school teachers and administrators. Unpublished Ed.D., Lehigh University, 1980.

2. Van Cleve Morris. Plato's philosopher-king: Position impossible. 1980 Annual Conference of the Midwest Philosophy of Education Society, Ames, Iowa.

3. The review discussed in this paper is the first part of a more complete review of dissertation in educational administration to cover the period from 1970 to the present.

Appendix A

Recent Dissertation Studies Relating to Planned Change in Education

Table 1

Recent Dissertation Studies Relating to Planned Change in Education

Author	Title	School	Year Completed	Order Number
1. Peter D. Gibbons	The change process in a school: A descriptive and exploratory study	University of Colorado	1977	7729918
2. Earl L. Avery	Tug of war: Local implementation of federal educational innovation	Harvard University	1977	7730673
3. Elizabeth B. Thompson Binstock	Innovation and organizational development within a bureaucracy: A case study of the early years of a public alternative high school	Harvard University	1976	7730674
4. Frederic K. Laurence	School superintendents' views of organization development in schools	Ohio State University	1977	7731915
5. Karolyn Johnson Snyder	A conceptual learning model for training leaders for change	Texas Tech University	1977	7731165
6. Ann Boyd Taylor	The role of the federal government in initiating educational change: A case study of project developmental continuity	Harvard University	1977	7732063

Table 1
(continued)
Recent Dissertation Studies Relating to Planned Change in Education

Author	Title	School	Year Completed	Order Number
7. James E. Teevan	An empirical test of a theory of cyclical organizational change	George Peabody College for Teachers	1977	7731637
8. Florence I. Henderson	Organizational structure and the adoption of innovations in education	University of Toronto	1975	NA
9. James B. Linder	A study of the relationship between selected characteristics of South Carolina school districts and the adoption of validated educational practices	University of South Carolina	1977	7801160
10. Richard E. Ault	A model for initiating change in large social systems	Western Michigan University	1977	7806163
11. Sidney A. Freund	Representational role orientation congruence and the high school principal's innovative propensity	Columbia University	1978	7807038
12. Kevin F. Dwyer	A study of the implementation of an organizational development program at the elementary school level	Boston University	1978	7808058

Table 1
(continued)
Recent Dissertation Studies Relating to Planned Change in Education

Author	Title	School	Year Completed	Order Number
13. M. Masoud Givrad	An experimental model of organizational development for institutions of higher education	University of Southern California	1978	NA
14. Joseph R. Harrop	The use of demonstration programs as diffusion agents in large city school systems: A comparative case study	Stanford University	1978	7808795
15. Frederic D. Ross	Changing the organizational structure of a school district: A case study	Stanford University	1978	7808873
16. Lee S. Sproull	Managerial attention in new education programs: A micro-behavioral study of program implementation	Stanford University	1978	7808848
17. Gail V. Bass	Alternatives in American education: District policies and the implementation of change	University of California Los Angeles	1978	7811335
18. Richard L. Stolsmark	Factors influencing the adoption of a curricular innovation	University of Wisconsin Madison	1978	7806448

Table 1
(continued)
Recent Dissertation Studies Relating to Planned Change in Education

Author	Title	School	Year Completed	Order Number
19. Philip C. Dehnick	A history of the literature on the change process in education	Temple University	1978	7812267
20. Robert E. Holloway	Perceptions of an innovation: Syracuse University Project Advance	Syracuse University	1977	7811658
21. Tanya I. Ludutsky	Organization development for student personnel administration	Indiana University	1978	7812975
22. Elliot H. Burns	Actions public school boards may take to reduce resistance to change during times of declining enrollment	Wayne State University	1978	7816013
23. Eileen C. Fane	Unplanned organizational change and organizational identity	Fordham University	1978	7816564
24. Mark H. Gelula	An evaluation of an organization development intervention in a school setting	State University of New York-Buffalo	1978	7817036

Table 1
(continued)
Recent Dissertation Studies Relating to Planned Change in Education

Author	Title	School	Year Completed	Order Number
25. Joel S. Bloom	A case study of the implementation process of Title III curriculum innovations in an urban school district	Columbia University	1978	7821812
26. G.L. Bosshart	The personality characteristics of innovative principals	University of Michigan	1978	7822863
27. Cheryl L. Davis	An assessment of teacher and administrator perceptions of recommended innovations in a selected school system	Auburn University	1978	7823191
28. Carla J. Edlefson	Participatory planning for organizational change: The case of Project Redesign	Stanford University	1978	7822495
29. Connie J. Showalter Lucas	Development of an instrument to measure four dimensions of organizational health: Innovation, autonomy, adaptation, and problem-solving adequacy	University of Arkansas	1978	7823286
30. Leo E. Lynn	The school and change study: Organizational stress and innovation in schools	Columbia University	1978	7822065

Table 1
(continued)
Recent Dissertation Studies Relating to Planned Change in Education

Author	Title	School	Year Completed	Order Number
31. Ethel Weiss Auster	Educational information consultants: Case studies of part-time knowledge linkers	University of Toronto	1978	NA
32. Jack D. Reeves	Influence of organizational characteristics and environmental factors on job satisfaction and adaptiveness in school districts	University of Texas-Austin	1978	7900619
33. Leonard C. Thacker	Adaptiveness of school districts as related to organizational structure and environmental characteristics	University of Texas-Austin	1978	7900644
34. Gilbert Robledo	EOPS, the establishment of an educational innovation: A study of organizational de-marginalization	University of California Santa Barbara	1978	7905572
35. Richard T. Lincoln	Case study of the strategies of planned change used in the implementation of the ANISA model of education in the Suffield, Connecticut public schools	University of Massachusetts	1978	7903799

Table 1
(continued)
Recent Dissertation Studies Relating to Planned Change in Education

Author	Title	School	Year Completed	Order Number
36. David H. Walter	The relationship between teacher perception of elementary principal change-oriented behavior and the institutionalization of open education	State University of New York-Albany	1978	7905543
37. Katie Blavat Barak	Project characteristics and processes affecting dissemination of Title IV-C projects	University of Southern California	1979	NA
38. Robert A. Frick	Installation of an educational innovation: The relationship to selected characteristics of school districts	Temple University	1979	7909996
39. Martin C. Gotowala	The relationship of training in client-centered consultation skills to reading consultants' ability to effect change	University of Connecticut	1978	7911373
40. Joseph A. Zannini	Stages of organizational growth: A psychological continuum	University of Nebraska-Lincoln	1978	7910524

Table 1
(continued)
Recent Dissertation Studies Relating to Planned Change in Education

Author	Title	School	Year Completed	Order Number
41. Annette J. Oren	A study of the dynamics of change in day care centers	Ohio State University	1979	7916014
42. William L. Spence, Jr.	Exportable innovations in school food service in Virginia during the period 1971-1976	University of Virginia	1978	7916341
43. Raymond A. Hansen	Management-by-objectives as a change agent strategy for organization development in a Wisconsin vocational, technical, and adult education district	University of Wisconsin-Madison	1978	7915104
44. Morris L. Holmes, Jr.	Establishing validity for the organizational health questionnaire	University of Arkansas	1979	7919227
45. Howard B. Bennett	The superintendent as change agent for two major events in the school district	Fordham University	1979	7920660
46. Gail P. Houghton	Using survey feedback as a problem solving strategy in a suburban high school	United States International University	1979	7924564

Table 1
(continued)
Recent Dissertation Studies Relating to Planned Change in Education

Author	Title	School	Year Completed	Order Number
47. Benjamin D. Kronnick	Implementation of planned change in an educational organization	University of California-Riverside	1979	7924291
48. Carol A. Fox Pulvino	Relationship of principal leadership behavior to teacher motivation and innovation	University of Wisconsin-Madison	1979	7918930
49. John P. Zaremba	Relationship of teacher motivation to innovativeness and job satisfaction	University of Wisconsin-Madison	1978	7918180
50. Peter B. Dow	Innovations perils: An account of the origins, development, implementation, and public reaction to "Man: A Course of Study"	Harvard University	1979	7927944
51. Marjorie Tunick Goldstein	Diffusion tactics influencing implementation of a curriculum innovation	Yeshiva University	1979	8001260

Table 1
(continued)
Recent Dissertation Studies Relating to Planned Change in Education

Author	Title	School	Year Completed	Order Number
52. Pasquale A. Maffei	Change strategy in a high school organization development project	Yeshiva University	1979	8001234
53. James H. Raymond	Teacher receptivity to change and its relationship to perceived risk, local-cosmopolitan orientation, and dogmatism	University of Southern California	1979	NA
54. John B. Dinkins, Jr.	A study of procedures to improve information dissemination and utilization for educational decision-making	University of Alabama	1979	8004543
55. Edward Maurer	A role model for change agentry based on perceptions created by selected intervention strategies	University of Massachusetts	1979	8004959
56. Barbara A. Scheer	A process for using knowledge of past change processes in planning future change efforts	University of Colorado-Boulder	1979	8003014
57. Johanna Clift White	Institutional resistance to future change: Attitudes of student affairs practitioners in selected postsecondary institutions	University of Florida	1979	8002916

Table 1
(continued)
Recent Dissertation Studies Relating to Planned Change in Education

Author	Title	School	Year Completed	Order Number
58. David W. Zeckser	Educational program assessment: A case study in organization development	University of Colorado-Boulder	1979	8003027
59. Ronald S. Andrade	The implementation of educational innovations: A study of dissemination tactics used by project personnel in California under the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, Title IV-C	University of Southern California	1979	NA
60. Alfred L. Dominico	The relationship between district management practices and principal receptivity to change	University of Southern California	1979	NA
61. Dorothy A. Smith	A comparative case study of the relationship of change strategies and perceptions of leader roles to the attainment of a renewal mandated for religious communities of women by the documents of Vatican 2	State University of New York-Buffalo	1979	8008132
62. Janet M. Clark	A study of the effects of a management-initiated innovation on teacher attitude and student achievement	Northern Illinois University	1979	8011158

Table 1
(continued)
Recent Dissertation Studies Relating to Planned Change in Education

Author	Title	School	Year Completed	Order Number
63. Wilma I. Jones	Adoption of educational innovation: The Colorado state facilitator diffusion model.	University of Colorado-Boulder	1979	8011283
64. Martin G. Brooks	An analysis of the relationship between a public school intervention and the distribution of benefits to participants	Columbia University	1980	8015066
65. Fouad T. El-Hage	The relationships of selected profile of organization variables, a measure of organizational health, and an indicator of organization effectiveness	State University of New York-Buffalo	1980	8015554
66. Peter G. Roswell	The effect of enrollment trends on innovations in schools	State University of New York-Buffalo	1980	8015555
67. James W. Hennigar	A research study of the relationship between the perceived managerial style of selected Maine middle management public school administrators and their perceived receptivity to change	George Peabody College for Teachers	1979	8016088

Table 1
(continued)
Recent Dissertation Studies Relating to Planned Change in Education

Author	Title	School	Year Completed	Order Number
68. Eugene R. Hunter	Problems encountered by elementary school principals in implemented programs of individualized instruction	State University of New York-Albany	1980	8017644
69. Karen L. Kanell	A comparison of principals' preference for "change via credibility" and its relation to organizational climate, principals' leader behavior, and teachers' attitudes toward change	University of Pittsburgh	1980	8018310
70. Scott D. Bristol	A systemic, psychological, contextual model and analysis of planned organizational change	University of Massachusetts	1980	8019445
71. Richard A. Kohler	The extraneous determinants and unintended consequences which occur during the implementation of an innovative program and their effects on staff commitment	University of Cincinnati	1980	8021061
72. C. Dennis Ortwein	Factors determining incorporation of innovative mini-grant programs in Nevada school systems	University of Nevada-Las Vegas	1978	8020462

Table 1
(continued)
Recent Dissertation Studies Relating to Planned Change in Education

Author	Title	School	Year Completed	Order Number
73. Robert M. Packer	Developing a model of planned change for school improvement at the secondary level	United States International University	1979	8019766
74. Jack B. Schoenholtz	Career-bound and place-bound superintendents: A study of their characteristics, preference for leadership style, and perceptions of needed and actual change in their employing organizations	Northern Illinois University	1980	8020680

EDUCATION AND ALIENATION: A DEVELOPMENT OF KARL MARX'S THEORY OF EDUCATION

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In this paper, I would like to review Marx's theory of alienation and his educational views, and show how education, particularly in capitalist society, produces human alienation. In addition, I shall posit a revolutionary role for education in abolishing the alienation of capitalist society and in the historical transformation toward human society.

Marx's philosophical conception of the human being served as the basis for his theory of alienation. "Man" was both the theoretical and practical starting point of Marx's theory of alienation. Following the terminology of Hegel, Feuerbach, and other contemporaries, he employed the concept of "species-being" in his early writings to identify his subject--man. In particular, Marx used the concept of species-being to distinguish man from the animal species. According to Marx, man distinguishes himself as a species-being, from the animal species, through his consciousness and through his conscious life-activity. Man alone is conscious of producing his existence as a species, and consequently, he alone freely produces the specific character of his species-life. Marx commented that man can produce according to the standard of every other species and comprehend the criteria inherent in the object of its production. It is this fact which makes man's productive activity free. "Man makes his life activity itself the object of his will and of his consciousness."[1] Consequently, in man's consciousness of himself as a species-being, he confirms his real social life. Thus consciousness emerges as the critical category in Marx's notion of species-being.

Although consciousness is a critical category, it is an abstraction without its objectification in nature through social production. According to Marx, "Man can be distinguished from animals by consciousness, by religion, or anything you like. They themselves begin to distinguish themselves from animals as soon as they begin to produce their means of subsistence."[2] That is, through social production, man produces the objective existence of the species, his real

existence as a species-being. Moreover, through his productive activity, man duplicates himself both intellectually, in consciousness, and materially, in reality. Man may therefore see himself in a world he has created. Marx concluded, "the productive life is the life of the species. It is the life engendering life. The whole character of a species--its species-character--is contained in the character of its life activity . . ."[3]

Having established the premise that man's species-character is determined, by his productive activity, Marx provided the criterion for assessing the condition of modern man vis-a-vis his species life. That is, man distinguishes himself as a species-being through his conscious life-activity in social production; his activity, as material production, not only gives life to the actual living species, but also determines his species-character. However, modern man lives and produces within the system of capitalist production. Consequently, Marx identified the condition of "alienation" as the resulting <u>real</u> relation of man, in capitalist society, to his <u>true</u> (in the anthropological sense) species-nature.

Marx described four relationships through which man's alienation in capitalist society could be viewed. Included were man's relations to nature as the object of his labor, to his own laboring activity, to his existence as a species-being, and to other human beings as individual species-beings.

First, according to Marx, man is a natural being, "That man's physical and spiritual life is linked to nature means simply that nature is linked to itself, for man is part of nature."[4] Man can produce nothing without nature. However, in capitalist production, man is separated from his organic relationship to nature as the <u>means</u> of his existence. Nature, its products and its objects, are no longer part of man's "natural rights." Private property and private ownership usurp all human rights, including those of man to the natural basis of his life. In capitalist production, the object which the worker produces is not his object but belongs to the owner of the means of production.

> This fact expresses merely that the object which labour produces--labour's product--confronts it as <u>something alien</u>, as a <u>power independent</u> of the producer. Labour's realization is its objectification. Under these economic conditions this realization of labour appears as loss of

> the object and bondage to it; appropriation as estrangement, as alienation.[5]

Marx added that if in fact the objects which man produces as a worker in capitalist society are taken from him, belong to another, then man's activity, itself, by means of which the objects were produced, is also alienated. He states, ". . . the estrangement is manifested not only in the result but in the act of production, within the producing activity itself."[6] The objects produced merely summarize the activity which went into their production. Production in capitalist society, as labor, is active alienation. Moreover, in the relationship between man, as the commodity labor, and his activity is also represented man's relationship to himself as a species-being, whose activity is "free, conscious activity."[7]

Furthermore, Marx related the alienation of man from his products and his laboring activity to man's species-character: "in tearing away from man the object of his production, therefore, estranged labor tears from him his species-life . . ."[8] In Marx's philosophical view, human beings fulfill themselves through their social production. When the objects the workers produce do not, in fact, belong to themselves, as in the case of private production, the objects then represent the concrete negation of their free, conscious activity; and "free, conscious activity is man's species-character."[9] Hence, Marx added that in alienating man from his species, capitalist production turns the life of the species into merely a means of individual existence.

In the fourth relation, Marx explained that following from the fact we are estranged from ourselves as species-beings, we are also consequently severed from each other as individual species-beings. "What applies to a man's relation to his work, to the product of his labour and to himself, also holds of a man's relation to the other man, and to the other man's labour and object of labour."[10] Because in capitalist society we are alientated from our true selves, it is impossible to relate to each other's needs in a meaningful way. For example, in the relationship between father and child, one of real human needs, the child's needs for food, clothing, and shelter cannot be met when the father cannot sell his labor in exchange for these things; thus it becomes merely a theoretical relationship, an abstraction, an unfulfilled practical relationship.

Marx's ultimate concern was to end human and social

alienation and to develop the productive and creative potential of the human species. He viewed the proletarian class struggle as the essential practical movement to abolish the division of labor and the oppressive conditions of capitalist production and the state; and the materialist conception of history represented the theoretical basis of the proletarian movement. Although not widely acknowledged, Marx viewed education as an unavoidable means toward the accomplishment of these revolutionary goals.

Marx declared that under capitalist production man is reduced to the level of commodity. Man becomes the commodity--labor:

> . . . Production does not simply produce man as a commodity, the human commodity, man in the role of commodity; it produces him in keeping with this role as a mentally and physically dehumanized being. -- Immorality, deformity, and dulling of the workers and the capitalists. -- Its product is the self-conscious and self-acting commodity.[11]

But if in fact man becomes a commodity in capitalist production, then, as Marx previously reasoned, it is because in the activity prior to his actual objectification in production man was alienating himself, i.e., alienated activity, the activity of alienation. In modern capitalist society, it is through schools that man is prepared to become the object, the commodity, labor. Education is to production what labor is to its products; education is the activity of alienation, the alienating activity which produces man as the commodity labor for capitalist production.

As Marx had utilized the concept of alienated labor to explain human alienation resulting from man's productive relations within the system of capitalist production; similarly, we may use the category of alienated labor to explain the existence and production of human alienation which results from man's relations within the system of education in capitalist society.

> Just as we have derived the concept of private property from the concept of estranged, alienated labour by analysis, so we can develop every category of political economy with the help of these two factors . . .[12]

First, what do we mean by education? In Marx's view there were two distinct modes or aspects of education in capitalist society: ideology and science. Both are as-

pects of mental production; however, ideology represents man's theoretical consciousness and science represents man's practical consciousness. Ideology, on the one hand, is man's inverted world consciousness, a "camera obscura," through which man's real relations in society are hidden; consequently, aiding the ruling class' control of the workers. Science, on the other hand, is based upon sense-perception and is capable of grasping the real relations which exist in nature and society. Although science first furthers human alienation by developing industry over man, it strives in its development toward a unification of man's knowledge, as one human and natural science.

Ideology in Marx's view described a particular relationship between man's ideas and the material basis of life in capitalist society. It should not be interpreted as a permanent state of affairs, nor a necessary limit imposed upon the development of all forms of thought in class society. In fact, according to Marx, the materialist conception of history represents precisely the opposite of this abstract bifurcation between thought and reality. Marx distinguished between real knowledge and science, e.g., the materialist conception of history, and the previous abstract, i.e., ideological, forms of thought:

> Where speculation ends--in real life--there real, positive science begins: the representation of the practical activity, of the practical process of development of men. Empty talk about consciousness ceases, and real knowledge has to take its place. When reality is depicted, philosophy as an independent branch of knowledge loses its medium of existence.[13]

Therefore, in Marx's own view, not all knowledge, even in class society, is necessarily ideological. The ruling ideas may well be those of the ruling class; but it is precisely against these abstract constructs, which attempt to hide the real relations between men and their activity, that real knowledge and science is directed. Consequently, in Marx's explicit doctrine on education, he advocated that all ideological and class influences be eliminated from public schools. In contrast, education and science were to play leading roles in socialist society.[14]

Returning to Marx's analysis of alienated labor and our discussion of education: the first aspect of human alienation which should be considered is that of the worker's relation to the products of his labor as alien objects. Within educational production, in capitalist society, there are two predominate relationships: the scholar's relationship to his intellectual and cultural products, including to the student's relationship to himself, as the commodity, the

object, labor.

The relationship of the scholar to his products, in capitalist society, is similar to that of the workers to their products, generally, Marx explained, "The class which has the means of material production at its disposal, consequently also controls the means of mental production, so that the ideas of those who lack the means of mental production are on the whole subject to it."[15] In short, scholars do not, in general, own the means of mental production. In fact, their productive activity is often regulated by the owners, either directly or through the state. In Capital, I, Marx pointed out that the social relations of mental production can be compared to those of material production:

> . . . If we may take an example outside the sphere of production of material objects, a school master is a productive labourer, when, in addition to be-labouring the heads of his scholars, he works like a horse to enrich the school proprietor. That the latter has laid out his capital in a teaching factory, instead of a sausage factory, does not alter the relation.[16]

Hence scholars are mental laborers, however much they might enjoy the facade of originality, independence, etc. which befuddles their working-class consciousness. The "bottom-line" is that the scholar produces intellectual and cultural products, commodities, generally for a wage (often called a salary). Her/his alienation as a worker is objectively clear in the fact that these products have little use-value for her/him, personally, and she/he has no real interest in their exchange because she/he has little or no capital invested in its production. In short, the scholar owns neither the means of mental production or its products and has only her/his labor-power to sell.

But not only is the scholar a mental laborer, she/he is also a material laborer. The scholar/educator's material is "man," taken as an object, as the commodity labor. The scholar/educator produces man in capitalist society according to the needs of capitalist production. That is, capitalist production needs technically educated and alienated labor.

This is one of the great oppressive triumphs of modern capitalist production. Marx's original notion of a working-class revolution was based upon the image of a rural peasant, who forced off the land and migrating to the urban

centers, would sell his labor-power; only to later revolt at the stifling and alienating conditions of capitalist industry. However, modern schooling has intervened upon the development of a potentially revolutionary class-consciousness. The worker is "pre-alienated" in schools. Not only in the historical reformist notion of learning to obey rules and accept authority and external rewards, but, more critically, because in capitalist education the future worker is made into the "self-acting, self-conscious commodity." In schools, the student is made into an alien object, both alien to her or himself and her/his own needs, and as alienated products of the scholar/educator's production as a capitalist worker.

Additionally, special consideration of the concept of alienation in the case of the student in capitalist education is required because the student is not merely produced as a commodity by the "teacher;" she/he must actively take part in the process by which she/he becomes an alien object. She/he must consider herself/himself solely as an object and labor to self-dehumanize, to self-squelch subjectivity and internal needs. His/her alienation is man's active alienation; the student's activity in schools is the activity of alienation.

Although the ideology of capitalist education has it that one's education is an invaluable possession, it is not education which is possessed by the learner, but rather the educated-laborer who is possessed. While the student perceives she/he is marketing her/his education in the capitalist marketplace, when one's education-labor is purchased, the individual goes with it--lock, stock, and barrel! Marx had summarized the effect of this alienating process:

> Therefore the greater this product, the less is he himself. The alienation of the worker in his product means not only that his labour becomes an object, an external existence, but that it exists outside him, independently, as something alien to him, and that it becomes a power on its own confronting him. It means that the life which he has conferred on the object confronts him as something hostile and alien.[17]

In capitalist society, the worker does not determine his productive needs nor its corresponding educational requirements. Therefore, his/her preparation for the needs of capitalist production, i.e., the need for technically educated and alienated labor, is in itself estranged and alien-

ated activity. The student/worker needs education because production has educational needs. "It is therefore not the satisfaction of a need; it is merely a means to satisfy needs external to it."[18] This is precisely the condition of human alienation in schools in capitalist society and, in many cases, precisely the attitude of the student. In this system, education has not intrinsic value, a good-in-itself, but provides only a means to something else--namely, money.

Of course, when man's species-activity, which gives life to the species, becomes a mere means of individual existence, then man has become separated from his real species-nature, whose character is "free, conscious activity." What follows for production, generally, also holds true for education. Man's separation and alienation from his species-life through education also means that he is separated and alienated from every other person in capitalist society. Observe, for example, how education, which is a social activity, is turned into a competitive relationship among students, an individual activity, a fight over the means-to-life in capitalist society.

In conclusion, I would like to state that in Marx's explicit doctrine on education, he clearly advocates that education play a significant role in the working class revolution. Based upon his view of science, he demanded education combined with technology and labor. In Capital, I he discussed the "Factory Acts" of England (1865), which required elementary education for child-laborers under the age of fourteen. Although critical of its meager educational requirement, Marx was impressed with its practical, educational results. Furthermore, he related this practical educational program to his theory concerning revolutionary education:

> From the Factory system budded, as Robert Owen has shown us in detail, the germ of the education of the future, an education that will, in the case of every child over a given age, combine productive labor with instruction and gymnastics, not only as one of the methods of adding to the efficiency of production, but as the only method of producing fully developed human beings. (Italics mine)[19]

Thus, Marx's theory of education, as revolutionary practice, is inseparably connected to his other social and political theories. The concept of "producing fully developed human beings" is an essential aspect of his theory of alienation; and the notion that education is "the only method" of ending alienation, indeed, requires our attention to the relationship between education and alienation.

In 1867 at a political meeting of the First International Working Men's Association, Marx discussed the role of schools in the communist movement. He turned to what was to be a central problem of materialism, i.e., the dilemma regarding education and social change:

> . . . there was a peculiar difficulty connected with this question. On the one hand, a change of social circumstances was required to establish a proper system of education; on the other hand, a proper system of education was required to bring about a change of social circumstances, we must therefore commence where we were.[20]

A revolutionary educational praxis begins with the changing of the circumstances of education itself! The struggle against the alienation inherent in capitalist production and class society cannot be singularly organized at the point of material production. In fact, according to this analysis of alienation and education, the factory may be already too late! Man is alienated in capitalist society, even prior to capitalist production, through schools. Moreover, education is an aspect of material production because labor is a material, a commodity, in capitalist society. Therefore, the scholar must not simply preach about class consciousness and social change in the classroom; as a worker, himself, he must grasp the material conditions directly at hand, abolishing the division of labor at first within the system of education. The ending of human alienation requires a comprehensive strategy aimed at both material production and the production of critical consciousness in schools. "To be radical is to grasp things by the root. But for man the root is man himself."[21]

FOOTNOTES

1. Karl Marx, "The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844," trans. by Martin Milligan and Dirk J. Struik, in Karl Marx (and) Frederick Engels: Collected Works (New York: International Publishers, 1975-) 3:276.
2. Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, The German Ideology, ed. by C. J. Arthur (New York: International Publishers, 1947), p. 42. Hereafter Collected Works.
3. Collected Works, 3:276.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid., p. 272.
6. Ibid., p. 274.
7. Ibid., p. 276.
8. Ibid., p. 277.
9. Ibid., p. 276.
10. Ibid., p. 277.
11. Ibid., p. 284.
12. Ibid., p. 281.
13. Karl Marx: Selected Writings, ed. David McLellan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), p. 165.
14. See The Karl Marx Library, ed. Saul K. Padover, VI: On Education, Women and Children (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1973), p. 36. Hereafter On Education.
15. The Marx-Engels Reader, ed. Robert C. Tucker (New York: W. W. Norton, 1972), p. 136.
16. Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, ed. F. Engels, trans. S. Moore and E. Aveling (New York: International Publishers, 1967), I:509. Hereafter Capital, I.
17. Collected Works, p. 272.
18. Ibid., p. 274.
19. Capital, I, pp. 483-4.

20. On Education, p. 32.

21. The Marx-Engels Reader, p. 18.

THE QUEST FOR INDIVIDUAL POWER: A RESPONSE TO SOCIAL ENNUI

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"No one does anything for anybody else without expecting to gain something in return."[1] This phrase sums up the philosophy of Robert J. Ringer, author of Winning Through Intimidation. The fact that this book was on the New York Times best seller list for eight months indicates that many Americans find this philosophy appealing. During the past several years there has been an epidemic of books that are aimed at helping individuals gain control of their lives. Last year Wayne Dyer's book, Pulling Your Own Strings, sold over 2,200,000 copies.[2] Ringer and Dyer's Books shared the best seller's lists with such other titles as: Power! How to Get it and How to Keep it, Looking Out for Number One, Taking Charge on the Job, How to be Your Own Best Friend, The End of Affluence: A Blueprint for Your Future and others. The popularity of these books rests on the same basic premis: There is an increasingly strong feeling on the part of many Americans that modern man has lost control of his own destiny.

I believe that modern American society is at the point of transition between what Tonnies called the Gemeinschaft and the Gesellschaft. For Tonnies, "man was by his very nature a social being who would unfold his essence only by living in communities of kinship, space (neighborhood), and spirit.[3] When he analyzed the relationship between man and his society he acknowledged that man was also capable of forming relationships that were based on agreements that were formed as a means to an end. Out of both of these types of relationships came certain rules for operation that developed into customs, ethics, mores and laws.

Of course, this dual social relationship was not originated by Tonnies. Eminent thinkers of antiquity, of past centuries and of the present have written that an individual relates to the world in two distinct ways and with two clearly defined mentalities. On the one hand, a person may relate with some individuals in an informal, personal, intimate manner. On the other hand, he may relate with other individuals in a formal, impersonal and structured manner.

People who have attempted to articulate this dicotomy have tended to construct a continuum bounded at the one end by the concept of interdependency and at the other by the concept of contractual relationships. Confucious spoke of the relationship of intimacy as the "great similarity" and the relationship of formality as the "small tranquility." Plato's ideal Republic versus the Capitalistic society, Aristotle's true friendship versus false friendship and St. Augustine's City of God versus the society of man, all reflect this perception of a basic duality in interpersonal relationships.

Although the idea of two modes of mentality did not originate with Tonnies, he gave the concept its clearest description in 1887 when he published his theory in Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft. In this work he attempted to develop a framework that could be used to grasp and analyze social order.[4]

Tonnies based his elaborate sociological theory on the two fundamental concepts of Gemeinschaft, usually translated as community, and Gesellschaft, usually translated as society. The former signifies a closely knit, generally self-sufficient, rural group, where individuals within the group know each other well, share common experiences and traditions and generally depend on one another. The latter is sharply contrasted as mass society with large groups of people that relate to each other only in formalized ways. In this type of relationship, people interact in a manner that is characterized as mechanical and rational.

Although Tonnies continually reminded his readers that his framework only described the process of change from Gemeinschaft to Gesellschaft, and that he was not recommending Gemeinschaft and condemning Gesellschaft, his work provides an ominous prophecy about the current and future state of human relationships.[5]

Tonnies referred to Gemeinschaft as the youth of society when things were less complicated, when each person had a sense of belonging, of self-worth, a sense of being in community with his neighbor. In this stage people knew their neighbors, were self-sufficient, shared a common value system and felt a sense of responsibility to each other and to their community. Gesellschaft is the stage of society's adulthood. In this stage personal relationships are fragmented, change is rapid, people have less in common with one another, and their allegiances and loyalities are diffused among many competing units.[6]

Although Tonnies followed an essentially economic interpretation of history, he assumed that all social relationships are created by human will. He believed that people make decisions on the basis of what they believe is in their own best interests. He described people as being willing to give up some of their autonomy in order to gain a desired end. He spoke in terms of means and ends. In the Gemeinschaft, relationships are valued as an end in themselves. In the Gesellschaft, things that used to be seen as ends become means to greater ends. With the shift from Gemeinschaft to Gesellschaft, actions stop being controlled by love, understanding, custom, respect, religion, folkways and mores and become motivated by a desire for more power. For Tonnies, the actions of Gemeinschaft man resembled "the organic function of growing things." Those of Gesellschaft man will be more apt to follow models or plans with logical precision.[7]

It is the premis of this paper that modern American society is making the transition from Gemeinschaft to Gesellschaft. With this transition comes a point of crisis. Value systems are splintering and crashing around us, while the life boats of family, church, and state are hurled madly about. Toffler speaks of our moving in a profoundly revolutionary way into a new civilization.[8] He believes that this is a period of which "all of our old assumptions, old ways of thinking, and old formulas, dogmas and ideologies, no matter how cherished or how useful in the past, no longer fit the facts."[9] We are currently in future shock, that "dizzying disorientation brought on by the premature arrival of the future."[10]

Packard has noted many of the ramifications of a greatly accelerated rate of change in society. He documented a sense of unconnectedness to either people or places. "Throughout much of the Nation there is a breakdown of community living. In fact, there is a general shattering of small-group life."[11] Our society has become transient and we have indeed become a "Nation of strangers." With this rapid change and the break down of a sense of community have come a series of secondary symptoms. Modern man is plagued by anxiety, depression, vague discontents, a sense of inner emptiness.[12] He is seeking a sense of control over his own life and his environment. This quest leads down such divergent paths as est, gestalt therapy, health foods, transcendental meditation, sex therapy, rolfing, yoga and even jogging. Each of these activities promises to give meaning to life. In addition to a plethoria of "how to" books on these and other subjects, there has grown a cult of philosophers around each activity. In

his book, The Culture of Narcissism, Christopher Lasch says that, "the world view emerging among use centers solely on the self and has individual survival as its goal."[13] He feels that a mood of pessimism exists that is spreading through our society.[14]

Recent events have severely shaken the confident image of the future that was once held by Americans. "As crisis after crisis has crackled across the headlines, as Iran erupted, as Mao was de-deified, as oil prices have skyrocketed, and inflation ran wild, as terrorism spread and governments seemed helpless to stop it, a bleak vision has become increasingly popular."[15] As a result of Americans being fed on a steady diet of bad news, disaster movies, apolcalyptic religious tracts and governmental incompetency - they have begun to conclude that contemporary society has no future. "For them Armageddon is only minutes away." The earth is racing toward its final cataclysmic shudder. This view of looking at the future generates privatism and passivity.[16] This sense of powerlessness is compounded as modern man has surrendered much of his rights in the ordering of control to others and with each new loss of freedom, the sense of powerlessness increases.

As people have lost faith in their leaders and have become aware of how little they control their own destiny, they have become haunted by a pervasive anxiety. This anxiety is caused by the processes of urbanization that have almost destroyed man's feeling of belonging to a community. The problems of developing and maintaining common or shared values (the basic ingredient of cohesion) is made vastly more difficult.[17] Technical change has pressed society toward greater material productivity with little consideration of the effects on social relations of local community. Individuals are suffering from alienation, depression, disillusionment, anomie, and a lack of a sense of personal self-worth. Man is losing his personal identity and essential dignity. He is being overwhelmed by forces of which he is only dimly aware, which subjugate him to a role of decreasing importance and present him with problems with which he has no means to cope.

"Superficially relaxed and tolerant, he finds little use for dogmas and at the same time forfeits the security of group loyalities and regards everyone as a rival for the favors conferred by a paternalistic state."[18] Lasch believes that, although modern man outwardly seems to support team work and cooperation, he harbors deeply antisocial impulses. Modern man is turning inward and has lost connection with the larger society. Self-improvement has re-

placed social improvement. Lasch feels that the horizon holds storm warnings that hint at catastrophe.[19] Because man has given up in despair at the prospect of improving society, he has given up any hope of improving his life in any way that really matters. Man has lost touch with the past and is afraid to look to the future, he lives for the moment.[20]

As the problems of society grow, man's belief in his own potency decreases. Poverty, racism, violence, hunger and inflation have increased at a rate that creates a feeling of hopelessness. Because modern man has lost faith in his ability to affect his environment, he has withdrawn into himself. "It is clear to many that the world is in trouble, and we're in trouble with it."[21] Ehrlich tells us that Americans should not just worry about their source of energy, but we should also be concerned about the quality, quantity, and price of our future food supplies. He believes that Americans will "soon be forced to make drastic changes in their eating habits. Not only will the supply be drastically reduced, but the cost of feeding yourself and your family will continue to increase."[22]

Historically, Americans have been conditioned to seek satisfaction and a sense of accomplishment by working hard. The Protestant work ethic held that success would come to those who were thrifty and industrious. In this age of diminishing expectations many people feel cheated. They feel that they have played the game by the rules and just as they neared the reward someone changed the rules of the game. This has resulted in a feeling of disorientation. Their psyche is continually jarred by the unfamiliar terrain and the multiple changes. The familiar guideposts no longer are reliable. As the horizon alters, many Americans are losing their focus on life. For many, self-preservation has replaced self-improvement as the goal of earthy existence.[23] Survival has replaced prosperity of a goal.

In an earlier time, man worked not only for personal wealth but also with a sense of contributing to the wealth of the community. People who lived together, in close proximity, instinctively responded to the needs of their neighbors. For the early American a sense of contributing to wealth of the community was very important. "For the Puritans a Godly man worked diligently at his calling not so much to accumulate personal wealth as to add to the comfort and convenience of the total community."[24] They recognized that a man might get rich at his calling, but they saw personal aggrandizement as incidental to social labor.

As communities began to grow and become more complex, these personal interactions and commitments began to diminish, and the people became less concerned with the welfare of their neighbors.

As reports of impending doom continue to filter down from think tanks and governmental officials, modern man has become increasing depressed and hopeless. There is a wealth of sociological and psychological studies that substantiate the belief that individuals develop a feeling of an inability to control their destiny when they perceive external forces to be too strong or too vague to control. If a person believes that his actions will affect the outcome of an event, he will continue to participate. However, if he believes that he cannot affect significant change, he may curtail all efforts to affect his environment.[25] Julian B. Rotter describes these beliefs as "internal control" versus "external control." If a person believes that a significant proportion of his life is controlled by luck, chance, fate or is under the power of others, this is an "external control" type of person. If, on the other hand, a person perceives that the event is the result of his own actions, he is referred to as an "internal control" type of person.[26] The latter type of person will tend to become involved in the various participatory processes in society. However, the person who sees chance or fate as the primary factor in the outcome of events is generally passive in orientation.[27] As society has become more complex and as man has become less able to significantly affect his destiny, he has become more passive.

All people are continually faced with the problem of deciding whether what happens to them is contingent on their behavior and can be controlled by their own actions, or whether it depends on luck, the intervention of strong outside forces, or influences that they cannot understand. As public voting percentages have declined, new consciousness movements have increased. Modern man has realized that there are a few new frontiers to conquer and few opportunities for meaningful decision making in society. Narcissism has become one of the central themes in contemporary America. A self-absorption has developed that helps to insulate modern man against the horrors around them.

Erich Fromm, in the Heart of Man, uses narcissism to include all forms of vanity, self-admiration, self-satisfaction, and self-gratification. However, for Lasch, narcissism has more in common with self-hate than with self-admiration.[28] For Lasch, modern narcissism is pathological, it is based on a dependence on the vicarious warmth

provided by others combined with a fear of dependence, a sense of inner emptiness, boundless and repressed rage.[29] As a result of this self-hate and sense of a lack of personal self-worth, the secondary characteristics of narcissism develop: pseudo self-insight, calculating seductiveness, nervous, self-depreciating humor.[30]

Lasch believes that contemporary narcissism is a result of modern man's rage at his powerlessness. Modern man attempts to compensate himself for his experiences of rage and envy with fantasies of wealth, beauty, and omnipotence. He begins to become very self-centered and develops with a kind of blind optimism. Lasch draws on recent clinical literature regarding the behaviors of an increasing number of patients who have diffuse dissatisfactions.

He believes that as a result of the menacing and uncertain future, modern man has lost a sense of self-worth and has taken on the new ethic of self-preservation.[32] For Lasch, modern man has become "indifferent to moral niceties, hoping to win your heart while picking your pocket."[33]

This new ethic is most clearly illustrated on the cover of Power: How to Get it and How to Keep it. Directly under the author's name is the following statement: "this book will get you a bigger raise, a better job, and total control over everyone around you."[34] Korda explains that before a person can play the power game, he must first clearly understand what power is. Korda believes that if a person is observant he can learn what is power from observing every aspect of life and every human exchange. He goes on to say that "the masters play the game twenty-four hours a day with parking lot attendants, spouses, lovers, head waiters, agents of the IRS, traffic policemen, their fellow workers, their superiors and their subordinates, instinctively trying to control every situation in which they find themselves and to place as much of an obligation as possible on the other person."[35] It is clear that this advice has radica ly departed from Cotton Mather's admonition that "every Christian had a general calling to serve God and a personal calling, by which his usefulness, in his neighborhood, is distinguished."

There are a large number of popular books that attempt to help modern man regain a sense of personal control of his life. Perhaps the most striking example of this appeal to narcissism is The Craft of Power by R. G. H. Siu. Siu begins the book by listing eighty-one statements that he refers to as "operational specifics." He follows

these eighty-one statements with a detailed discourse aimed at helping the readers to "expand their personal power."[36] To reinforce the importance that he places on learning how to use power, he states: "The one who is inept and faint-hearted only gets in the way and messes up the tournament grounds with his splintered lance and sorry carcass."[37] He goes on to admonish his readers to "grab more from those with more. Grab less from those with less. And counter-grab from those who grab from you."[38] This harkens back to Ringer's belief that every person is out to get you and you should always be on guard.[39]

Siu's basic philosophy is that power is the most important commodity and its successful implementation is the highest art form. He realizes that many people will reject his theory. And he warns the reader to "let not the wailing and groaning of the innocent weaken your will to win and keep."[40]

Perhaps the clearest statement of his concept of man's relationship to his fellow man is made in the section titled, "Vectoring Resources." People are to be used like fuel in the furnace of power, or cleared away like wornout gears for more efficient replacements, so that they burn with the requisite intensity, cleanse them of incombustible allegiances. Let the cadre prove its selfless commitment and offer up their persons as signed, undated blank checks in your strongbox."[41]

Siu's work and others of a similar thrust are clear indications that Tonnies' Gemeinschaft is rapidly being replaced by the impersonal, logical, formal relationships inherent in Gesellschaft. Contemporary American society is rapidly losing its sense of community. The effects of urbanization, industrialization, specialization, and technology have tended to destroy man's sense of relatedness, and to create a general malaise.

This loss of Gemeinschaft leaves our lives significantly depreciated and increases the rate of breakdown of conditions requisite to human dignity. The sense of powerlessness that has become the central issue in contemporary American culture will not be abated by Zen or health food or even Siu's book on the Craft of Power.

FOOTNOTES

1. Robert J. Ringer, Winning Through Intimidation, (New York: Fawcett Crest, 1974), p. 62.

2. Publishers Weekly, Vol. 217, No. 7, (February 22, 1980).

3. Ferdinand Tonnies, Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft, (trans. and ed.) C. P. Loomis, (New York: Harper & Row, 1963), p. lx.

4. Tonnies, Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft, p. vii.

5. Tonnies, Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft, p. 2.

6. Fred M. Newman and Donald W. Oliver, "Education and Community," Harvard Educational Review, Vol. 37, No. 1 (Winter 1967), p. 61-62.

7. Tonnies, Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft, p. 6.

8. Alvin Toffler, The Third Wave (New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1980), p. 18.

9. Toffler, The Third Wave, p. 18.

10. Alvin Toffler, Future Shock (New York: Bantam Books, 1971), p. 11.

11. Vance Packard, A Nation of Strangers (New York: Pocket Books, 1974), p. 1.

12. Christopher Lasch, The Culture of Narcissism (New York: Warner Books, 1979), p. 92.

13. Lasch, The Culture of Narcissism, p. 32.

14. Lasch, The Culture of Narcissism, p. 17.

15. Toffler, The Third Wave, p. 27.

16. Toffler, The Third Wave, p. 28.

17. Murray G. Ross, Community Organization: Theory and Principles (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1955), pp. 80-83.

18. Lasch, The Culture of Narcissism, p. 22.

19. Lasch, The Culture of Narcissism, p. 28.

20. Lasch, The Culture of Narcissism, p. 30.

21. Paul R. Ehrlich, The End of Affluence (New York: Ballantine Books, 1974), p. 141.

22. Ehrlich, The End of Affluence, p. 190.

23. Lasch, The Culture of Narcissism, p. 107.

24. Lasch, The Culture of Narcissism, p. 108.

25. Janice J. Weinman, Local Control over the Schools (unpublished Doctoral dissertation, Harvard University, 1970), p. 5.

26. Julian B. Rotter, Generalized Expectancies for Internal Versus External Control of Reinforcement (Psychological Monographs, 1966, Vol. 80, No. 69), pp. 1-43.

27. Rotter, Generalized Expectancies, p. 3.

28. Lasch, The Culture of Narcissism, p. 72.

29. Lasch, The Culture of Narcissism, p. 72.

30. Lasch, The Culture of Narcissism, p. 75.

31. Lasch, The Culture of Narcissism, p. 84.

32. Lasch, The Culture of Narcissism, p. 107.

33. Lasch, The Culture of Narcissism, p. 107.

34. Michael Korda, Power (New York: Ballantine Books, 1975), Cover.

35. Korda, Power, p. 6.

36. R. G. H. Siu, The Craft of Power, (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1979), p. viii.

37. Siu, The Craft of Power, p. 5.

38. Siu, The Craft of Power, p. 5.

39. Ringer, Winning Through Intimidation, pp. 60-62.

40. Siu, The Craft of Power, p. 6.

41. Siu, The Craft of Power, p. 13.

DEWEY ON MORALITY AND THE MORALLY EDUCATIVE*

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Dewey's views on ethics and moral education will be explored. His ideas on the latter shall be examined as corollaries of and as a means to understanding his ethical positions. In addition I shall address some general problems with the aid of a Deweyan perspective and vernacular. The juxtaposition of ethics and ethical issues in education throughout this paper shall enable us to make some rather general observations and raise some tentative conclusions concerning the relationship between philosophy, education, and philosophy of education.

In Outlines of a Critical Theory of Ethics Dewey observes:

> The first step in ethics is to fix firmly in mind the idea that the term moral does not mean any special or peculiar kind of conduct, but simply means practice and action, conduct viewed not partially, but in connection with the end it realizes.[1]

In Moral Principles in Education he writes:

> There is no fact which throws light upon the constitution of society, there is no power whose training adds to social resourcefulness is not moral.[2]

Dewey is attempting to make us think of moral conduct not as a separate type of conduct ("above and beyond" ordinary social conduct), but rather as a form of social conduct, i.e., "conduct viewed not partially but in connection with the end it realizes." Moreover, all social conduct, in that it involves social consequences is "moral conduct" when so conceived. This way of formulating matters has led some writers to express the underlying doctrine involved here as enunciating the coextensiveness of the social and moral spheres. It is, however, more important to see what Dewey is drawing our attention towards (e.g., the importance of

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considering consequences in "moral conduct"), and away from (e.g., "goody-goody" and "holier than thou" vies of morality), than to take him quite so literally.

The foregoing provides the clue for comprehending the meaning of "moral education" for Dewey. Needless to say the phrase 'moral education' is ambiguous. The current literature reveals a number of uses. It might refer to the task of (1) educating about morals (i.e., their nature, importance, etc.), or it might refer to (2) how the task of educating about morals (to increase knowledge or improve conduct) ought to proceed (here the connection between "moral" and "education" in 'moral education' would be understood in a vein similar to the way the connection between "mathematics" and "education" in 'mathematics education' is), or (3) it might refer to how education can best operate to serve the function of the moral development of students. For Dewey, there can be little doubt that (3) is the definition that interests him, insofar as it provides the definiens of moral education which should, in his view, be an integral part of the school's concern. In Moral Principles he accordingly provides us with the following definition of moral education: "the development of character through all the agencies, instrumentalities, and materials of school life."[3]

Dewey would insist upon the importance of the distinction between (2) and (3). If we read Moral Principles with an eye towards something resembling a system or program of moral education, we shall be rather disappointed. To talk in such terms, or to speak of "how the task of educating about morals ought to proceed," is to implicitly relegate the moral domain to a separate sphere, a move that would greatly displease Dewey.

Dewey's rejection of the first definition rests on his distinction between "ideas about morality" and "moral ideas." Moral education, in that it is concerned with influencing conduct, should be concerned not with "presenting ideas about morality" (which are, in a sense, following Whitehead, "inert ideas") but "moral ideas." "Moral ideas" are what Dewey refers to as "moving ideas" - ideas which have a force (i.e., an ability to influence conduct) gained from their connection with experience, unlike "ideas about morality" which are simply propositions which are "presented."[4] The distinction rings of the Wittgensteinian one between telling and showing - the latter of Wittgenstein's account, being the proper "method" for understanding ethics.

We now digress to some prior considerations important to an understanding of Dewey's ethical positions. We shall

be concerned with normative ethics, which I take to be threefold: (1) a theory of obligation, (2) a theory of value, and (3) a theory of moral-personhood.

The key to understanding theories (1) and (2) in Dewey is his conception of deliberation. In Human Nature and Conduct he writes:

> Deliberation is an experiment in making various combinations of selected elements of habits and impulses to see what various lines of possible action are really like.[5]

Deliberation thus stands in sharp contrast to overt action. Each impulse, each habit, is given its due as the individual tries to discover not so much what the best course of action is (a view that fails to recognize that a "course of action" is only fully known when its potential consequences are understood), but rather what courses of action are out there. In deliberation we reflect upon the consequences of our actions, how they will affect us and how they will bear on our future actions.

Deliberation ends with choice of a course of action. But again, this choice is best construed not as some final end, but rather as a way to act which best unifies the competing preferences involved in deliberation, most fully allowing for activities to be carried through. Dewey observes in Human Nature and Conduct how truly extraordinary it is that deliberation locates so quickly and precisely, and with such delicacy, the path to be taken to the unifying activity which culminates in choice. Part of this, no doubt, is a function of the fact that deliberation is concerned with the tendencies of our impulses and habits, where they "take us." Here is where principles are employed. We use principles something like summary rules or generalizations about past experiencing to help us determine the tendencies of our actions - what Dewey, in a different contextual setting (an epistemological one), refers to as "secondary experiencing" in Experience and Nature. It is not necessary to constantly consider all the particularities of each new situation; principles subsume much of the work to be done, even though they are subject to change and are capable of being overridden. This explains the references throughout Dewey's writings to the experimental and non-fixed character of morality.

In Human Nature and Conduct Dewey persuasively reponds to those who claim that deliberation is no different from the method of calculation of good found in the utilitarian model of his day. He says there can be but one (correct)

reply to the question: "What is the difference between deliberation and basing one's decisions on maximizing good?" "All the world of difference."[6] The contrast of the process of deliberation with the method of calculation of good found in the utilitarian model will serve to highlight certain important features of deliberation not commonly explored.

Implicit in the utilitarian account of deliberation is the initial identification of some goods and liabilities. One then tries to find which course(s) of action maximize(s) good. Simple calculation is done; the action which fares best in the plus column is the obligatory one. (Needless to say, there are versions of utilitarianism not very much like this, but our interest here is not in assessing utilitarianism per se but rather in obtaining a better hold on Dewey's concept of deliberation.)[7] How is this different from deliberation? In responding to this question Dewey paints the picture of an almost aesthetic mental act:

> The office of deliberation is not to supply an inducement to act by figuring out where the most advantage is to be procured. It is to resolve entanglements in existing activity, restore continuity, recover harmony, utilize loose impulses, and redirect habit. To this end, observation of present conditions, and recollection of previous situations are devoted. Deliberation has its beginning in troubled activity and its conclusion in choice of a course of action which straightens it out. It no more resembles the casting-up of accounts of profit and loss, pleasure and pains, than an actor engaged in a drama resembles a clerk recording debit and credit items in the ledger.[8]

Characterizing the difference in more concrete terms, we can speak of an inappropriate notion of calculation, and an ill-conceived relation between means and ends. On the first matter, Dewey correctly observes:

> Future pleasures and pains, even of one's own, are among the things most elusive of calculation. Of all things they lend themselves least readily to anything resembling a mathematical calculus. <u>And the further into the future we extend our view, and the more the pleasures of others enter into the account, the more hopeless does the problem of estimating future consequences become</u>. (my italics)[9]

In other words, the moment we begin to calculate we are embarking on a different enterprise than in deliberation. The purpose of the latter is to arrive at the good; we do not begin with it in some disguised form. Arguing from analogy - if calculation or manipulation is not the modus operandi of the artist; why should it be that of the moral agent? In both art and morality "the givens" are determined as we proceed - they are the products of an interactional process.[10]

Thus, we find in Dewey the makings of a persuasive argument against the idea of there existing "devices" in art and morality which provide desirable results in advance. (Paraphrasing matters in the vernacular of mathematical logic, we have here the basis for an argument against the "decidability" of the artistic and moral domains.)[11] A weak corollary of all this is plain, if not particularly gratifying: the educator has a subtle role to play qua moral-educator; he can no more show the student how to "be good" than the art teacher, for example, can merely indicate how to achieve a certain level of artistry. Acting morally requires sensitivity and intelligence. We should expect nothing less of moral education.

Opposing the dichotomous conception of means and ends in the utilitarian model, Dewey argues for a conception of means and ends as dialectically interdependent. Concerning ends, he writes:

> Ends are foreseen consequences which arise in the course of activity and which are employed to give activity added meaning and direct its course. They are in no sense ends of action.[12]

Ends then, function to define and direct our actions. By specifying our ends we do not specify what we end up with. Similarly, means engender consequences; hence, means are not void of effects in themselves as the slogan "the end justifies the means" seems to imply. That slogan, unduly honored by men's rhetoric and actions, assumes that there is always some single end of action. On this point Dewey observes:

> Not the end in the singular - justifies the means; for there is no such thing as the single all important end....It is not possible to adequately characterize the perversion of intelligence involved in refusal to note the plural effects that flow from any act, a refusal adopted in order that we may justify an act by picking out that one consequence which will enable us to do what we wish and for which we feel the need of justification.[13]

An agent who simply shoots for a certain end, disregarding completely the means employed, is acting fanatically rather than morally, just as an artist who merely aims for some final representation, his product at a later time in no way shaped by his product at an earlier time, is acting as a kind of human photostating machine, rather than artistically.[14]

Dewey is always seeking to direct our attention not to "the means" or "the ends" of an activity, but to the activity itself. His famous throwing/shooting and sailing examples are to the point here:

> Men do not shoot because targets exist, but they set up targets in order that throwing and shooting may be more effective and significant. A mariner does not sail towards the stars, but by noting the stars he is aided in conducting his present activity of sailing....[15]

Dewey's attacks on the means/ends dichotomy have significant import in the educational arena.[16] Any adequate treatment of the topic of educational goals or aims of education can hardly avoid prior considerations concerning the relation between means and ends. I shall consider here the bearings of the dichotomy on the matter of moral education.

Too often education is treated as the means to some end such as "getting ahead," graduating to the next grade, establishing one's intellectual superiority, etc. To conceive of education in such terms (i.e., as simply the vehicle to these things) is to miss its potential value, to say the least. Educational experiences which place the emphasis here, are, to borrow a term from Dewey's Experience and Education, "morally miseducative." Dewey observes in Moral Principles:

> Who can reckon up the loss of moral power which arises when there is the constant impression that nothing is worth doing in itself, but only as a preparation for something else, which in turn is only a getting ready for some genuinely serious end beyond?[17]

For these reasons, Dewey would protest against much of what falls under the rubric of "vocational education" today, although, in another sense, he felt that all education should be vocational. The difference is between education for vocation and education which utilizes the practical purport of its subject matter, wherever possible, to enrich

educational experience.[18]

We now move on to Dewey's theory of obligation. While an explicit analysis of sentences containing obligation terms is not to be found in Human Nature and Conduct, or in any of Dewey's later writings, an analysis of such propositions can be found in his Syllabus of Ethics. It is to be read with some caution, however, as the Hegelian element prominent here tends to be less conspicuous in the later Dewey.[19]

Dewey says that when we say we ought to do something, the thought expresses two ideas: (1) What one is obligated to do is in some sense "outside oneself," i.e., it is an act we may choose not to do. (2) If one acts in the way one ought to, one has chosen the course of action that allows for the best realization of oneself as an individual. The essence of obligation, Dewey holds, is that it rests in the dual nature of its initial externality (in that the action we are obligated to perform is one we may choose not to do) and its ultimate internality in that the action we are obligated to perform is the one which best allows for our self-realization.[20]

But what is the action which best allows for our self-realization? It is the one that results in the harmonious state of affairs that grows out of deliberation. This state is described in Dewey's ethical postulate and reflects both the pragmatism and Hegelianism at the core of his ethical views. He observes in his Syllabus:

> The ethical postulate, in other words, expresses the fact that moral experience continually demands of every agent that he shape his plans and interests so that they meet the needs of the situation, while it also requires that through the agent, the situation be so modified as to enable the agent to express himself freely.[21]

Too often in the educational setting, "obligation" is conceived of in terms of acting in accord with rules and conventions. Meeting one's obligations is not understood as something that enriches one's person. Thus obligation is interpreted as precisely what it is not (on Dewey's account), a system of constraints on the individual's freedom, imposed from without. Dewey comments on this in Moral Principles:

> Training is pathological when stress is laid upon correcting wrong-doing instead of forming habits of positive service. Too often the teacher's concern for the moral life of pupils takes the form of alertness for failures to conform to school rules and routines. These regulations, judged from the standpoint of the child at the time are more or less conventional or arbitrary. They are rules which have to be made in order that the existing modes of school work may go on: but the lack of inherent necessity in these school modes reflects itself in a feeling, on the part of the child, that the moral discipline of the school is arbitrary.[22]

A final metaphilosophical notes on Dewey's conception of obligation. Modern analytic philosophers would tend to look askance at Dewey's rendering of the meaning of obligation, particularly what would doubtless be seen as the dubious metaphysics of persons underlying it. It should be noted, however, that the meaning of a term can be broached in a distinctively educational way. We can include considerations of how it is we came to learn the term. Coming to grips with Dewey's theory of obligation in these terms, I believe that we will find his understanding of "obligation" to be both meaningful and fruitful.

We might describe this method as (a) looking at philosophy educationally. Philosophically important concepts are analyzed by appealing to the educational process. I take it that this is one of the tasks of philosophy of education and it can be contrasted with (b) educational issues, problems, concepts, etc., considered against a philosophical background or perspective and (c) educational issues providing a sensitizing context for the discussion of philosophical issues. (It strikes me that (a) and (c) provide legitimacy for there being a separate discipline of philosophy of education.)[23] (a) differs from (c) insofar as education is functioning as more than a mere means for obtaining a grasp on the meaning of philosophical concepts - in some contexts it provides the meaning of philosophical concepts. Looked at in a slightly different way, (b) and (c) conceive of education as "narrower" than philosophy whereas (a) sees education as being "broader" than philosophy.[24]

We leave the world of meta-philosophy and return to the world of philosophy with a discussion of Dewey's theory of value. In Human Nature and Conduct we find "good" defined:

> Good consists in the meaning that is experienced to belong to an activity when conflict and entanglement of various incompatible impulses and habits terminates in a unified orderly release in action.[25]

Also, something is said concerning the uniqueness of the good:

> In quality, the good is never twice alike. It never copies itself. It is new every morning, fresh every evening. It is unique in its every presentation....Only with a habit rigid to the point of immobility could exactly the same good recur twice.[26]

What sorts of things possess intrinsic value or intrinsic disvalue according to Dewey? In short, Dewey holds that nothing is intrinsically valuable to disvaluable.[27] (In particular, individual persons do not possess intrinsic value or disvalue.)[28] This view finds explicit statement in Essays in Experimental Logic,[29] but is hardly unexpected given Dewey's aversion to the idea of fixed ends in themselves.

Modern day contextualists seem to subscribe to the view that the only type of value is instrumental value. Richard Garner in Moral Philosophy writes:

> Thus the contextualist argues when it is questioned whether or not A is good, it is possible to prove that it is by showing that it leads to B, C, and D. If we want to show whether B is good, it is possible to prove that it is by showing what it leads to - A, C, and D.[30]

Sidney Hook observes in his essay "The Desirable and Emotive in Dewey's Ethics":

> ...whenever we are mature enough to make a decision or even begin to be puzzled, we never start de novo or from scratch. We carry with us a heavily funded memory of things previously discovered to be valuable, ends or goods to which we feel committed as prima-facie validities. The list will not be the same for everybody or for any one all the time, but it will contain values like health, friendship, security, knowledge, art, amusement, in their plural forms.[31]

It should be noted that there are two candidates for

"objects" possessing intrinsic value in Dewey. One is the harmonious resolution of conflict, the desired outcome of deliberation. Here, Dewey might have a provocative reply. He might argue that it is only vis-à-vis a reductionist perspective that one would think that the resolution of conflicts has intrinsic value. It is valuable, as are many things, but since it appears to be basic to value itself, we should not make the mistake of believing that it has intrinsic value. Resolution of conflict has value within a certain context, i.e., the deliberative endeavor, it is not intrinsically valuable.

The second candidate for an object having intrinsic value is the elusive but ever important notion of "growth" that shows up in so many of Dewey's educational writings. Indeed, in Reconstruction in Philosophy he seems to say as much: "...growth itself is the only moral 'end'...."[32] I believe that Dewey could still defend his position by arguing along the lines that "growth" is no one thing, i.e., it cannot even be properly construed as an object possessing intrinsic value.[33] This point of view will be developed and examined shortly. Let us simply note at this point that there is an apparent inconsistency in Dewey on this question. Letting Dewey speak for himself again by returning to an earlier quote, starkly reveals the general problem:

> Who can reckon up the loss of moral power which arises when there is the constant impression that nothing is worth doing in itself....[34]

I think the problem can be resolved however. For sure there is a sense in which nothing is valuable in itself, and at the same time a sense in which value is not merely a matter of extrinsic connections. The key thing to be noted is that to say that objects are valuable, while not intrinsically valuable, does not commit one to the position that they are instrumentally valuable. How can something have a value which is neither instrumental or intrinsic?

An example may make matters clearer here. Suppose that Johnny is a rather undisciplined person, doing rather badly in school. He makes and goes forward with a decision to commence studying in a serious, systematic fashion. Suppose further that the particular way in which he studies is something we would agree has value. Now "studying" is not intrinsically valuable; it is easy enough to imagine contexts in which studying would not only not be valuable, but would be disvaluable. Nor can we simply reduce the value found in Johnny's studying to its intended effects. These are part of what makes the act of studying important, but

not all. The studying itself is also important. It is important then to understand the studying and the entire context in which the act is taking place. Once the action and context are fully understood, it becomes almost analytic that the activity has value.[35] In fact, when we first place meaning on the proposition "studying has value," we automatically fix an appropriate context in which the proposition is true. (This underscores the primary of context, of fully blown situations.) And the activity of studying is an essential part of that context. We might say that while studying itself does not have intrinsic value, studying within a certain context may. Let us call this type of value <u>contextual</u> value.

The account just offered differs from that of the "contextualist" mentioned earlier in one important respect. While the contextualist does not believe in the existence of "intrinsic values," he still maintains that value is instrumental, i.e., that the value of an activity is derivative on (or can be defined on the basis of) what it leads to. Here we maintain that an activity <u>in a certain context</u> is what has value; value is not a matter of "extrinsic" connections, even when those connections are conceived themselves as instrumental.

Aren't we still left with the problem of whether "growth" has intrinsic value? I think not. It is important to realize that "growth" is the name for situations of a certain kind which by definition have value - activities where there is growth necessarily are valuable ones. "Growth," in short, names no one activity or "object." There is no inconsistency whatsoever in maintaining that nothing has intrinsic value and in holding that activities or processes where there is "growth" are valuable in more than an extrinsic sense.

Finally something should be said about the nature of discussions which are couched in terms of intrinsic and instrumental values. Such talk exemplifies a kind of "ethical foundationalism" which implicitly gives credence to moral relativism. Value, we are told, comes in two categories. There is a more complex sort, "instrumental value," which has value on the basis of its connection with a more basic kind of value, "intrinsic value." We think of value as ultimately being founded on or reducing to "intrinsic value." Skepticism about intrinsic values (which may be quite justified) entails then a skepticism about whether <u>anything</u> has value. Epistemological foundationalism works in an analogous way.[36] Knowledge that p (propositional knowledge) is said to be derivative on

knowledge of certain "basic" propositions which are understood to be incorrigible. Skepticism about basic propositions (which too may be quite justified) entails epistemological skepticism. In ethics and epistemology, we would do well to avoid such doubts. This can be done by taking seriously what our theories are about.[37] No setting is better than the educational one for providing such a perspective. As we see others becoming better persons, engaging in valuable activities, i.e., becoming "morally educated," how can we be moral relativists? As we see individuals learning, thinking, becoming knowledgeable, how can we be epistemological skeptics?

Let us now return to the crucial notion of harmony by considering three criticisms of it. (1) Dewey can go either of two ways with harmony. He can opt to define it in terms of more basic value terms, or he can define it in value-neutral terms. The latter course leaves us with the problem that Dewey is ultimately only providing us with a notion of subjective good, obligation, etc. If harmony is defined in value-neutral terms; what, for example, prohibits us from saying that Hitler, acting in a way that resolved conflict for himself, while committing some atrocity, was doing what was good? (The problem of the Hitler-type action poses the same difficulties for "harmony" as the problem of the burglar for Dewey's conception of education as growth.) Dewey would thus seem to be forced into the former approach, but his very theory of value appears to make this an untenable move.

(2) The requirement that 'obligation,' 'good,' etc., always involve an element of discord is too stringent. For example, could we not properly say that I am obligated to do all that I can to save a dying child's life even though there may be no 'conflict' in need of resolution? Moreover, 'good' appears to have sundry uses (e.g., 'good person,' 'good action,' 'good institution') while Dewey is apparently paying homage to only one - 'good (situation that results out of the harmonious resolution of conflict).'

(3) Dewey speaks almost religiously of "the harmonious state of affairs" resulting out of deliberation. Such talk presupposes: (1) Such a state can always be arrived at vis-à-vis deliberation, and (2) the course of action chosen to produce harmony is uniquely determined by the underlying circumstances in their entirety. Both of these assumptions would appear to require argumentation which Dewey does not provide. It hardly seems out of the realm of reason that situations are such that no matter what course of action an agent chooses, conflict and tension remain. Nor does it

seem impossible that two entirely different courses of action can serve to restore harmony equally well, in two very different ways (different problems, tensions, entanglements, conflicts, being resolved, for example).

Serious as these criticisms may be, I would maintain that Dewey's theory of deliberation is of enormous value nonetheless. This stems from the fact that his descriptions keenly mirror the kind of activities we engage in when acting morally. For sure we do not have a "logically pure" or final characterization of the nature of value or obligation (and one can only wonder if such a characterization is even possible). But we do have something quite important. Philosophy, Descartes and many contemporaries notwithstanding, is not to be done in an empirical vacuum.

Dewey, on the other hand, well understood that for a philosophical problem to be meaningfully formulated, it had to be conceived in terms of our shared experiences. And it then must be solved (or more often "dissolved") in the lexicon of experience. (Indeed "experience" plays as trenchant a role for Dewey as language for Wittgenstein.)[38] The import of this for ethics is clear enough. For those of us who already have some conception of the kinds of considerations which are relevant in the area of morality, Dewey's theory enhances our capacity to act morally by holding up an exquisite portrait of ourselves qua moral agents. In short, it is of unquestionable educational value.

Finally, it should be conceded that as an ordinary language analyst of such terms as 'good' or 'obligation,' Dewey failed. And he would be proud of that failure. He was decidedly not trying to do ordinary language philosophy. Philosophy for Dewey sought to transcend the ordinary; it sought to be insightful. I do not wish to make Dewey immune from criticism. He can be confronted. I suspect, however, that as with all great philosophers, that confrontation must be on his own terms.

Some writers conceive of normative ethics as consisting of a theory of value and a theory of obligation. Dewey was much too interested in the character of deliberative, purposeful, intelligent, sensitive conduct for us to leave matters simply at that. For these reasons, I incorporate under the rubric of normative ethics what I refer to as Dewey's theory of moral-personhood.

Dewey does not provide us with a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for "good-personhood" or a recipe for the moral life. He does however emphasize and draw our

attention to certain general features of, or rather prerequisites for, moral conduct. Here, I wish to discuss three of these - the role of social intelligence, the importance of an affective component in moral conduct, and the need for (wherever it is necessary) redirecting our habits.

The experimental character of morality mentioned earlier makes intelligence a necessary condition for moral behavior. Early on Dewey conceived of intelligence as the capacity to see similarities and congruities between apparently diverse things and the ability to appreciate and recognize elements of difference amongst very similar objects.[39] In the area of morality, it is clear why this two-headed creature would be most important. For we must always be awake to new circumstances, the reactions of others to our conduct, and the character of our own impulses and habits. Being cognizant of the present situation and our changing selves involves the second function of intelligence. In judging and understanding others, it is important to see similarities with ourselves. This involves the first function.

Too often intelligence is seen as cold and aloof, its office separate from the office of moral conduct. Here, since intelligence is clearly not a sufficient condition for moral conduct, the fact that it is a necessary one goes overlooked. Deliberation is a precondition for moral conduct and the act of deliberating requires intelligence. As Dewey tells us in Human Nature and Conduct:

> Impulse does not know what it is after; it cannot give orders even if it wants to. It rushes blindly into any opening it chances to find.... What intelligence has to do in the service of impulse is to act not as its obedient servant but as its clarifier and liberator. And this can be accomplished only through a study of the conditions and causes, the workings and consequences of the greatest possible variety of desires and combinations of desires. Intelligence converts desires into plans, systematic plans based on assembling facts, reporting events as they happen, keeping tab on them and analyzing them.[40]

In short, we live in a world where our actions engender consequences for ourselves and others, materially and psychologically. Good intentions alone are not enough. One can have the best of intentions and fail to adequately assess the plight of others by unintelligently considering the consequences of one's actions. In Dewey's phraseology, good

intentions are "goody-goody," they are not good. Again, intelligence rather than being unrelated to moral conduct, as so many think, is a necessary condition for it. Moreover, for Dewey, education's primary concern is inculcating the habit of intelligence.

Above and beyond intelligence, what is required of moral conduct is what Dewey refers to as "force of character." This embodies an important affective constituent whose importance Dewey clearly perceived. In an inspiring passage in Moral Principles he writes:

> But the consciousness of ends must be more than merely intellectual. We can imagine a person with most excellent judgment, who yet does not act upon his judgment. There must not only be force to insure effort in execution against obstacles, but there must also be a delicate personal responsiveness - there must be an emotional reaction. Indeed good judgment is impossible without this susceptibility. Unless there is a prompt and almost instinctive sensitiveness to conditions, to the ends and interests of others, the intellectual side of judgment will not have the proper material to work upon. Just as the material of knowledge is supplied through the senses, so the material of ethical knowledge is supplied by emotional responsiveness. It is difficult to put this quality into words, but we all know the difference between the character which is hard and formal, and one which is sympathetic, flexible, and open. In the abstract the former may be as sincerely devoted to moral ideas as the latter, but as a practical matter we prefer to live with the latter. We count upon it to accomplish more by tact, by instinctive recognition of the claims of others, by skill in adjusting, than the former can accomplish by mere attachment to rules.[41]

A person may be intelligent and possess the emotional sensitivity necessary for moral conduct and yet still be privy to a bad habit such as compulsive gambling.

Dewey provides us with an interesting analysis of habits and their role, and the means to do away with bad habits. In Human Nature and Conduct Dewey tells us:

> A bad habit suggests an inherent tendency to action, and also a hold, command over us.... It overrides our formal resolutions, our conscious

> decisions. When we are honest with ourselves we acknowledge that a habit has this power because it is so intimately a part of ourselves. It has a hold upon us because we are the habit.[42]

The analysis of 'bad habits' in terms of their proclivity to take a hold over us hardly seems right. Cannot a 'good habit' exhibit the same tendency? Perhaps we would not want to say that a good habit "takes a hold" over us, but this is only because of the pejorative connotation of 'takes a hold.' It would appear that the consequences of a given habit provide a sounder criterion for determining whether it is or is not a good habit. To turn one of Dewey's examples against him here, we might observe that poor posture is indeed poor posture because of the biologically bad effects it engenders rather than its proclivity to take a hold over us. In the case of his analysis of "bad habits" once again "Dewey the instrumentalist" made the mistake of attempting to define something on the basis of intrinsic characteristics alone, failing to consider extrinsic connections.

The conventional wisdom is to think of bad habits as having developed accidentally and as things we cannot control. As such we think of them as not reflecting our "true selves" and as things we cannot be held responsible for. In a passage containing a characteristically fabulous mixture of philosophizing and psychologizing, Dewey provides a very different view of the matter:

> These traits of a bad habit are precisely the things which are most instructive about all habits and ourselves. They teach us that all habits have projectile power, and that a predisposition former by a number of specific acts is an immensely more intimate and fundamental part of ourselves than are vague, general, conscious choices.[43]

How is it that we come to "break a bad habit"? The key thing to be noted is the positive force of a bad habit. Forces are operative which tend towards bad results. Poor posture, for example, is not the absence of good posture, so much as it is the proclivity to hold one's posture in a certain way. Here is the clue for understanding Dewey's prescription for breaking bad habits. He writes in Human Nature and Conduct:

> We must stop thinking of even standing up straight. To think of it is fatal, for it commits us to the operation of an established habit

> of standing wrong. We must find an act within our power which is disconnected from any thought whatsoever about standing. We must start to do another thing which on one side inhibits our falling into the customary bad position and on the other side is a series of acts which may lead him into the correct posture. . .[44]

If moral education is concerned with developing good character, then one should expect that remarks concerning the nature and meaning of good character should have application to the conduct of moral education. In attempting to show that they do, I shall fall victim to what is an easy and perhaps irresistible temptation with Dewey, describing what he would have said. In this case, I think what I shall do can be justified on the grounds that I will "apply" remarks he made time and time again in other contexts straightforwardly to the domain of moral education.

Dewey would emphasize the importance of the school developing social intelligence as compared to "reason" and no doubt would be wary of moral education programs which emphasize "moral reasoning." Moreover, he would take it as a major task in moral education to avoid methods and a mode and style of teaching which lead to a false dichotomy between the cognitive and the affective, between "thought" and "feeling." And the best way to do this, as we shall shortly see, is to develop positive methods which show us that "thought" and "feeling," "reason" and "emotion," and so forth, are not disparate. For Dewey those methods center around emphasizing the social character of knowledge.

In general, Dewey's analysis of how it is we come to change our habits, draws as an important corollary for moral education, an emphasis on positive methods. Briefly, if we wish to achieve more of X (punctuality, courage, etc.) where not-X is prevalent, the best way is not to focue on "X-doings" but rather to induce the student to become involved in some other activities which may lead indirectly to X.

Dewey was well aware of the fact that the child passes through various stages of moral development and that education must take its clue from where the student "is at."[45] We find Dewey sounding something like Piaget and Kohlberg when in Moral Principles he writes:

> In the first place, all conduct springs ultimately and radically out of native instincts and impulses. We must know what these instincts and

> impulses are, and what they are at each particular stage of the child's development, in order to know what to appeal to and what to build upon.... We must study the child, in other words, to get our indications, our symptoms, our suggestions.... We must know what history, geography, and mathematics mean in psychological terms, that is, as modes of personal experiencing, before we can get out from them their moral potentialities.[46]

Dewey does not perform the Herculean task of elaborating in concrete detail what this means for pedagogy and curriculum - what is significant, however, is that he clearly understood that for subject matter to be presented in such a way that it had moral import, it was of paramount importance to understand the moral development of the child.

For Dewey, the social character of education is the main "ingredient" in moral education. He observes in Moral Principles that "apart from participation in school life, the school has no moral end or aim."[47] Schools have recognized the importance of inculcating social values in education but have translated this, unfortunately, into educating for "citizenship." "The social work of the school is often limited to training for citizenship and citizenship is narrowly interpreted as meaning capacity to vote intelligently, disposition to obey laws, etc."[48] The mistake here is manifest. Dewey writes:

> To pick out one of many social relations which the child bears, and to define the work of the school by that alone, is like instituting a vast and complicated system of physical exercise which would have for its object simply the development of the lungs and the power of breathing, independent of other organs and functions.[49]

Another mistake is to educate for preparation into social life. On either of three interpretations, Dewey looked with great disfavor at the approach suggested by this phrase. The case where "education for preparation" is understood as "education for vocation" has already been discussed.

If we treat education for preparation into social life as education which maximizes the individual's ability to "fit in," so to speak, no one objected more than Dewey. Education in the true sense is a liberating experience, enabling the individual to determine which aspects of society are coterminous with his interests and purposes and those which he may wish to change, adapt, or reject. In addition

to being part of an already given and structured society, the individual helps to determine what the society he will be a part of should look like. There are aspects of society which are undemocratic, and ultimately even asocial, which we should certainly not be "preparing for."

Along these lines, one must not make the mistake of treating all "social activities" as qualitative equals. While it is fairly obvious that some activities are not genuinely social, indeed even dangerous to the interests of the society at large (e.g., membership in the Ku Klux Klan), it is not so perspicuous that all social activities may be (roughly) scaled according to their social value.

A distinction implicit here is between activities which are social in a descriptive sense and those which are social in a normative sense. Let us say that an activity is social in the descriptive sense if it is simply an activity which is collectively engaged in. On the other hand, an activity is social in the normative sense if it is social in the descriptive sense; and, as a result of their interactions with others, the people engaged in the activity grow or mature. We are all familiar instinctively and intuitively with the difference here. Yet too often we assume that there is some value in involvement in an activity if it is social merely in the descriptive sense. Even on occasions when we have (for good reason) been repeatedly dissatisfied with an activity, we speak of the unlimited value of "learning from experience," as if all experience was educative. Indeed for Dewey an important function of education is to educate in such a way that the student understands the differences between experiences which are educative and those which are not educative or are miseducative.

A third way to understand the "education for preparation into social life" dictum is to see "preparation" as an activity always antecedent to social activity. If Johnny is to become moral, then, on this view, he must first learn about trait A (e.g., duty, responsibility), trait B (altruism), etc. Such a view separates knowledge from action, the moral context from the social context, and invariably leads to the institutionalization of programs which lay emphasis on the negative - correcting wrong-doing. In contrast to this, Dewey proposes that the "only way to prepare for social life is to engage in social life."[50]

It is easy to misunderstand Dewey here. As we have just stressed, Dewey was well aware of the great evil in some "social activities." When Dewey says that the only "preparation for social life is social life" he means that

for those activities which are genuinely social (e.g., working together, making friendships, etc.) one can only begin to understand and appreciate the nature, difficulties, and value of the activities by direct involvement. The situations are social - their meanings derive from one's interactions with others. It follows that they cannot be fully understood or appreciated apart from one's participation in them. The individual must exercise intelligence to avoid miseducative experiences. But while intelligence is most often sufficient to tell an individual which activities to avoid, it is not sufficient to convey the nature and value of socially meaning activities. That requires involvement, experiencing.

Something of a "moral education paradox" should be considered now. We may speak of (1) a problem from the point of view of the teacher, i.e., the putative "moral-educator" and (2) from a social point of view. (1) may be conceived as follows. Isn't a prerequisite for effective moral education that those doing the moral educating are themselves moral? Teachers can be as moral or immoral as their students - how can we therefore trust such a task to them? Furthermore, in the absence of any definitive criteria as to who is or is not moral, how is moral education generally possible? This is the personal paradox of moral education. (2) may be thought of in this way. Some activities are morally educative, others are morally miseducative. In the absence of definitive criteria for knowing whether or not an activity will turn out to be morally educative, don't we always run the risk of fostering social activities which will turn out to be morally educative, don't we always run the risk of fostering social activities which will turn out to be morally miseducative under the guise of "moral education"? Is the Deweyan dictum that "morality is social" educationally meaningful? This is the social paradox of moral education.

There are many interesting background assumptions behind these objections. Considerations of space do not allow as detailed an analysis of these criticisms as one might like. I hope, however, I shall approach some of the questions raised here in a manner that quickly goes to the heart of the problem.

Dewey could, I think, respond to the objection raised in (1) in two ways. Quite justifiably, he could emphasize that his conception of moral education downplays the role of the teacher and emphasizes the role of "the social." Perhaps considerations such as those implicit in the objec-

tion in (1) are part of the rationale of this analysis. (One consideration, already mentioned, the importance of "showing" as compared to "telling" is certainly important in this regard.) Secondly, he would point out that there are certain things that the teacher can be aware of (e.g., the importance of involvement in certain kinds of activities, avoiding some of the errors mentioned) which can help him in his role as moral-educator, indeed greatly so. To say this is in no way inconsistent with the simple fact that the teacher due to his own "moral constitution" may not be a positive influence. This cannot be denied. So the burden of argument for Dewey must shift to the objections raised in (2) - "the social" needs vindication as an effective and implementable source of moral education.

Dewey must acknowledge that it is often difficult to know ahead of time whether or not certain social activities will be morally miseducative. He would no doubt note that this does not mean that intelligent choices cannot be made, but more importantly I believe he would raise the following point. Social activities of a very simple kind (e.g., two individuals working together on a project in wood-shop) can be very potent morally. It is no coincidence that the examples of morally educative activities we find in Moral Principles invariably seem to be of this type. If we find activities where interaction and cooperation are essential to the very enterprise (and which involve a modicum of other factors), the prospects for positive experiences are great.

It strikes me that all moral education programs (insofar as they aim to improve conduct) must make an assumption somewhere along the line, to the effect that "morality is infectious." For Dewey, social situations nurture and spread the infection. Dewey was a great believer in "democracy" in its social sense. He saw moral conduct as the concomitant of people engaged in meaningful activities, working together, and sharing common interests. Man as a social being could only realize himself in the social setting: as language is impossible outside of society so too is morality.

For sure at some point the student must learn how to be selective about the social situations and activities which he enters, and experience with "simple situations" is never ultimately sufficient for this. However, nothing is quite so important as "spreading the infection" in the first place and here is where simple situations have an important role to play. Once the student grasps the social character of morality much of the necessary work of moral education has been done.

Objections (1) and (2) do raise limits on what schooling or education in general can do. It should always be remembered though that limits and lack of guarantees do not imply that nothing or nothing of great value can be done. They only mean that intelligence becomes more important and that the challenge is ever greater than it first appears.

Although he did not see schooling as a panacea, Dewey was a great believer in its ability to play a pivotal role in the social development of individuals. This is, I believe, the central theme of his great classic Democracy and Education. And he was well aware of the possible ill-effects of education, witness the following passage from his Sources of a Science of Education:

> The increasing number of insane and neurotics is itself evidence of great failure and evil in our educational processes, parental and scholastic. Even more significant is the discovery in psychiatry itself of the number of morbid displacements, injurious to both happiness and social usefulness, found in persons called normal. Conventional and traditional methods, in instruction and discipline, are continuously engaged in manufacturing morbid fixations and dislocations. But when the latter reveal themselves they are usually attributed to some element of defect or perversity, inherent in the human nature of those taught, while in fact by far the greater part of them are induced growths, having their cause in the relations set up in social contact.[51]

Dewey defines a study as "a means to bringing the child to realize the social scene of action."[52] He emphasizes that subjects be studied from the point of view of their relevance and impact on mankind's conscious experiences. Otherwise, subjects as such are void of moral content. Any study (e.g., algebra, physics, geometry), from this point of view, is a potential source for improving (or worsening) conduct. Consider, for example, Dewey's remarks concerning mathematics-education in Moral Principles:

> I take one more illustration, namely mathematics. This does, or does not accomplish its full purpose according as it is, or is not, presented as a social tool. The prevailing divorce between information and character, between knowledge and social action, stalks upon the scene here. The moment mathematical study is severed from its place which it occupies with reference to use in social life, it becomes unduly abstract,

> even upon the purely intellectual side.... Back of this and that and the other bad method is the radical mistake of treating number as if it were an end in itself, instead of the means to accomplishing some end. Let the child get a consciousness of what is the use of number, of what it is really for, and half the battle is won. Now this consciousness of the use of reason implies some end which is implicitly social.[53]

In advanced mathematics a distinction is made between "pure" and "applied mathematics" and those whose interests are "applied." Was Dewey merely speaking for the second group and ignoring or disvaluing the concerns of the first? In answering this question, I hope to deal with the more general claim that Dewey placed too much emphasis on practical studies, underestimating or failing to appreciate the place of theoretical work.

The answer to this question is strongly in the negative. It is the way the distinction is engrained in our usage which is defective. That is not to say that there is not some merit or basis to this distinction. There are cogent reasons for saying that individuals whose interests lie in differential equations that "applied" interests while those whose lie in mathematical logic or point-set topology, for example, have "pure interests." In the former field, one is often directly involved with problems that touch on the concerns of "ordinary life" (building bridges, fluid dynamics, electric circuits, etc.) whereas the same cannot be said of the latter two fields.

But even pure mathematics is "impure," not in a projorative sense, but in the sense that one is always engaged in activities for some purpose. The recursive function theorist proving a theorem is extending the architetonic of recursive function theory. The recursive function theorist's end-in-view (providing a proof of some result) is not social in the short view of things, but it is in the long run view, in that he is contributing to a field which itself has indirect social value based on the contributions it makes to other fields. This aside, the fact that he is engaged in a purposeful activity, making intelligent choices, is rendered murky by the popular interpretation of the pure/applied dichotomy. A picture is painted of a theorist who inhabits a world of his own, whose actions are somehow differently motivated. (Here is an example of where mathematics-pedagogy can be morally miseducative. Because mathematics and moral education do not appear to be intimately connected we should not think the <u>teaching of mathematics</u> and moral

education are unrelated.) In fact, the pure mathematician is solving problems just like the applied one, and his effectiveness is gauged by the same canons. Indeed, we might say that the applied mathematician's work is "impure" in that his end-in-view (we may assume) is solving the particular problem he is working on, not the social concerns which generated it, from which it ultimately derives value nonetheless.

We see then that Dewey's incisive comments concerning the teaching of the concept of "number" to the child, with its implicit Wittgensteinian undertones of "meaning as use," extend to the purview of advanced mathematics and quite obviously other fields as well. Dewey was not only drawing our attention to and emphasizing the importance of engaging in socially meaningful activities, but to the great value of engaging in purposeful activities in general. The minute we do things and bestow value on things without cognizance of purpose, we implicitly strike a note against "the social" and on behalf of the "unduly abstract." An abstract concept of number is virtually without meaning to the young child. Not so to the mathematician. Dewey would have attacked the pure/applied dichotomy, not the work of the "pure" or "applied" mathematician. And more generally Dewey looked with disfavor not at those doing "theoretical" or "practical" work but at the theory/practice dichotomy.

Dewey's closing paragraph in Moral Principles provides a fitting conclusion for this paper:

> The one thing needed is that we recognize by observing, that moral principles are real; that they are inherent in community life, and in the working structure of the individual. If we can secure a genuine faith in this fact, we shall have secured the condition which is alone necessary to get our educational system all the effectiveness there is in it. The teacher who operates in this faith will find every subject, every method of instruction, every incident of school life pregnant with moral possibility.[54]

Dewey has presented us with what would now be a refreshing conception of moral education - moral education going on within the fabric of the school as it already is. There is no need for a separate program of moral education as school life already finds itself "pregnant with moral possibility."

FOOTNOTES

1. John Dewey, "Outlines of a Critical Theory of Ethics," appearing in John Dewey: The Early Works, 1882-1898; 3: 1889-1892 - Early Essays and Outlines of a Critical Theory of Ethics. (Carbondale and Edwardsville, Southern Illinois University Press, 1969), p. 242.

2. John Dewey, Moral Principles in Education. (New York: Philosophical Library, Inc., 1959), p. 43.

3. Ibid., p. 4.

4. Ibid., p. 2.

5. John Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct: An Introduction to Social Psychology, The Modern Library (New York: Random House, 1930), p. 190.

6. Ibid., p. 201.

7. Indeed, some recent versions of so-called "rule utilitarianisms" offer a conception of ethical decision-making processes that sound quite "deliberative." See, for example, the kind of utilitarianism defended by Richard Brandt in his article "Toward a Credible Form of Utilitarianism" appearing in Introductory Readings in Ethics, edited by William K. Frankena and John T. Granrose. (Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1974).

8. John Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct, p. 199.

9. Ibid., p. 203.

10. Let me make the analogy here a little more explicit. In Art as Experience, Dewey describes the artist as a producer whose actions engender esthetic consequences. Just as the ethical agent is harmonizing means and ends in his imagination in the course of deliberation, the artist is engaged in harmonizing what he wants to produce with the esthetic effects it engenders. Dewey writes: "The doing or making is artistic when the perceived result is of such a nature that its qualities as perceived have controlled the question of production." See John Dewey, "Having an Experience," appearing in The Philosophy of John Dewey: The Lived Experience edited by John J. McDermott. (Longman Canada Limited, Toronto, 1973), p. 566.

11. I have in mind here something along the following lines. In logic we define a set E of well-formed propositions to be decidable relative to a domain D if and only if there exists a recursively specifiable procedure for determining whether or not an arbitrary element of E is an element of D. We might say, for example, that "obligation is decidable" just in case given an arbitrary ethical proposition (containing an obligation term), arbitrary problematical situation, etc., there exist effective (recursive) procedures for determining whether or not the proposition is true, what a desirable course of action is, etc. Some logicians working in the theory of constructions believe that it is possible to provide languages for such domains as art, morality, etc. A Deweyan insight might then be expressed as an impossibility theorem of metamathematics.

12. John Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct, p. 225.

13. Ibid., p. 229.

14. In fact, Dewey actually defined fanaticism in terms of the severing of ends from means. See John Dewey, "The Field of 'Value'," appearing in Value: A Cooperative Inquiry, edited by Ray Lepley. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1951), p. 71.

15. John Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct, p. 226.

16. And elsewhere too. But the importance of means and ends seems to be particularly pervasive in education. Discussions invariably circle back to considerations involving means and ends. I suspect that this is a function of the fact that education itself is an activity or process which can claim itself as its own means and ends.

17. John Dewey, Moral Principles, p. 25.

18. The form here is beginning to look familiar. Instead of education for (or as a means to) some goal x, we have x through education (e.g., "vocation through education") and education through (or with the aid of) x (e.g., "education through (or with the aid or) vocation"). We have (essentially) the same form when x = morality.

    More abstractly and generally we can think of the situation as follows. Instead of some one predetermined means a leading to some one fixed ends x, we have a set of

means and ends (the result of reflection on a situation) "changing" or "interacting" with one another. Pictorially: a* $\longrightarrow$ c*, c* $\longrightarrow$ a**, a** $\longrightarrow$ c***; b* $\longrightarrow$ d*, d* $\longrightarrow$ b**, and so on. (I am suggesting therefore that we should think of "a through x" and "x through (or with the aid of) a" as shorthands for just such a set of processes.) Where x is "the goal of a lesson" and a is "the lesson plan," the breakdown of a $\longrightarrow$ x into such a set is transparent. (Even when the substance of a goal and lesson plan stay the same, we must assume that there have been many changes and accommodations along the way.)

19. Some caution but not much. Young Dewey - the Hegelian, mature Dewey - the instrumentalist, is a dualism I reject. Dewey sounded less Hegelian as he "matured" (and to some extent he was), but Hegel's influence was always very much present. For a cogent rejection of this " 'meta-Deweyan' daulism," at least in one important area of philosophy, see Philip L. Smith, The Development and Formulation of John Dewey's Theory of Mind," International Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 16 (1976), pp. 275-303.

20. John Dewey, "The Study of Ethics: A syllabus," appearing in John Dewey: The Early Works, 1882-1898, 4: 1893-1894 - Early Essays and The Study of Ethics: A Syllabus. (Carbondale and Edwardsville, Southern Illinois University Press, 1971), p. 312.

21. Ibid., p. 234.

22. John Dewey, Moral Principles, p. 15.

23. (b) is simply philosophy of education as a "philosophy of," i.e., as a branch of philosophy (such as philosophy of art, mathematics, politics, etc.). (a) and (c) widen the role of philosophy of education. Practitioners in the field can't help but feel that philosophy of education is not "just" another "philosophy of," i.e., I believe that there is something in the nature of education that makes philosophy of education different. I would suggest that this is reflected in (a) (I do not think that it makes sense to speak of doing philosophy artistically, mathematically, or politically, at least in the intended sense) and in the range of (c) (given a philosophical problem, there always seems to be an educational situation where it is realized or mirrored - the same cannot be meaningfully said of, e.g., mathematics, art, or politics).

24. Along these lines, we find a trenchant and provocative quote from Dewey: "Education is by its nature an endless circle or spiral. It is an activity which includes science within itself. In its very process it sets out more problems to be further studied, which then react into the educative process to change it still further, and thus demand more thought, more science, and so on, in everlasting sequence." See John Dewey, The Sources of Science of Education, (Liveright, New York, 1929), p. 77. I believe that Dewey is picking out another and quite significant sense in which education is "broader" and philosophy - the basicness of philosophy of education to all of inquiry. In a recent paper in which he claims that educational theory itself, supports its putative foundations, Ralph C. Page argues (in effect) that inquiry and research always presuppose and are shaped by a certain conception of inquiry and research that are at least partially defined in educational terms. Page writes: "All the proposed 'foundations' of education embody implicit or explicit judgments about objectivity and usually neutrality too, and to this extent they depend upon an adequate educational theory for their full explication and defense." See Ralph C. Page, 'Educational Inquiry Supports Its Own 'Foundations'," Philosophy of Education 1978: Proceedings of the Thirty-Fourth Annual Meeting of the Philosophy of Education Society, edited by Gardy D. Fenstermacher. Champaign, Illinois: Philosophy of Education Society, 1978, p. 285.

25. John Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct, p. 210.

26. Ibid.

27. In the area of art, maintaining that no object is intrinsically valuable sounds more plausible. Perhaps then if we could extend our esthetic/ethics analogy in Dewey which has been scantily sketched out here, we could feel more comfortable with Dewey's claim. Phillipa Foot has claimed that, in general, we impose more stringent standards of objectivity and rationality in ethics than esthetics. See her paper, "Morality and Art," appearing in Proceedings of the British Academy, Vol. 56 (1970).

28. Saying that persons do not have intrinsic value may seem (what is worse than merely wrong) downright mean. But there is a positive way of interpreting this claim. No matter how much wrong or bad a person has brought about or contributed to; since he is not intrinsically bad,

we can look for brighter days. This strikes me as humanistic rather than mean. There is, of course, in all fairness, an existentialist flip side to the coin. No matter how much good one has done, since one cannot be intrinsically good, it is possible that dark days lie ahead. The key word is possible since it is very arguably the case that what is important here is what it is reasonable to expect of such a person. But we have already said too much on this matter.

29. John Dewey, Essays in Experimental Logic. (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1916), p. 361.

30. Richard T. Garner and Bernard Rosen, Moral Philosophy: A Systematic Introduction to Normative Ethics and Meta-Ethics. (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1967), pp. 131-32.

31. Sidney Hook, "The Desirable and Emotive in Dewey's Ethics," appearing in John Dewey: Philosopher of Science and Freedom, A Symposium, ed. Sidney Hook. (New York: The Dial Press, 1950), p. 197.

32. John Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy, enlarged edition. (New York: The Modern Library, 1957), p. 177.

33. Sidney Hook seems to be arguing along these lines. See his article, "John Dewey - Philosopher of Growth," appearing in Dewey and His Critics, ed. Sidney Morgenbesser. (The Journal of Philosophy, Inc., New York, 1977), pp. 12-14.

34. John Dewey, Moral Principles, p. 25.

35. There is an analogy here with Grice's notion of "conversational implication" in the philosophy of language. A proposition may not be implied in a logical sense, but may be in a conversational sense, in that once the presuppositions of a given conversation are taken as true, the proposition is entailed in a logical sense. In other words, given the context, the proposition must be true.

36. Epistemological foundationalism is usually conceived as an attempt to reply to the skeptic by placing knowledge on a "solid footing." Perhaps there is more danger with "ethical foundationalism" in that its connection with a skepticism about values is not generally appreciated.

37. Richard Rorty has argued that prgamatists have had their priorities straight here, while most contemporaries in

the Kantian/epistemological mode have not. See his "Pragmatism, Relativism, and Irrationalism," Proceedings and Addresses of The American Philosophical Association, Vol. 53, No. 6, August 1980. (The American Philosophical Association - University of Delaware, Newark, Delaware), pp. 719-38.

38. Comparisons between Dewey's positions and his mode of philosophizing with those of Wittgenstein abound and have been the source of some recent discussion. Some similarities should come through in this paper.

39. John Dewey, "Psychology," appearing in The Early Works, 1882-1898. (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1967, Vol. 2, p. 114.)

40. John Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct, pp. 254-55.

41. John Dewey, Moral Principles, p. 52.

42. John Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct, p. 24.

43. Ibid., p. 25.

44. Ibid., p. 35.

45. Kohlberg has often described himself as a "follower" of Dewey. See, for example, his article, "The Cognitive-Developmental Approach to Moral Education," appearing in Moral Education. . . It Comes With the Territory, edited by David Purpel and Kevin Ryan. (McCutchan: 1976), pp. 176-77. Kohlberg also likens Dewey to Piaget, here.

46. John Dewey, Moral Principles, pp. 47-49.

47. Ibid., p. 11.

48. Ibid., p. 8.

49. Ibid.

50. Ibid., p. 14.

51. John Dewey, Sources of a Science of Education, p. 69.

52. John Dewey, Moral Principles, p. 31.

53. Ibid., pp. 40-41.

54. Ibid., p. 58.

WHY DEWEY'S METHOD FAILED AS SOCIAL CRITICISM: A RESPONSE TO REVISIONIST POSITIONS

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Scholarly debates among educational thinkers in the mid-seventies focused with considerable intensity on the political assumptions and consequences of Dewey's alleged apology for an oppressive status quo under the guise of liberal reform.[1] According to revisionist historians Dewey's functionalist-gradualist approach to social change, reflecting middle-class privilege, blinded him to the necessarily undemocratic nature of technological development. A species of blind-spot or sub-conscious collusion theories serves in most revisionist commentaries to account for his evasion of class conflict. The accompanying view -- that control was Dewey's primary concern, I believe is incorrect. Nevertheless, the question raised by the revisionists is important. How and why did Dewey's critical method fail to criticize?

The argument presented here is in general agreement with the position that Dewey's proposed method of critical inquiry failed as social criticism with unfortunate consequences for the shaping of educational thought. Rather than achieving the critical "bite" he sought for Dewey's method co-operates with the very undemocratic conditions it seeks to identify and reconstruct. I shall argue that the main weakness is attributable to inquiry's embeddedness in Dewey's concept of communication. In the whole lexicon of Dewey's redefined terms, none is held by him in such high esteem. His formulation of its meaning employs a combination of agrument by definition with ambiguity of use which puts the concept beyond clear analysis. Since inquiry itself is a highly developed form of communication, its logical status is rendered shaky. I will attempt to demonstrate specifically Dewey's use of 'communication' in its bearing upon the status of his method as 'critical'.

In The Quest for Certainty, where Dewey spells out his theory of knowledge, he extends the validity of inquiry in the natural sciences to the areas of moral and political activity. Science provides us with a method which is also a model for controlling change.

> In the new experimental science, knowledge is obtained . . . through deliberate institution of a definite and specified course of change.[2]

All instances of knowledge have the specified task of the "transformation of disturbed and unsettled situations into those more controlled and more significant."[3]

Ultimately, the source of the method is the common sense world characterized by immediate problems of . . . "use and enjoyment of the objects, activities and products, material and ideological . . . of the world in which individuals live."[4] It is through use and enjoyment that we are connected with the common sense social world. It is a world of shared "meanings accepted." Deeply embedded meanings in customs and traditions form the basic categories of a shared language system. According to Dewey, the language system is "regulative and normative of specific beliefs and judgments."[5] Dewey puts great emphasis on the changeable character of the common sense world assuming that this disturbs stable patterns of use and enjoyment while the embedded meanings change slowly. All forms of inquiry are specializations which are continuous with more primitive ongoing forms of communication which form the matrix of the immediate common sense world we all share. They differ primarily in that the inquiries of science are disinterested inquiries carried on for their own sake. The distinction is merely that between sets of problems. Thus . . . "science takes its departure of necessity from the qualitative objects, processes, and instruments of the common sense world of use and concrete enjoyments and sufferings."[6]

The two notions here that should be underscored are inquiry's continuity with the common sense world and the source of its critical independence. Scientific inquiry achieves its power through its independence from special interest.

Scientific inquiry, then is necessarily "social" whatever the domain of investigation and rooted in the social assumptions and needs of the common sense world. Communication and hence community is the precondition for its development. As a specialization which strives to reorder events, its power to evaluate stems from its fidelity to its own imperatives.

In Experience and Nature, Dewey tells us that "of all things communication is the most wonderful." Its wonder for him consists in its capacity to transform co-existence into participation. Beside it, he says, the claims for religious miracle pale. The passage makes clear Dewey's extreme respect for communication as both a moral achievement and pre-condition for the human "world."

> Even if 'society' were as much an organism as some have held, it would not, on that account, be society. Interactions, transactions, occur de facto and the results of interdependence follow. But participation in activities sharing in results are additive concerns.[7] They demand communication as a pre-requisite.

Communication and, hence, participation is not only a defining feature of society, it also is a measure of social progress. The worth of technology, for example, is located in its capacity as a means toward the enrichment of shared meaning.

> If the technological age can provide mankind with a firm and general basis of material security, it will be absorbed in a humane age as . . . an instrumentality of shared and communicated experience.[8]

It will be absorbed because it defeats the scarcity which encourages competitive and, hence, inhumane conditions and because technology itself as an extension of scientific inquiry counts as a form of communication. Technological knowledge, as a special controlled mode of communication, is a primary means to enlarge the domain of shared participation.

Scientific method for Dewey represents the most promising way of control our surroundings. Through it we are no longer at the mercy of chance. Our customary awe of science obscures for us this important, but unglamorous, role in human life.

> If we could free ourselves from a somewhat abject emotion, it would be clear enough that what makes any proposition scientific is its power to yield insight, intellectual at home-ness, in connection with any existential state of affairs, by filling events with coherent and tested meanings.[9]

A necessary condition, then, for the expression of scientific propositions is an open and public communication context, that is, one devoid of concealed and purely private meanings. Implicit in this view is that the common sense world is comprised of meanings and assumptions accessible to all.

It becomes difficult to see how a perspective within this set of relationships could resist a closing system of

mutually reinforcing meanings and concepts. How is the self-corrective function of method on which Dewey himself insists, to be established?

The answer lies in the fact that Dewey places the miracle of shared communication in a dark universe. Human experience grapples inevitably with situations of danger and pain.

> What the method of intelligence, thoughtful valuation will accomplish, if it be tried, is for the result of trial to determine. Since it is relative to the intersection in existence of hazard and rule, of contingency and order, faith in a wholesale and final triumph is fantastic.[10]

To grasp the importance for Dewey, of contingency and hazard as permanent features of existence, is to understand his apparent lack of fear regarding closed repressive social systems. Further, it assigns to his method of intelligence its necessarily provisional and experimental nature. Method operates, as he says, at the intersection of order and disorder. This ontological position underlies all his social, political, and ethical theory. Social existence as continuous with existence in general displays the ultimate traits of conflict and harmony. For human beings as both biological and social creatures, this means a rhythmic fate of alternating moments of satisfaction and pain. He is more resolute than most of us in his conviction that this works out to our advantage.

> Life itself consists of phases in which the organism falls out of step with the march of surrounding things and then recovers unison with it either through effort or by some happy chance. And in a growing life, the recovery is never mere return to a prior state, for it is enriched by the state of disparity and resistance through which it has successfully passed . . . If its activity is not enhanced by the temporary alienation, it merely subsits.[11]

In the Deweyan view, conflict and confusion have been the impetus for increasingly effective methods of response. Critical thinking itself, a valuation of valuations, aims at the institution of positive good. A conflicted situation reconstructed through critical thinking into a more harmonious situation is Dewey's paradigm for truth seeking action in the world. The method needs both moments of alienation and the capacity to identify that alienation

in order to work. That we can identify the true sources of conflict is assumed, and the sign that we have done so is the enriched communication accompanying the resolution into harmony.

This formulation of the relationship of method to conditions of human life skirts some unpleasant social possibilities. For one thing, the treatment of technology as an expression of science, suggests that its development depends on open and shared communication. Thus, though it functions like a powerful natural force in modern society, its genesis and purpose keeps it within the domain of criticism and control. It is an extension of that scientific method by which goods are criticized in the first place. Secondly, Dewey carefully distinguishes communication from "mere" information, excluding much that common parlance includes. He fails to grapple with the fact that dispensing information which is taken by us to be an important form of communication necessary to the survival of complex organizations, drives out shared reciprocal communication. Thirdly, he assumes that existence is characterized by a dependable randomization of immediate goods and evils which provides a consistent source of situations calling for criticism. Thus, Dewey is not led to serious consideration of the capacity of the common sense world to exclude or suppress awareness of the conflicts which are the impetus of inquiry.

The issue is that necessary to Dewey's claim for a self-corrective method of inquiry is statable conflict within a prior communication context of shared meanings at the prescientific level. Conflict which can be articulated and understood is a necessary condition for rational action. If social conflict of interest becomes a serious danger to social order, then its mere expression is rendered fearful. Such expression threatens to fragment a "common sense" the shared and viable world. The conflict in question may be repressed or deflected into other issues. Should such a repression occur, it deprives critical method both of its "moment" and its material. The method, then, would operate only at the level of appearances. The level of the safe and permitted conflicts accessible to method, however, would present themselves as the conflict situations whose reconstruction would issue into more harmonious conditions. The method would then work to mask rather than to transform basic social conflict.

I do not wish to assert that Dewey was simply naive in his claims for the efficacy of his method, but only that it

would be difficult for him to distinguish between two types of harmonious situations. Those which are the outcome of open shared communication and those which are conditioned by the suppression of conflict awareness. Further, the cause of the difficulty is, in part, that the relationship between inquiry and its roots in pre-scientific communication, which Dewey explicitly recognizes, remains unanalysed. Thus, the sought for social criticism in behalf of making social change rationally controlled is confined to the level of appearances. Aspects of social conditions elude the method. Macro-social conditions, particularly concealed conflicts escape examination and, thereby, gain their negative power to preclude the articulation of problems.

Dewey held that social conflicts of interest express themselves in many smaller personal and inter-group conflicts which become too numerous to ignore. Consequently, he rejects the notion that a false harmony is possible.

At issue is whether the norms and structures of communication can be so powerful as to suppress the very stability of deep conflict of interest. Dewey's own criteria for a rational communication context is one expunged of concealed privatized meanings. All claims must be open, public, and statable. The place of communication in his method of inquiry, however, encourages evasion of the analysis of the link between method and context. How can certain features of social reality be excluded from the method at the outset? Mutuality and reciprocation taken mainly as ends in themselves seem to make this analysis unnecessary. One consequence is that Dewey, contrary to his intentions, can be used, and has been used, to add legitimacy to programs where political conflict is totally excluded from the study of communication and its improvement. Increased communication as both the precondition and the test of the success of critical thinking establishes a circularity that misses reality. The resulting disillusion. This is a serious area for educational theory, since it reflects upon its own methods and consequences. A serious confrontation with the limits of a liberal, rational commitment, as expressed in Dewey, can only further the understanding of American education's quandaries and possibilities. The issue of Dewey's logical consistency is far more fruitful an area for analysis than the aspersion on his general motives and interests.

FOOTNOTES

1. See, for example, Clarence Karies, "Liberalism and the Quest for Orderly Change," History of Education Quarterly 12 (Spring, 1972), 57-80 and Joel Feinberg, "Dewey and the Polish Community" in Reason and Rhetoric (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1975) pp. 103-108.

2. John Dewey, The Quest for Certainty. New York: Minton, Balck and Co., 1929. p. 296.

3. The Quest . . . p. 296.

4. John Dewey, Logic: The Theory of Inquiry, (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1938), p. 60.

5. Logic: The Theory of Inquiry, p. 62.

6. Logic: p. 71.

7. John Dewey, The Public and its Problems (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1927), p. 152.

8. The Public . . . p. 217.

9. Logic: p. 73.

10. The Quest, p. 220.

11. John Dewey, Art as Experience, (New York: Capricorn Books, G. P. Putman and Sons, 1958), p. 14.

ORTHODOXY AND DISSENT IN RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER LEARNING*

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Orthodoxy and dissent is a growing problem in institutions affiliated with religious sects. Most of the literature on the problem has been produced by theologians, lawyers, etc. But this topic is a fertile field for educational philosophers since many of the issues involved have far-reaching educational implications. Furthermore, some of the facets of this problem apply to all institutions of higher learning whether or not they have any religious affiliation. Some of us remember the 1950's when "orthodoxy," as defined by certain senators was expected of faculty members at state schools. People in philosophy of education were being "investigated" because of their non-orthodox views on education. However, I will limit my discussion to the religious institution. Further, the sectarian elementary and secondary schools will not be considered, except tangentially, since these schools are designed primarily to educate the young in a specific creed. One might question the adequacy of the "narrow" education some of them offer to children who will be living in a pluralistic society, but no one can say that such schools are not explicit about what they offer. In reality, most of them would have no reason for existence if they did not profess to teach a specific creed.

In post-secondary schools the degree to which orthodoxy is expected varies greatly from institution to institution. For example, Missouri and Wisconsin Synod Lutheran Colleges now require adherence to the creeds of those synods to teach <u>any subject</u> at their colleges. For example, several years ago, a Missouri Synod college terminated all non-tenured faculty who were not members of that church group. One faculty member, an Arab, who taught economics, contested the termination, arguing that his field was theologically neutral. But he lost his case because it was ruled that schools of that type have the right to limit membership on the faculty to members of that church.

A somewhat different arrangement is found in some other institutions. The college may not be affiliated with any particular sect, but has a published "creed" which all stu-

*presidential address

dents, faculty and administrators must adhere to and sign. If they ever dissent from this creed they must leave the school.

In Catholic institutions, a variety of arrangements exist. The most common form until approximately twenty years ago was ownership and operation of the institution by a religious order of men or women or in some places the local diocese owned and operated the college or university, e.g., St. Thomas College in St. Paul, University of San Diego. Recently, the ownership of a number of Catholic colleges and universities has been transferred to boards of trustees made up mainly of lay persons rather than clergy or religious. But these schools still label themselves as Catholic.

In general, in the past, most of the faculty and students in the Catholic colleges and universities were Catholics. But orthodoxy was expected mainly in the field of theology and other "sensitive" areas such as philosophy and education. Since WWII, most of these institutions have grown rapidly and many have added doctoral programs. Such rapid expansion necessitated hiring many non-Catholic faculty in all fields to the point where non-Catholics make up the majority in some departments. Non-Catholic scholars are found even in theology or religious studies departments especially in those granting doctoral degrees. Lutherans are teaching courses on Luther and other aspects of Lutheran theology; Jewish scholars are teaching courses on Judaism, etc. In all of these instances, no test of orthodoxy was required of the non-Catholic scholar. The primary criterion for appointment was the faculty member's scholarly reputation, although a "sympathetic understanding" of the religious commitment of the institution was expected of non-Catholic faculty.

In the past few years, this recognition of the pluralistic composition of religious institutions of higher learning has been challenged. Concordia Seminary (Missouri Synod) in St. Louis experienced a protracted battle over the right to dissent which ultimately ended in an A.A.U.P. censure.[1] In the end, however, the Seminary affirmed that no faculty member could be retained if he/she expressed any dissent from the defined creed of the sponsoring sect. (About 60% reduction in students and faculty resulted from this decision.)

Another interesting case of dissent was centered at

the Catholic University of America where a group of theologians led a movement objecting to the encyclical of Pope Paul VI banning artifical contraception. The original statement, released in the name of eighty-seven American theologians, was ultimately endorsed by more than 600 Catholic academicians qualified in the sacred sciences including moral theologians, canon lawyers, philosophers, biblical scholars and teachers in related fields. This case differs from that of Concordia Seminary because the dissent was not directed at a defined article of faith but at a papal teaching contained in the encyclical which is not classified as an article of faith although it is considered authoritative. This kind of dissent presumably is legitimate though not often exercised before the Second Vatican Council. As might be expected some Catholics labeled such dissent treason. Obviously, those challenging the loyalty of the dissenters had never heard the scholar's "right" (and even duty) to dissent from a non-infallible teaching (with sufficient reasons for the dissent) and still be loyal to the Church. The dissenting theologians put special emphasis on this point in their statement and had church history on their side. For example, 1) authoritive statements on war have ranged all the way from guaranteed salvation if one dies in a religious war against the infidel to the outright condemnation of war in recent church statements; 2) on the purpose of marriage church teaching has ranged from making the absence of procreative intent to recent Vatican II statements affirming that procreation is not the primary end of marriage but only one of several legitimate ends; 3) on clerical celibacy, the authoritative statements have both permitted and prohibited married clergy; 4) on usury, the practice of taking any interest on a loan was condemned at one time but later the term usury was reserved for taking excessive interest; 5) on religious freedom, the authoritative statements range from the prohibition of religious freedom for all but the "true church" to the John Courtney Murray position (adopted by Vatican II) that religious liberty is the right of every person. (Other examples can be found).

The battle of words, charges and countercharges, legal hassles, etc. that followed this incident showed that the institutional philosophy of education was not clearly stated. Apparently, even the Chancellor of the University did not know that scholars had the right and duty to dissent when they <u>had</u> good reasons to do so. To make a long story short--after the A.A.U.P., an outside law firm, etc., were brought in on the case, the University Board of Inquiry recommended that the proceedings against the professors be terminated and the Trustees' threat of suspension be removed. The Academic Senate unanimously approved the recommendation of the Board of Inquiry and later the trustees terminated

the proceedings against the professors.[2]

Another case which received international attention was the "Hans Kung Affair" at Tubingen University in Germany. This case differs from the two mentioned above because Tubingen is a secular State University. But it has a faculty of theology with representatives of the major religious sects on the faculty. By the Concordat of 1933 with the Vatican, the local hierarchy were given the right to determine the orthodoxy of the theologians who would represent them on the faculty. The original intent of this agreement goes back to 1848 when the German Universities were secularized and some means had to be found to protect church interests in the secular institution. The result was that no one could teach the Catholic or any other religion in public institutions at any educational level (elementary school through graduate level) unless approved by church authorities. (One must keep in mind that religion is taught at all levels in the public schools and that the parish and religious order priest and Protestant ministers receive their pastoral training in the state universities). Thus, it is understandable that the hierarchy of the various faiths wish to determine who will teach an orthodox version of their faith. When Hans Kung's orthodoxy was questioned by the hierarchy, the University officials had no choice but to affirm the hierarchy's view that he was not an acceptable representative of their faith at the University. (Later, however, he received a faculty appointment in another School of the University).

In some respects, then, the Concordia and Kung cases bear a resemblance insofar as both involved dissent from defined doctrines and both results in the termination of respected scholars by the governing bodies of the two religions. Also these two cases seem to be settled, at least officially, since legal and academic appeals have not brought about any chance in the status of the two scholars involved.

The problem that is created by the principle involved in the case, the right to dissent, is that church authorities wish to extend the right of control over theology faculties to all institutions which claim to be representative of that particular faith. For example, there are two hundred forty-one Catholic colleges and universities in the U.S. enrolling almost one-half million students. In fact, as Fr. Theordore Hesburg observed, there are more Catholic institutions of higher learning in the U.S. than in all the rest of the world combined. What would happen if church authorities were able to interfere in the internal affairs of these institutions by demanding that all faculty in theology (and

other sensitive areas) be approved by these external authorities? (The technical term for this perogative is "Canonical mission" or "Call to Teach in Synods"). The effect would be to eliminate what all U.S. colleges and universities mean by legitimate autonomy and control from within the institution. An outside procedure devised by church authorities would be substituted for the normal internal procedures used in all other academic departments in the case of faculty who teach in areas involving faith and morals. Obviously, the academic freedom of one group of faculty would be eliminated and promotion and tenure would be impossible for faculty who might at some time dissent from the official orthodox position. The simplest way out of this dilemma is for the institution to give up identity with the church in order to preserve the essential characteristic of a university, i.e., the free quest for knowledge and truth. Montreal University chose this option. But many institutions wish to retain their religious identity since that is the major reason for their existence. Also, many people believe that alternatives to the secular institution should be available to those who wish to attend a higher educational institution with a religious atmosphere. This, then, is the heart of the problem for the educational philosopher--how to retain the religious identity of the institution and at the same time preserve the autonomy of the university and the academic freedom of its faculty?

At the outset, it seems that one must agree that each religious group has the right and even the obligation to define what it believes. (I, for one, would not join a political party or even a service club unless, I knew what their position is on the basic issues of the day). The adherents of these faiths should understand what they profess and what the implications of these beliefs are for their daily lives. For example, if creationism as described in Genesis is an immutable doctrine of a certain faith one cannot accept evolutionary theories. Rather, my obligation as a believer is to show that evolution is a false doctrine. This may solve the problem for the faithful, since they have a right to know the official position of their church on such matters. Furthermore, they generally do not wish to be troubled and confused by theories or hypotheses not yet mature or tested and/or not yet accepted by church authorities. But it does not resolve the problem for the scholar in an institution of higher learning. Scholars must be free to pursue the truth and the results of their research are needed by the rest of the church including the church authorities. But this "right" might come into conflict with the responsibility of church authorities who are to look after the unity of faith and moral teaching so that the faithful have some official guides in faith and morals. (The controversy over the encyclical Humanae Vitae is a good example of this conflict of rights and responsibility).

One escape from this dilemma is to make several distinctions to clarify the situation. First and foremost, the term University (or institution of higher learning) is the "genus" which has certain essential characteristics. Then there are different species, e.g., religious, state, private, etc. Thus, a religious university is an institution whose roots are earthly, and whose laws and values are of its own making. One of these laws and values is autonomy which has been an essential characteristic of the university since the early days of the great medieval universities--Paris, Bologna, etc. Already in the 13th century, universities were declared independent of bishops and archbishops as well as kings and princes. It is significant to note how early in a society where civil and religious authorities shared the power between them that the university was recognized as an institution not subject to either. Thus, the people of the times believed that these institutions of higher learning could serve both the state and the church best when they were subject to neither of them. Academic freedom and autonomy are not privileges granted by church authorities to a university, since the university is not a pastoral arm of the church as are seminaries. Church authorities might assert that the statements of a particular scholar do not jibe with the official position of the church. But this prerogative does not take away the scholar's right to do his research and use the findings either in his classes or in publications. What this position clearly implies is that a university should have no juridical control by an ecclesiastical authority even if it bears the label of a particular church.

Some argue that without juridical control there can be no guarantee that the religious character of the institution will be retained. The response to this objection is that the religious character of an institution must be maintained by those who teach and administer in it rather than by some legal control over the institution. Also, practically speaking, it would add another layer of bureaucracy to an already "overbureaucratized" institution. It seems then that a person or institution can be loyal to the church without being subject to the many details and rules of the church bureaucracy. Very often such rules and regulations have little or nothing to do with faith and morals.

Such a position does not imply that church authorities and the universities should be adversaries. On the contrary, regular contact between the church and university people should be encouraged. A clearer understanding of each others role must surely benefit both sides. For example, the two "partners" might develop a plan for the pastoral activities which take place on the campus. Also they might devise a

plan for handling cases where a scholar holds views contrary to the accepted doctrines of the church. Good communication between the two also will assist church authorities to recognize that maintaining their moral and financial support for the institution is to the advantage of the church and society even when there are instances of dissent. Church authorities might even become defenders of the freedom of the university as some of the popes did in the later Middle Ages.[3]

Obviously, this mutually helping relationship between church authorities and the university is difficult to maintain and some guidelines are needed. But before suggesting what these might be, another option might be mentioned. For those religious groups operating a number of schools of higher learning, a diversity of institutions might be maintained. For example, parents and/or students might chose a "confessional" type institution where they would be certain that only "orthodox doctrines" would be taught in courses involving faith and morals. (That would touch upon many subjects besides Theology such as biology, philosophy, sociology, education, etc.). Even though dissenting opinions might be mentioned or discussed in class it would be made quite clear that such opinions either represent "error" or at best are not yet accepted by church authorities. Normally, too, in this type of institution all knowledge would be "integrated" through the vehicle of theological belief. Religious practice also would represent the traditional modes approved by church authorities.

The epistemological basis for this approach is that, although there are different modes of knowing, the theological mode is supreme. Thus, all knowledge and truth will be judged in the light of orthodox teachings.

At the other end of the spectrum one might find large (and sometimes prestigious) universities which retain their religious identity but possess the same essential characteristics as their secular sister institutions. Surely, there would be a "religious presence" that one does not find in a secular university, but academic freedom and autonomy would be essential to them. In such institutions parents and students would recognize that dissent, based on scholarly research, will be expressed in classes, guest lectures, etc. The secular disciplines will have their own autonomy and will not be subject to the theological beliefs of the sponsoring religious sect. Even theological studies will reflect an openness to new knowledge and new interpretations of old beliefs--again based on scholarly research. An example of this type of outlook can be seen in the recent use of theologians

of anthropology, sociology, psychology and linguistics in their studies of the scriptures.

The epistemological basis for this position asserts that there are indeed different modes of knowing, each with its own methods and materials. Thus, the theological modes is only one of several ways of arriving at knowledge or truth. It also implies that one modes might use the findings of another to enhance its own development. Between these two extremes on the spectrum one might devise other institutional arrangements which would still reflect a specific religious identity but not fit either of these two models.

But to return to the issues mentioned above, the establishment of guidelines for fostering a mutual releationship of guidelines for fostering a mutual relationship between church authorities and the university. One such set of guidelines was proposed by the Catholic Theological Society of America.

1. Sound academic customs and practices as developed and maintained over the years should be retained in North America (Catholic) Universities since these benefit the university, the church and society.

2. Those institutions (e.g., Catholic University of America) which have officially erected and approved schools of religious studies might have to reexamine the status of juridical control by church authorities in order to clarify their relationship with the rest of the university.

3. The American and Canadian Theological communities should enter into an active sustained and structured dialogue with church authorities to work out appropriate modes of mutual accountability.

4. The faculties of theology of universities not under juridical control of the church should not be subject to the same regulations as those which are under that control.

5. The legal and civil ramifications of extending church control to other than those under juridical control must be examined closely. Such a change might affect accreditation status, affirmative action, AAUP norms to which most subscribe, collective bargaining arrangements, etc.

6. Certain rules and regulations coming from church authorities which might apply in other countries cannot be implemented in North American Universi-

> ties without doing serious harm to their status and integrity.[4]

I would like to summarize these points by adapting Charles Curran's closing remarks in his article which appeared in the April 1980 issue of Academe (to fit all religious institutions.)

If one strictly applies the notion that there can be no dissent from orthodox religious teachings in institutions under the juridical control of church authorities "such institutions cannot be true universities in the accepted sense of the term in the United States. Likewise the theology done in such institutions will not have the necessary academic freedom to perform its function properly." As a result, the institutions themselves, the discipline of theology and the church will suffer.

If the same principles prohibiting dissent in theology and related fields are applied to institutions not under the juridical control of the church authorities but labeled as religious, the autonomy of such institutions and the academic freedom of the faculty in theology and related fields will be threatened. In the last analysis a religious university, under these conditions, is a contradiction in terms.

FOOTNOTES

1. See AAUP Bulletin, 1975.

2. For a detailed account of this case, see C. Curran, R. Hunt, Dissent In and For the Church, New York, Sheed and Ward, 1969, Chapter 1.

3. See R. J. Henle, "Catholic Universities and the Vatican," America, April 9, 1977.

4. Paraphrased from the Report of the Catholic Theological Society of America. A working paper on Ecclesiastical Academic Legislation, 1980.

FOLKLORE ON 'THE SELF CONCEPT'

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Do not ask what a sensitive term "really" or "truly" means. Rather, ask how it has been used and how it might be used. We are concerned here with the term 'self concept'. This term is so much used in the ordinary language of education, but little educational writings provide for its explication. The term, 'self concept', obviously pertains to mental health, so conceivably better expertise or precision in using it could practically become associated with better coping with emotional confusion and crisis.

Try the experiment of asking someone, "How is your self concept?" -- even if the situation is the frivolity of game playing, and note the type of responses. Some of your respondents are prone to leap into a substantive reply; others may querry you for a defintion or suggest a different question such as, "Do you want to be my psychotherapist?" Some are likely to equate 'self concept' with 'mental health'; the terms can be used interchangeably.

The relationship of sense and concept is distinctly within the philosopher's province; thus, the philosopher ought to be concerned about the science that is and the science we need on self and self concept.

There is a widely-held belief that education -- especially schooling -- should aid in the development of a person's self concept. A brochure titled "One Hundred Ways to Enhance Self Concept" is typical of much popular literature on mental hygiene for teachers. The assumption behind such literature is that the self concept is a thing to be nourished or "tuned up" similar to the services which a mechanic provides for a balky motor.

Such belief, however, is not the exclusive property of minimally-trained practitioners; it is shared widely by writers who publish in educational journals. In the EDUCATIONAL INDEX for 1976-77, 'self concept' is cross-referenced with the more appropriate term 'self perception'. The cross-referencing is of the sort: "You'll find it elsewhere, not here." This is to the credit of the INDEX's editors, and our ensuing line of argument should make clear why they deserve credit.

"Test and Scales," in this same volume of EDUCATIONAL INDEX, is a sub-head of "Self Perception" and contains 26 listings. Nineteen of these have 'self concept' in the title. In 16 of the 19 titles, 'self concept' is used in the sense of an all-prevading singular thing or function; the implication is that it resides at the very core of personal Being. Simply by inspecting the language in the titles we can determine that the term is indeed used as a basic singular entity.

It is pleasing, however, to note that one of the titles does, in effect, imply the caution that 'self concept' is a construct which requires analytical probing for the purpose of judging its semantic adequacy.

A full 10 of the 19 titles imply that self concept is an entity which can be measured and scaled. And there is also the implication that self concept can be analyzed into components.

Three of the 19 titles imply that self concept develops itself or that it can be developed or that it is otherwise subject to influence or conditioning from outside forces.

In no title do we find an indication that the person in experience comes upon or has within him or her self a plurality of self concepts and other indicators of self-identity.

Such knowledge as the above surely deserves the description 'folklore' -- notably so if we contrast it with William James's findings on the consciousness of self. Interestingly, William James did not need the term 'self concept'.

Why has such knowledge taken such firm root? Why this folklore? Western civilization has had various love affairs with words assumed to be there, but not known. Shelley waxes lyrically about "words not spoken." And there is this common dialogical response of "What you are really saying is . . ." More formidably there is the Christian theme in the fourth Gospel of The Word being there -- even before creation -- and The Word becoming Flesh. Hence, there is in western culture a special power to be ascribed to certain unspoken, even unknown, words. This doesn't explain how 'self concept' came to be a popular term, but we do have an area for further inquiry.

So we have cultural precedents for believing that a concept can be present even if there are no known articulations

or verbal renditions of it. The anomoly is a concept without conception. The false logic is that a concept is there, with conceptualizations known by no one.

It is plausible to assume that 'self concept' in popular thought serves the function which soul served in previous decades and centuries. Apparently, no one seemed to worry about 'soul concept' in the times when 'soul' prevailed in popular thought. But what ever the popularity of 'self concept' it has not achieved the sublime status which formerly was ascribed to 'soul'. Soul, in popular literature had both power and vulnerability. There are no cautions these days about the danger of losing one's self concept of the sort Robert Louis Stevenson offered about losing one's soul. And who has heard about selling one's self concept analogous to selling one's soul as Stephen Vincent Binet narrated in "The Devil and Daniel Webster?"

The folklore on self concept, however, does have a positive side. The view that formal education ought nourish the child's self concept is indicative of a cultural commitment that schooling must be more than a vehicle for imparting rudimentary knowledge and vocational technology. When the claim is made that schooling -- especially at precollegiate levels -- should essentially nourish academic intelligence and let character development be the exclusive province of other institutions -- home, church and local community -- this folklore on self concept provides a ready retort. The logic becomes that if the self concept is nourished consistently at all educational levels, the effects shall eventually be better character.

There is a similarity between the Freudian Unconscious and the self concept of folklore. Each is assumed to be present and by definition is not known by its beholder. In Freudian doctrine the Unconscious is a powerful amalgam of psychic forces ruling us in ways we know not of nor why. Yet despite the inherent mystery in Freud's Unconscious, his versions of the Unconscious are accepted by many in professional education as valid science. A true educational science on self and self concept ought give the professional educator the means for dialogue with professional psychiatrists on a basis of scientific equality. It is sad to note how little respect there is in Academe for a science of education -- even the possibility that one might become better developed.

The folklore on self concept provides simplistic responses for the lack of student achievement. Why is this or that student having trouble learning? It is because he or she has a deficient or weak self concept. Ergo, some

of the hundred ways of "enhancing" it should be employed. The data which signals less than satisfactory achievement and inappropriate attitudes are simulataneously signaling inadequate self concept. Then the logical deduction is made that the inadequate self concept causes the inadequate performance. This suggests a parallel with the dictum "Opium makes one sleepy because of its dormative power."

Philosophers of education are privileged to explore the question of what term or terms describe(s) the central core of one's Being -- if it can be assumed that there is such an entity. While the Thomistic philosopher accepts 'soul' as a descriptive term, relatively few secular psychologists accept such lexicon. The Freudian Unconscious, and associated terms Id, Ego, Superego, have arcane connotations. 'Mind' and 'Intelligence' as used by Dewey offer possibilities, but behaviorist psychologists reject 'Mind'. So the problem is: What shall the educational practitioner know in the light of such conflicting doctrines? If he or she is to be privy to a science on self and self concept, we can recall William James's enjoiner that a valid science of psychology (which he was seeking to articulate in over 14 years of writing) should not fly in the face of common terminology -- assuming that the terms from common language can be adequately defined. Hence, he chooses 'thoughts and feelings' as the basic indicators for what appears in consciousness. The analogous suggestion here is that 'self concept' can be appropriately differentiated from 'self', 'sensation', 'perception' and other related terms. Imagine the harmony were we to have a science of education largely in harmony with common usage. Imagine the increased public support of schools of education if the enlightened public should feel that there is a common language about the worth of people binding them to the work of philosophers of education.

In a science of education 'self' must be distinguished from 'self concept' especially in light of the fact that folklore uses these terms interchangeably. A simple distinction issues from an inspection of the logic of the language; a self concept is a concept (or a conception) of self. A particular version of A cannot be an A. A conception of a thing is not the same as the thing itself. We further need to distinguish 'self perception' from 'self conception', and we further have problems about singularity and plurality of self and self concept.

How should we deal with the old philosophic problem: "Is the self something real and permanent?" This problem is related to the theological questions: "Does the human have any continuity before or after bodily death?" "Do we have immortality as Jesus and the Apostles declared?"

Such questions deserve (and are receiving) continued attention by liberal theologians; and, in particular, I mention John Cobb, Jr. whose irenic personality and whose writings could persuade philosophers of education to look more closely at the God-talk in Whitehead.

While the present decade is hardly the time for a science of education on God and the continuity of the soul, surely a science on self and self concept is manifestly required.

Hume could not philosophically accept the existence of the self as a separate entity amidst its multitudinous perceptual manifestations. But others, including Kant and James, established it through rationale deduction. The question whether or not one's Self is the same or different from one's Self of 20 years ago is likely to be dismissed as pragmatically uninteresting by multitudes of teachers and the question becomes one in the province of esoteric theologians. But a science on self and self concept can begin with the fact that every passing thought and feeling to which one is consciously attentive is indeed one's very own thought or feeling. We can rationally assume that one self in some sense unites all conscious manifestations of self. We cannot doubt that these instances of self-awareness occur within the same physical body. Questions about perceiving and conceiving of self are pragmatically more interesting then questions about the permanency of Self.

We find the sense of self as my-ness or me-ness in every passing thought or feeling. These senses (or sensations) and perceptions of self can be empirically observed; our disposition for the trouble describing our own feelings of self is, at least in part, a product of our formal and informal education. The terms 'sensation' and 'perception' denote objects of awareness which occur passively, but 'conception' has a connotation of deliberate activity or choice. Thus, a science on self and self concept cannot be concerned with 'self concept' alone.

A further semantic point: If the term 'self concept' is a truncated form of 'self conception' then a particular self concept which one holds (or holds onto) must consist of a conceptualized version of one's Self. My self concept must be, therefore, a description of how I know myself. It has to be, assuming we are in science not folklore, what I know as one of my identities. If the object within my awareness (or let's say the thing in my psyche) is essentially a feeling of identity, then let us use each nomenclature as sense or sensation of identity or sense of self.

In 1892 when William James was concluding his 14 year study of what he refers to as "the so-called new science of psychology," he said that if such science does exist, it is a science which does not stand on solid ground. He states, ". . .it means a psychology particularly fragile, and into which the waters of metaphysical criticism leak at every joint . . ." While we, a century later, want to be optimistic about forming a science of education, we must not dismiss metaphysical concerns in the typical cavalier and hubristic manner which we find among so many professors of education. Problems about the One and the Many cannot be wished away. Given the fact each of us encounters a myriad of sensations, perceptions and conceptions of self, might there not be one singular entity to which all these myriad representations refer? Whatever the answer, it is a matter for philosophical, not scientific determination.

While the Self Itself is beyond empirical observations, popular language refers to "finding oneself" and there is the ancient Greek enjoiner to "Know thyself." Again referring to William James, he helps at least a little in relating such matters to science. In typically modest language, he reports his personal observations on the "Self of Selves" of which he claims he gets a glimpse within his own bodily processes. I quote from PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY:

> In a sense, then, it may be truly said that, in one person at least, the 'Self of Selves' when carefully examined, is found to consist mainly of those peculiar motions in the head or between the head and the throat. . ." (Vol. I, p. 301)

James is referring to a sense of a unifying self -- not a conception of it. So, again, if in the parlance of educator-talk 'self concept' is intended to indicate a centralized core of personality which abides throughout all experience, we must reject such nomenclature. Manifestly, your Social Security number has a far greater permanence than your self concept.

Each of us, however, is profoundly free to declare that a given self conception does unite much -- or in hyperbole -- everything about us. A follower of Billy Graham can say, in good logic, "Whatever else I am, I am one who accepts Christ." There is nothing illogical about this. Conceivably, the holder of such a simplistic self concept could reason thusly, "This is how I presently conceive myself; I shall be experimental and find out how this conception

works in experience." However, some self conceptions can become to be known as self deceptions. William James's sister, Alice, said that he was born anew every morning. Logically, she could have meant that he habitually came to give up untenable self conceptions (having come to see them as self deceptions) in favor of self conceptions (or self concepts in contemporary lexicon) which promise to have pragmatic cash value. So, 'to find oneself' as a term in a science of education can mean that amidst a multiplicity of self conceptions, one comes to accept one view of self which deserves priority attention.

Thus, we have a happy issue after all. 'Self concept' does belong in a science of education if it refers to a conception of self which one chooses or accepts. And we come to see that those who say that teaching or counseling or other schooling has as primary purpose the enhancement of the self concept are in error. Of course, education is relevant, but the relevancy is to self concepts, not the self concept. One of the primary functions of teaching and counseling is to facilitate the choice or acceptance of self concepts (or conceptions) which, in the educator's judgment, are manifestly valid. Indeed, education should enhance something about the self, viz. the choice or acceptance of appropriate self concepts and the dismissal of untenable self concepts or conceptions.

On the matter of explicit choice of self concepts, again, the experience of William James is instructive. At the age 28 in 1870, James was suffering the backlash agonies of a severe bout with existential trauma. The enduring feeling was that he was utterly worthless. In his philosophical readings he came upon a particular definition of free will. It was Renouvier's and was defined as the holding of an idea in the mind longer than it would be there otherwise because of choosing to hold it there. As he states in his diary, James decided to acept this definition and he set before himself a program of acting on it as if it were true. This fateful personal event marked the beginning of what became his famous pragmatism.

James's testimony was not fully revealed until ten years after his death; in his day a person of prestige could not afford to reveal the sorts of intimate existentiality which is permitted in these times. But knowing now as we do, we can ask what are its implications for a science of education. We can begin with the bare nub of the fact, viz. that at least one prestigious philosopher and psychologist reported that he chose a self conception as a person who is free to

plan a personal program of self-education based on choice. The question of whether this instance of pragmatic choice did have cash value is answered by looking at the record of James's career after this fateful event. In one of his published writings James writes, "When it comes to Being, we are all beggars." With the account of the above personal encounter in our minds, we can judge that James was overly modes in making this assertion.

In the science and philosophy of education, James's testimony suggests for us broader questions about the sharing and non-sharing of self conceptions. Within all educative environments there are feelings and decision about which self conceptions should be shared and which should not. Sometimes the choice to share or not to share is an instance of moral choice. Even within the privileged communication of counseling, the sharing of the counselor's self concept could make a significant difference either for better or worse. In classroom teaching, similar judgments are made. It is a truism that what is most effectively taught is a firm sense of the teacher's pattern of self-identities. More candid honesty about self concepts by the teacher could produce a reciprocating honesty by students.

To read James on the consciousness of self and on free will makes inevitable the judgment that his writings have not been adequately digested and critiqued for their instructive value for the science and philosophy of self and self concept. Paradoxically, as I've said above, James had no need for the term, self concept, in his 111-page chapter in PRINCIPLES and his 41 pages on the self in BRIEFER COURSE.

James's treatment of notions on the Unconscious has been similarly ignored by philosophers -- similar to the neglect given to his treatment of consciousness of self by psychologists. James heard Freud lecture at Clark University, in the last year of his (James's) life. While he spoke felicitous words to Freud about the future of psychology belonging to men like him, James later confided that his impression of Freud was that Freud was a man of fixed ideas.

It is significant that James was seriously ailing at the time of this encounter; he suffered an attack of angina while walking with Freud. This brings us to the sad consideration that James was unable to form his own researchings on the notion of the Unconscious into a formal retort to Freud's claims. What is it that he might have offered?

In the PRINCIPLES he has a treatise-length treatment of the beliefs focusing around the assumption of the Unconscious. In this work, forecasting his later identity as a radical empiricist, James reduces the beliefs on the Unconscious into forms which are susceptible to empirical observation. Thus, I hope I have made the point that todya's philosophers who would articulate a philosophy of self and self concept would be wise to take on James. Let us mark our calendars now to remind us to prepare for the centenial of PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY in 1990.

So I have made a case for the need for a better science and philosophy of education on self and self concept and related questions. I have argued that folklore more than science or valid philosophy falsely guides the thinking of too many educators in this area. I have tried to demonstrate that a reconstruction of the language around such terms as self-sensation, self perception, consciousness of self, would serve to make more clear the educator's function with respect to the popular term, self concept. And I have further argued that Jamesian writings on the self and free will deserve much deliberating attention from philosophers and scientists of education.

G. H. MEAD'S ANALYSIS OF PATRIOTISM

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George Herbert Mead (1863-1931), a social psychologist and philosopher at the University of Chicago, concerned himself with human social experience from the standpoint of the relation between the individual and society. Mead held that the behavior of all living organisms was the result of an evolutionary process rooted in social interaction. Therefore, he attempted to analyze social behavior as a means of human mind and self. Between 1910 and 1930, he extended this analysis to the psychological and philosophical framework of patriotism, mob action, politics and religious fanaticism, and their relation to the development of self in society. In order to stay within the time frame allotted to me, I will confine my discussion, however, just to Mead's analysis of patriotism.

Mead's discussion of patriotism is most clearly viewed within the perspective of Mead's argument for the evolution of the self and the mind in society as found in Mind, Self and Society, an edited version of the lectures Mead presented at the University of Chicago in the course "Social Psychology."[1] Mead stated that human society could not exist without human minds and human selves. Minds and selves, on the other hand, could not have developed but in the lower stages of the human social process, as it is through social behavior that minds and selves develop.

The human self (the social individual) is not, in Mead's view, innate in the human organism. Rather, it is the process by which human communication and social interaction are internalized. We take from the social interactive process, the social act, our own response as well as the response of others within the social situation. We reflect on our social experience and govern our behavior in future social situations in light of this reflection. This process of internalization and reflection is the mechanism by which the human self develops. The development of the self, then, is the process of living together which takes place through human communication.

There are two stages in the development of self. The first stage consists of organizing the attitudes of par-

ticular human organisms toward both our self and other selves engaged in specific social acts. In other words, we use past experience to predict how those around us will react to a particular behavior in a given social situation and choose our own behavior accordingly. A second step in the process of the development of the self is that of universalizing the responses of those around us into common social attitudes, a process which Mead described as the development of the "generalized other". The attitudes of the generalized other become the standard by which we measure our own behavior. The process of measuring self behavior against the generalized other is self consciousness.

When humans have become self conscious (have developed a self in Mead's sense) they can reflect upon the attitude of the community and either conform to or deny that attitude. Behavior of a self conscious human being, then, is not instinctive, it is purposive choice. We are stimulated by the self to take the attitude of the community, but we can choose not to accept that attitude. We analyze the social result of each possible response within a social act and choose the response we will make. This is not a conditioned choice, it is an intelligent or reflective choice.

The human mind is a social phenomena that develops within the social process. The ability to reflect on the relation between our own behavior and the attitudes of the generalized other is the indication of the presence of the human mind. Reflectiveness is the key. We reflect on our own experience in light of the group experience, in order to choose responses to be made within a social act. After we act, we know what we have done. But, having a mind is more than recognizing what we have done and how others responded to that action. Human beings are able to choose their future behavior. Humans are able to consider what the probable responses of others will be to their actions before acting. It is the delayed reaction that is necessary to intelligent conduct. We organize, test and select responses to stimuli before we act. Human beings, thereby, control behavior consciously. The human mind reflects upon the experience of the past to solve the problems of the present. The experience in past social actions becomes the basis for choosing responses in the present social actions projected into the future. The perceived past reaches into the future to determine the present. The future, which appears as uncertain but intelligible, marks the field in which the mind operates.[2]

Mead asserts that self conscious human beings assume

the attitude of the group and govern their own behavior accordingly. In a community, individuals have rights within the community, and duties to that community - they are both citizens and members of that community. These rights and duties inhere in all members of the community. When a self conscious human being accepts the attitude of the generalized other concerning common social problems, an attitude develops toward those people joined in a common undertaking. Each individual self identifies with the generalized other and social cooperation results. However, when the human self totally accepts the attitude of the generalized other, reflective activity is suspended and the individual is only capable of habitual social responses mediated by those attitudes. The result is social control.[3]

Not every action a human being performs, then, is the result of reflective mind. Habitual social responses are generated by taking the attitude of the generalized other. Mead held that some habitual social responses are the result of instinctive behavior similar to the instinctive behavior of lower animals.[4] In his view, the family is the fundamental unit of society, both human and animal, a unit based on the instincts of reproduction, the maintenance of species, cooperation and mutual protection. This fundamental unit has been generalized in human society, however, to include the clan, the tribe and the state. The natural instincts for cooperation and mutual protection have also been generalized to include the larger social group.

The hostile instinct that prompts animals to protect themselves from others is present in human beings in the form of self preservation. In human society, however, the hostile instinct has been mediated by what Mead termed friendly instincts, cooperation and sympathy. The conflict between these hostile and friendly instincts have resulted in a modification of behavior in human social life. Cooperation and adjustment to others have been incorporated into social acts by human beings acting reflectively.[5]

Instinctive hostility is still present, however, in our inclination to oppose outsiders, be cautious with newcomers and in our tendency to use our system of manners to keep strangers at a distance. This instinctive opposition to outsiders is reflected by an attitude of solidarity within the social group. Mead characterized group solidarity as instinctive, nonreflective behavior. Individual differences between group members are obliterated in the common attitude of the social group toward those outside the social group. The individual, as a member of the group defending itself from an outsider, becomes aware of self not

as a reflective self, but as a functional member of the group. When individuals join a group against an outsider, the individual self is an assertion of the group self. The self becomes a representation of the generalized other.[6] This nonreflective acceptance of the attitude of the generalized other, according to Mead, can be seen in mobs, political parties, religious cults and patriotism.

With that framework in mind, let us now look more closely at Mead's analysis of the attitudes and behaviors termed patriotism. In his article "Psychology of Punative Justice," Mead stated, "To many a man his country has become infinitely valuable because he finds himself willing to fight and die for it when the common impulse of attack upon the common enemy has been aroused. . . Property becomes sacred not because of its social uses, but because all of the community is as one in its defense. . ."[7] The point Mead is making is this, "It is a great deal easier to feel than it is to think."[8] When our hostile instinct is aroused by the need to defend our group or nation the individual self is fused with the community self by the emotion of hatred for the enemy - the outsider. We clearly see and totally accept what the group stands for. We act instinctively, not reflectively. The hostile instinct of self preservation becomes group preservation and all other instincts are held in abeyance. In Mead's words, "There is no ground upon which men get together so readily as that of a common enemy."[9]

Since other instincts are in abeyance when we react to the need to protect the social group, and since, the individual self is subsumed in the community self, we are not acting reflectively. When humans are not acting reflectively, but are accepting the attitude and behavior of the generalized other, social friction is reduced. Group members behave uniformly. This temporary relief from social friction, this unanimity of behavior is, according to Mead, largely responsible for the emotional response we label patriotism.[10]

Patriotism, described by Mead, as an emotional fusion into a common self, a conjunction of individual self with the community self, is at its peak when a human feels that security is threatened. When we fear a common enemy the focus is on that enemy, not on the self. According to Mead, behind both patriotism and mob action lies the same psychological mechanism. Whether this mechanism is used to serve fine or ignoble ends depends on the enemy faced and the values that hatred of that enemy represent.[11] It would appear that whether behavior should be labeled patriotism or mob action is an ethical question.

Mead claims that wars, for example, have both ethical and psychological causes. The ethical cause is a reflection of the issues to be settled by military action. The psychological cause, however, is the same for both sides in the conflict - the reluctance to lose that peculiar national self consciousness and sense of national superiority that humans feel when they allow themselves to become a common self against a common enemy.[12] It is through this national self-consciousness that we distinguish and separate ourselves from other nations. It is by this national self-consciousness that we constitute what we are as a group to ourselves.[13]

What Mead has said is that patriotism is the emotion we feel when we subsume our individual reflective self in the community self, when we merge our own self with the generalized other in order to present a united front toward a common enemy. It is the emotion that allows a man or a woman to overcome the instinct of self preservation and become willing to fight and even die for the preservation of the group.

In the grip of this emotion, individuals no longer act reflectively. They accept the attitude of the generalized other. On its positive side, patriotism becomes a mechanism of social control that overcomes one's own instinct of self preservation in order to defend the social group. On its negative side, it can degenerate into unthinking mob behavior and race hatred, similar to what we have seen for so long in the Klu Klux Klan, similar indeed, to behavior we have seen toward Iranisn immigrants in this country since last November. As Mead said in "National-Mindedness and International Mindedness," "We have no direct control over our loves and our hates, our likes and our dislikes, and for this reason we are relatively helpless when a common enemy fuses us all into a common patriotic pack or stampedes us under the influences of sympathetic terror."[14]

But has Mead clearly demonstrated that patriotism is just a mechanism of social control? Has he demonstrated that patriotism includes the suspension of reflective behavior? If we accept Mead's argument concerning the evolution of the self in society, we can also easily accept his argument that the individual self and the community self are fused by the emotion of patriotism when the social group is threatened. It does not seem to follow, however, that this fusion is the inevitable result of instinctive behavior rather than reflective choice.

According to Mead, reflective behavior is suspended when humans are gripped by the emotion of patriotism and instinctive behavior takes over. Patriotic behavior is in his view, habitual social behavior conditioned by human instincts. It is purely a mechanical form of social control. Social cooperation, on the other hand, is reflective behavior. Individual selves reflect upon the social situation and choose to accept the attitude of the generalized other. They choose to cooperate for the good of the social group.

If patriotism were nonreflective, if it were simply an emotional mechanism of social control, one could not feel patriotic and be unwilling to fight for one's country. All conscientious objectors would, by definition, be unpatriotic. Is that indeed the case? Are patriotism and conscientious objection mutually exclusive? I don't think that most of us would hold that to be the case. The man who is a conscientious objector for religious reasons, but now is willing to leave his home and give up his job to perform social service for the good of his country during war time, even though he cannot in all good conscience engage in combat, could be said to be behaving patriotically. It would also appear he is acting reflectively. He has had to weight two conflicting values - his religious tenets and his desire to join his community in fighting a common enemy - in order to decide how he will respond to the threat to the social group. His behavior is reflective, not habitual. His behavior is an illustration of social cooperation, not social control.

Mead appears to have confused observable behavior with the meaning of that behavior. While Mead may have demonstrated that the emotion of patriotism causes human beings to accept the attitude of the generalized other, he has not demonstrated that this acceptance includes a suspension of reflective action. It would appear that patriotic behavior may be either habitual or reflective behavior.

The question of whether or not patriotic behavior is always habitual has ramification for educators in elementary and secondary schools. A perusal of recent letters to the editors in newspapers and popular periodicals generated by the situation in Iran and Afganistan and the reinstitution of draft registration in this country indicates that a number of American citizens hold our educational system responsible for the waning level of patriotism. Should educators accept the responsibility for the level of patriotism exhibited by American citizens? If so, what are the ramifications of such acceptance?

Mead would say that the level of patriotism changes as our ability to clearly perceive a threat to our national security changes. We need a focal point for our emotion. Moral issues alone are not strong enough to generate the emotion necessary to merge individual selves into a common self. The focus of emotion is stronger through the mechanism of having a potential victor and a potential party to vanguish, of having an individual or group of individuals to focus on.

It may be that Americans have not had an identifiable enemy during the past thirty years and therefore have been behaving less patriotically. The moral, the economic and the political issues involved in the struggle between democracy and communism since the 1950's have not provided that identifiable enemy. Communism has become faceless. There have been few overt hostile acts by the Soviets that would clearly mark them as a threat to national security. Moreover the scientific, economic and cultural exchange with the Soviets has softened our picture of the U.S.S.R. as a security threat. American patriotism was in evidence for a time during the Cuban missile crisis and is now evident in the attitude many U.S. citizens have towards Iran. Iran has become the emotional focus for Americans and we have seen a renewed surge of patriotism since November, 1979.

If Mead's analysis is correct, if patriotism is an emotional response to a common enemy, if patriotism is habitual behavior, educators will not be able to teach patriotism by requiring students to repeat the pledge of allegiance. Nor will students become patriotic by learning how to perform the mechanical skill of operating a voting machine or by studying a factual presentation of American history. The only way educators could teach patriotism would be by changing the focus of our social studies courses in order to emphasize the danger to the United States from an identifiable enemy and by promoting the attitude that we are, as a group, superior to that enemy, an approach that to many carries the negative implication of indoctrination.

Mead, as a social psychologist, held that the difference between primitive and civilized human society was the level of social determination in individual action. The more primitive the society, the more social determination was exhibited in behavior.[15] American educational rhetoric would indicate we hold a similar view. Mead, as a pragmatic philosopher, held that the evolution of the intelligent mind was basic to social progress from the primitive

to the civilized.[16] Again, American educational rhetoric indicates we hold a similar view. It would appear, then, that we could not accept the responsibility for the development of patriotism in American citizens if indoctrination were the requisite teaching methodology as this method is in direct conflict with what many hold to be the primary goal of the educational system - the development of a society of independent reflective selves capable of intelligent, purposive choice.

If, however, we accept the possibility that patriotism may be a reflective behavior exhibited in social cooperation, we could, perhaps, accept the responsibility for teaching patriotism. The approach, however, would be very different from that of indoctrination. The teaching methodology would include problem solving and reflective choice making in situations where values are in conflict. This teaching methodology would have as its aim the development of self-conscious individuals capable of reflective behavior.

FOOTNOTES

1. George Herbert Mead, Mind, Self and Society from the Standpoint of a Social Behaviorist. Edited, with an introduction, by Charles W. Morris. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1934.

2. George Herbert Mead, The Philosophy of the Act. Edited, with an introduction, by Charles W. Morris, in collaboration with John M. Brewster, Albert W. Dunham and David L. Miller. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1938. p. 58.

3. George Herbert Mead, Movements of Thought in the Nineteenth Century. Edited, with an introduction, by Merritt H. Moore. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1936. p. 101.

4. George Herbert Mead, "The Psychology of Punative Justice," The American Journal of Sociology, XXIII (1917-1918), 577-602. p. 578.

5. "The Psychology of Punative Justice." p. 579.

6. "The Psychology of Punative Justice." p. 582.

7. "The Psychology of Punative Justice." p. 590.

8. George Herbert Mead, "National-Mindedness and International-Mindedness," International Journal of Ethics, XXXIX (1929), 392-407. p. 401.

9. "The Psychology of Punative Justice." p. 599.

10. "The Psychology of Punative Justice." p. 600.

11. "National-Mindedness and International-Mindedness." p. 393.

12. George Herbert Mead, "The Psychological Basis of Internationalism," Survey, XXXIII (1914-1915), 604-607. p. 606.

13. "National-Mindedness and International-Mindedness." p. 394.

14. "National-Mindedness and International-Mindedness." p. 396.

15. Mind, Self and Society. p. 221.

16. Movements of Thought in the Nineteenth Century. p. 351.

PLAYFUL GAMING*

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Introduction

Playful gaming may be seen as a category for the analysis of play and games. Though not a treatise on the definition of play or game, the paper may be seen as a modest contribution in that direction. The existential possibility of playful gaming is demonstrated logically, through a synthesis of play and games, and functionally through a examination of instances where it makes sense to speak of games that are more or less playful the significance of playful gaming to education is demonstrated in the analyses made of Plato's, Dewey's, Sartre's and Marcuse's theories of play, the synthesis of an instructional game-category for the translation of an educational ideal into practice, and the analysis of the learning of norms and values in political and educational socialization games.

Playful Gaming

Playful gaming may be seen as an activity that occurs in all games that are played. Since games are not always played, as in games where players do not want to play, it seems logical to point out that not all gaming in a game is also playful. Games that are playful, or playful games, vary according to the degree to which playing in a game is more or less emphasized, depending on the purpose or theory for which each playful game is used. But since all playful games are, by definition, playful, we conclude that common to all playful games that are gamed is playful gaming.

Abstracting from this observation, we also conclude that playful gaming may be seen as an idea or metaphysical category in which playing and gaming are each a necessary, but not sufficient condition. As a result of the tendency of the human mind to conceptualize and abstract, playful gaming may be raised to the status of a concept or an idea or a category that becomes more or less firmly entrenced in the ideal but subjective cosmos of our imagination. Unless we

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can successfully argue against the possibility of its existence in ideal form, in our imagination, playful gaming may thence be used deductively in the study of games and games-like activities. Transcending all particulars or particular instances of playful games, playful gaming is not an idea of the Platonic type, but rather a synthetic a priori of the type found in Kantian metaphysics.[1]

The following objection may raise against the possibility of having a logically valid concept of playful gaming. It may be argued that there is no difference between "play" and "game", and thus make no sense to talk about "playful gaming" as a term with a meaning different from "gaming" (or "playing"). Indeed, in the literature on play and games, several authors use the term "play" and "game" interchangeably, as if they are logically coextensive.[2] If "play" and "game" have the same exact meaning, there is no sense in qualifying "game" with a term that has an identical meaning: nothing more is said about game other than that it is gamed.

A careful review of the literature on the nature of play and games leaves us with some commonly held or "residue" ideas. Play is seen as an activity that is voluntary and desired for its own sake, as an end in-itself. Games, on the other hand, are formally what they are because of their dependence on rules.[3] Thus rules make the game irrespective of the attitude of the players in the game. We conclude that since play and game are terms with different meanings, we may give playful gaming a new lease on life. Games may be gamed playfully, or not played at all.

A second objection against playful gaming may take the following form. It may be argued that as soon as play is saddled with rules, it becomes non-play; that its autotelic quality is lost by the imposition of, and dependence on, rules. Thus, it may be argued that as soon as play is encapsulated inside a set of game rules, it loses its play quality and becomes game. In other words, it may be said that rules in a game drown the play quality in play by making rules, rather than the activity itself, the defining factor.[4] Since games were earlier defined as necessarily controlled by rules, then if by "playful" in playful gaming one means play controlled by rules, playful gaming may be a contradiction in terms.

The basic flaw in this objection is its failure to distinguish between rules that are externally imposed, and rules that are intrinsic or self-imposed. The latter may

occur in play, since they emanate from the player himself; the former may be found only in non-play activities, including in games that are not played, that is, in games where the factivity is externally imposed. Thus there seems to be nothing essential about game rules that characterize them as playful or not, other than the attitude of the players toward game rules as being their rules. Any game may become playful once its players decide voluntarily to accept its rules. In this "borrowing" of rules from a game, the players may be less creatively playing under borrowed, rather than self-developed rules, but since their rules are self-imposed, they are nevertheless playing. Or, put more abstractly, they are playfully gaming.

One should also consider the fact that play may have rules apart from any borrowing from, or relation to a game. It has been argued that all play that involves the faculty of imagination is necessarily representational, and, therefore, also ruled.[5] This view has been defended on the ground that in play, one is not unreflectively living himself out, but imaginatively projecting the play situation that, as a rule, most be consciously represented and differentiated in order for it to continue to be play. According to Vygotsky, this is the reason why players are more conscious of rules in their play, than in their non-play.[6] He offered an illustration of two sisters who decided to play sisters: The sisters now played sisters according to the rules of sisterhood, whereas before, they were living their role as sisters without consciously generalizing and representing themselves as sisters.

Though the objection may be raised that not all play is representational,[7] the significant point for our purposes here is that if it can be shown that play has rules, they are always self-imposed. Stated another way, rules that are played but played outside the context of a game, are more spontaneously grounded in the player than rules that are borrowed and played in a game; in both circumstances, however, rules are self-imposed, and, therefore, played.

It follows logically from our analysis that if a game could be forced on the players, it would cease to be play. The two terms, play and game, should be carefully used in order to account for the fact that rules in play are always self-imposed, as compared to game rules, which may or may not be. thus one of the necessary, though by no means sufficient, criteria in the analysis of play and games is the voluntariness of rules. We conclude that playful gaming may be seen as a metaphysical category that allows someone to rate the rules in a particular game according to their

degree of playfulness, that is, according to the degree to which players feel that game rules are self, rather than externally imposed.

Play and Political Education

It has been maintained that in play, players represent.[8] Since representation occurs through the faculty of imagination, this means that in play, players also imagine. That play is imaginative, especially after three years of age, is widely held in the literature.[9] As imagination, play is "unreal" in so far as it harbors only possibilities. In imagining the possible and projecting it into the future, play never leaves non-play, but is played out in the midst of non-play. Consequently, the unreality of play is not a characteristic of play, but of the fact that the surrounding reality is not playful.[10]

In order to understand this comparison (of play to reality) better, let us compare play, which is v o l u n t a r y a n d i m a g i n a t i v e, w i t h S a r t r e' s phenomenological ontology. The for-itself secrets a nothingness in the in-itself, and imaginatively projects a possibility in the in-itself. Thus the in-itself is necessary for the for-itself to arise as a for-itself. Similarly with the "realness" of play; play may be seen as unreal only if the reality surrounding play is non-play. Once the reality around play becomes play, then play becomes "real" (and reality playful) while what was before real, now is pushed aside into either the unreal or the marginally real.

The underlying assumption in the above argument is that as imagination, play acts like a Hegelian negation in the midst of non-play.[12] The political and social significance of this element of play has been realized only by a few, and then mostly by philosophers such as Plato, Schiller, Ruskin, Sartre and Marcuse.[13] Thus play may be seen as offering refuge to the repressed, since it allows the free play of imagination. Psychoanalysts have seen play as abreaction or compensation of painful experiences in non-play: players act out in play what they could not or would not do in non-play.[14]

It may be argued that to a political conservative, play represents a threat and he may try to control it. One way of controlling play is to abreact its voluntary basis by ossifying its rules into a game, and then force the game on the players who thus either cease to play, or, as we have seen in our analysis of play and game, above, adopt or

internalize game rules voluntarily. If rules are internalized as one's own, in the sense that they are seen as self-imposed, then playing in the game may continue as play, but play that "borrows" its freedom to create rules, from the rules of the game. Games fence play inside a manageable area that can be much more easily supervised than pure play. A conservative may design games that allow very little spontaneous, as contrasted to borrowed, creativity in play.

An example of a conservative who realized the political significance of play and games is Plato.[15] Misunderstanding his political philosophy, some writers saw in his blueprint for education a benevolent desire to allow youth to play freely and be educated and develop through "games".[16] But Plato repeatedly and explicitly emphasized his dislike for free and unbridled play, and carefully discriminated between games that will be used freely in order to select the elite, and games that will be carefully designed, prescribed and supervised in order to educate the masses, including the masses of children. In none of his games are the rules to be questioned or avoided by the players without suffering punishment by the state authorities.[17] Obviously, Plato's "games" should rate very low in spontaneous creativity, though their degree of playfulness would depend on the players' attitude toward the corresponding game rules.

In the other camp of political thinking, radical philosopher Herbert Marcuse saw the "play impulse" as the vehicle to liberation from the oppressive order of things.[18] Inspired by Schiller's critique of alienation as the result of dehumanizing work, Marcuse defended and described his utopian, though by no means necessarily unrealizable, society where work would become play and competition display.[19] In contrast to Plato's emphasis on the imposition of games, Marcuse grounded liberation in the ability of man to govern himself in play.[20]

In his encomium of play, Marcuse failed to appreciate fully either the internal dynamism of playful games, or the conservative role that games may be designed to play. Thus it is conceivable that in "abreacting" play, games undermine spontaneous creativity by changing it into creativity that is well fenced and borrowed from, or based on the limits prescribed by the rules in the game. He failed to realize that the "play impulse" may be thus incorporated into the prevailing reality and sublimated in the form of a more or less playful game. Thus emptied of a large part of its spontaneity and total freedom, the play impulse becomes politically less threatening to the status quo. Moreover,

the players in a game may become so engrossed in playing the game that they cannot see the hand of the game designer that lies behind the scenes. Consequently, due to the self-propelling effect of playful game rules on the players, the game may be played and have certain socialization outcomes without necessitating the presence of its designer to enforce it on the players.

A disciple of Marcuse's philosophy may be alarmed by this functional autonomy in playful games: games may be designed that, if played by the masses, may lead to the re-intergration of revolutionary play impulses that the masses may have developed in their free play of ideas and imagination, into the repressive order; and since there is no need to enforce the rules of a game that is carried forward by the players themselves, there is no need to enforce the game.

It may be argued that in modern society, where the communications media (T.V., radio, film, etc.) is by definition a network of representative signs, thus lending itself easier to play, games may be designed that can be played through the mass media.[21] These games have rules (rules of conduct, social expectations, what products count as desirable, etc.) that are widely disseminated through the media and known to the majority of people. The element of a playfulness in these media games may cause the audience, as a result of the joy and entertainment that may accompany play, to not only participate frequently, but also to project, identify with, and internalize the model values and behavior displayed in the media. Sugar-coated with play, media games may thus act as an agent of socialization, or "media socialization," into the mainstream, which may or may not be personally alienating. Without altering radically the ludic or play element in society, these media games may socialize its audience to not only accept non-play around them, but also to continue to depend on media games for some play in their lives.

Consequently, it may be argued that in places where the media is centrally controlled by a repressive status quo, the playful socialization games played in the media may act as an agent of repressive, albeit playful, socialization. Playful games may become a formidable weapon in the hands of a repressive status quo, whose control of the media enables it to underwrite, become a patron of, or design games whose playfulness and wide dissemination may stifle revolutionary impulse, prevent social conflict, or result in the re-integration of the oppressed in the social order that

oppresses them. With little effort and not a drop of blood, the state of domination is thus internalized, valued, and preserved by the oppressed themselves.[22]

Ironically, the same line of thought may lead one to argue that playful games may be used by the oppressed, and specifically by their leaders, to penetrate the repressive social order. Revolutionaries may design media socialization games, displayed in the underground press and other communications media controlled by anti-establishment forces, that may engage the attention of those who play in them to the repressive nature of the repressive order. This may be done using the same means as that which is used in the playful media socialization of the oppressed back into the repressive order, namely, through the medium of playful games. Although their ends are different, their means are the same: both the oppressor and the oppressed may use playful games in order to educate, influence, and redirect the masses. Thus, it is not a matter of which social ideal do all playful games, or, more abstractly, playful gaming, promote(s), because that depends on what playful game is used, and also how it is used. Since playful games may be more or less playful, and gamed in different ways, they may be made to serve different ideologies, beliefs, or purposes. The question that comes to mind, then, is how can playful games be made to serve those ideals that are said to be desirable.

In the following sections, this question will be dealt with in different ways, starting with what has been done, and ending in what might be done.

Unanswered Questions

At the present time, probably the best that can be done in order to investigate the extent to which games are linked to social behavior, is to extrapolate from studies in the psychology of play, to what the effects of playful games in the social arena might be.[23] There is obviously a need for clear conceptualization, leading ideas, and empirical research in this area. For example, are there playful games that lead necessarily or with a high degree of probability to specific socialization outcomes, and if there are, should we re-design our educational games to conform to our social values? If there are not, or if we decide to see games as ends rather than as means, then should we always use playful games only as a means for the achievement of game-extrinsic goals, or should we rethink and reconstruct radically our lives so that playful games are no longer "unreal", or a mere means to something else, but the essence and re-

ality of our lives?[24] The latter consideration seems especially pertinent today in light of the possibility, in the not too distant future, of a society that becomes technically automated and work-free. By "work-free" here is meant a society in which machines do all the monotonous, boring, and alienating labour, leaving humans free to work-play at things they really like. In that society, where all work is play, alienating labor may no longer be necessary as a means to happiness, though undoubtedly some will continue to see alienating labor as a desirable end in-itself. At any rate, the author makes no effort, in this paper, to analyze fully, let alone offer any answers, to all these problems, issues, and concerns. If anything, he has attempted to remove only some of the shrubs and wild bushes that proliferate in the wilderness of numerous, but sometimes uncritical studies of play and games.

Dewey's Theory of Play

In testing the existential validity of playful gaming, I have selected to review analytically Dewey's theory of play, and synthetically the theory of "freedom education".

In his overall theory of the nature of interest and its role in pedagogy, Dewey included games and play in his proposed curriculum[25] Dewey thought that education should be built on the interests and native needs of the students, and, therefore, students should be allowed to play, especially in early childhood; in playing freely, students not only quench their interests, but also manifest them visibly in action, thus offering the opportunity to their teacher to observe them at play and learn their interests.[26]

Thus Dewey did not think that education should be based on free play for its own sake, but only as a means for teachers to learn about the native needs and interests of their students. This is also evidenced in his belief that sooner or later teachers should intervene in children's play, and guide their play intelligently toward educationally and socially desirable goals. If that does not happen, then "play results in amusement and not in educative growth."[27] Or as he put it elsewhere, "play . . . changes into fooling and if habitually indulged in is demoralizing."[28]

It may be argued that in Dewey's theory of play in education we can discern a frail reflection of his belief, stated most clearly in Experience and Education, that impulse alone should not guide student behavior in school, but should allow intelligence, judgment, and observation to intervene.[29] This intervention of intelligence may be

compared to the intervention of the teacher in children's play: as a model whose authority is sanctioned by the social order generally, the teacher may represent intelligence and rationality to the child. At any rate, it follows logically from our analysis of playful gaming that in so far as Dewey advocated intervention from outside and certain limits be placed in child's play, to that extent he also believed that children's games should not be totally free and spontaneously engaged in, but controlled and supervised. It may even be argued that Dewey's problem-centered pedagogy resembles playful games that transcend free play by incorporating it into a set of game-rules designed benevolently by the teacher.

We may also note that if play is representational, then Dewey's fears concerning the cognitive role of play in education may be unfounded. Play may be inherently educative, not only as a means to educative growth, but as an educative experience in-itself. As representation, play engages the mind in symbolic activity, in the isolation, projection, representation and manipulation of meanings and ideas. It may be argued that if Dewey had realized the cognitive imperative of play, he may have considered it not only a means to educative growth, a mere sideshow that allows teachers to observe their students' native interests, but an activity with intrinsic educational value.

Finally, it should be noted that in free play, children may engage in democratic problem solving, an idea that has been tested and empirically verified in experience.[30] If empirical testing continues to show this to be true, then free play (or games that are very playful) may not only be intelligent, but also democratic and problem-oriented -- three aspects of play that are also important prerequisites in Dewey's theory of method in education.

If Dewey advocated games that are not free-play or "very" playful, as our analysis, above, has shown, they are not totally devoid of play, either. The author has not concerned himself, in this paper, with the detailed construction of a rating scale that measures exactly game playfulness. It suffices here to point out the fact that, using Dewey's theory of play as an example, we have illustrated the existential utility of playful gaming in the metaphysics of play and games.

Freedom Education

The ideal of "freedom education" was contrived by the author a few years ago on the basis of Dewey's and Sartre's

philosophies of freedom.[31] When he wrote this ideal, the author felt a pressing need to find an appropriate method for translating it into practice. It is submitted that playful games may be designed that meet the logical criteria for an appropriate method for this ideal. By "criteria" here is meant the basic premises in freedom education. Thus, nothing is said here about the effectiveness of these games in experience, other than that they may be designed; since little is known about the effectiveness of games, generally, it would be presumptuous and logically suicidal to claim that these games, if they can be designed, they will also necessarily bring about in experience the educational outcomes that are described as being desirable in freedom education. Their effectiveness can only become a hypothesis for empirical testing in experience. These playful games may be seen, if logically congruent with freedom education, as working hypotheses for empirically testing the effectiveness of freedom education via playful games. Of course, if after testing in experience the effectiveness of these playful games, we find that they are ineffective, that still does not show that freedom education may not be translated in practice, e.g., through means other than playful games, and certainly doesnot reflect on the coherence of freedom education as an internally consistent system.

Since these playful games share certain criteria in common, they form a game-category or group that, if described in the abstract, may be seen as a game metaphysic. Given that freedom education is neither Dewey's nor Sartre's theory of freedom and education, but a synthesis of the two into a new whole, this game-category may share some of the elements in the theories of play in Dewey and Sartre, but ultimately transcends both.

Dewey's theory of play has already been dealt with, in a previous section of the paper. According to Sartre, play releases subjectivity.[32] Because so completely self-ruled and self-regulated, pure play does not participate in the project of the for-itself to unite with the in-itself and become God; its rules are its own, and they are their own foundation. Thus in play man does not aspire to appropriate the in-itself or subjugate the world.[33] It may be argued that in Sartrean ontology, when man is playing, he is free even from the demands of Sartrean freedom.

Let us now proceed to lay down the foundations of the aforementioned game-metaphysic, which we will call FREEDOM. In FREEDOM, students participate in the invention of both

rules and rules about rules, or meta-rules. There is only one meta-meta-rule that is given or built into the game, namely that no rule may be made without first thinking of a meta-rule on which the rule is based. Rules and meta-rules parallel the structure of imaginative consciousness in Sartrean ontology: conscious that it is conscious, and also free to make itself be.[34] In allowing this open-ended choice at the top, students come face to face with their responsibility to make rules, rather than borrow them and thus fall completely into "bad faith".[35]

Since it is stipulated in freedom education that students should learn how to translate their self-awareness as choosers into intelligent action,[36] there are certain methodological imperatives that FREEDOM meets, not by imposing them on the students as game-rules or laws, but structurally through the process of making the game playful. Thus students borrow no rules from the teacher or designer of FREEDOM, but begin with a problem, the lack of rules. Subsequently, they solve this problem interactively with the teacher, who acts as a resource, and any later problems that come up, they solve on the basis of the rules they have made. As a result, they not only feel responsible for the choices they make (something which Sartre saw as desirable), but also focus their education on problem solving (desirable in Dewey).

Assuming that playfulness in a game motivates the player to continue playing, then since FREEDOM is very playful, it may be argued that, in playing FREEDOM, students look forward to return to wherever the game is played (the school, the classroom, or elsewhere) in order to continue playing. Anticipating their moves and play in the game, students look forward to return to the classroom to continue playing in FREEDOM, but prepare themselves and utilize all the resources available in social life while outside the classroom. This meets one of Dewey's most important criteria for education, namely, the desire for continuous and uninterrupted growth.

Since students or players in FREEDOM are allowed to participate in the invention of rules, FREEDOM registers the interest of the player in the game. By drawing to its orbit the interest of the player, FREEDOM motivates him to go on playing on the basis of his interest. The classroom is not seen in isolation from all the things that may be interesting outside its sphere of influence, such as, libraries, art institutes, industry or museums. It is the place where knowledge, ideas, learning, and problem solving are primarily played, whereas the world outside the

classroom is the place where this classroom play motivates students to continue learning and solving problems for, and in anticipation of, this play. Education that is built on the interest of the student is another important prerequisite in Dewey's theory of method in education.

Assuming that play is, to a certain extent, an exercise in the manipulation of meanings and ideas, then it may be argued that FREEDOM engages the player in thinking reflectively or intelligently in his play, which meets an important criterion in both Deweyan epistemology and Sartrean philosophy of freedom, and also in freedom education.

Finally, the role of the teacher in FREEDOM is transformed from one authority type to another: from institutional and antagonistic, to playful and cooperative. Since his authority over the meta-meta-rule is reflexive, he is also bound by the rules the meta-meta-rule may generate. His authority is not the authority of a dictator, but of a judge who must interpret the game according to a meta-meta-rule. Consequently, FREEDOM players do not feel their teacher's weight in the classroom as undesirable, but as a resource for the solution of problems. Again, this meets Dewey's pedagogical theories of teaching, Sartre's theory of self-government in play, and is strongly implied in freedom education.

As mentioned earlier, FREEDOM is not a <u>particular</u> game, but a lower order metaphysic of one <u>type</u> of playful games. It is adpatable to the teaching of differenet subjects, as diverse as philosophy, law, medicine, and sociology.[37] In conclusion, it is submitted that enough has been said to allow this adaptation to occur on the basis of the educational synthesis described in the ideal of "freedom education".

FOOTNOTES

1. Plato, Euthyrpo, Charmides, Phaedo, Laches, Republic, Meno, Laws, in The Dialogues of Plato, 4th edition, 4 vols., ed. B. Jowett (Oxford, England: Clarendon Press, 1953). Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason. tr. Norman Kemp Smith (New York: Macmillan, 1933); Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, tr. with introd. Lewis White Beck (New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1950).

2. There are almost countless examples of this usage of "play" and "game". The works cited, below, were selected without paying meticulous attention to including all the articles that fall under this category: see C. S. Byrum, "Philosophies as Play," Man and World: An International Philosophical Review, Vol. 8, No. 3 (Aug. 1975), pp. 311-26; R. F. Dearden, "The Concept of Play," The Concept of Education, ed. R. S. Peters (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1967), pp. 73-9; J. L. Esposito, "Play and Possibility," Philosophy Today (Summer 1974), pp. 137-47; Karl Groos, The Play of Man (New York: D. Appleton, 1901); J. Huizinga, Homo Ludens: A Study of the Play Element in Culture (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1949); K. Riezler, "Play of Little Children," Child's Play, ed. R. E. Huron and B. Sutton-Smith (New York: John Wiley, 1971); L. M. Hinman, "Nietzsche's Philosophy of Play," Philosophy Today (Summer 1974), pp. 106-24. There is a second group of writers on play who may not confuse the two terms in their writings, but show little awareness of, or interests in, the epistemology of play and games; a third group of writers shows more interest in the relationship between play and games, and some of the writers in this group are included in note no. 3, below.

3. B. Suits, "What is a Game?" Philosophy of Science, Vol. 34 (1967), pp. 148-56; Suits, The Grasshopper: Games, Life and Utopia (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1978); E. Radar, "A Genealogy: Play, Folklore and Art," Diogenes, No. 103 (Fall 1978), pp. 78-99; R. Burke, "'Work' and 'Play'," Ethics, Vol. 82, No. 1 (Oct. 1971), pp. 33-47; C. Cherry, "Games and Language," Mind, Vol. 84, pp. 528-47; J. von Neumann & O. Morganstern, Theory of Games and Economic Development (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1944); P. Weiss, Sport: A Philosophic Inquiry (Carbondale, Ill.: Southern Illinois University Press, 1969). There are also many works in the psychology of plays, some of which are included in note no. 23, below.

4. P. Weiss wrote that the difference between play and games is a matter of emphasis on rules. As he put it, "It is a rare game in which there is not a considerable expression of spontaneity, but the spontaneity is normally kept within the confines of the rules. If freshly forged, the game is still kept in consonance with accepted rules. Because there is spontaneity in a game we are justified in saying that a game is 'played'. Play, though, puts its emphasis on the spontaneity, and not on the rules." Sport: Inquiry, p. 146. This "mild" view of the difference between play and games by Weiss may be contrasted to the "hard" view held by a group of writers who see play and games as polar opposites. For example, Alvin W. Ross maintained that games are, on account of several of their characteristics, including rules, "point-for-point antitheses of what we here suggest to be the characteristics of 'play'." Ross, "Toward Understanding the Concept and Function of Play," Educational Theory, Vol. 6, No. 1 (Jan. 1956), p. 23n.

5. L. S. Vygotsky, "Play and Its Role in the Mental Development of the Child," Play: Its Role in Development and Evolution, ed. J. S. Bruner, A. Jolly and K. Sylva (New York: Basic Books, 1976), pp. 537-54.

6. According to Vygotsky, "there is no such thing as play without rules. . ." Play, p. 541.

7. For example, someone may argue that some of the play-instances in Jean Piaget's observations of infants-at-play are not representational. See J. Piaget, Play, Dreams and Imitation in Childhood (New York: W. W. Norton, 1962), pp. 6-146.

8. Vygotsky, Play; S. K. Langer, Philosophy in a New Key (New York: Mentor, 1974), pp. 126-28; E. Fink, "The Ontology of Play," Philosophy Today (Summer 1974), pp. 147-61; Fink, "The Oasis of Happiness: Toward an Ontology of Play," Games, Play, Literature, ed. J. Ehrmann (Boston: Beacon Press, 1968).

9. In addition to the works by Fink and Langer, cited in note no. 8, above, there are several works in philosophy and psychology that analyze the imaginative aspect of play. In philosophy, see John Dewey's account in "Imagination and Play," The School and Society, reprinted in John Dewey: The Middle Works, 1899-1924, Vol. 1: 1899-1901, ed. Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondale, Ill.: Southern Illinois University Press, 1976), pp. 85-6; Dewey, "The

Second Stage or Play Period," Middle Works, Vol. 1, pp. 194-210; Dewey, "Play, Work, and Allied Forms of Activity," How We Think, reprinted in Middle Works, Vol. 6, pp. 307-11. H. G. Gadamer, "Play as a Clue to Ontological Explanation," Truth and Method (New York: The Seabury Press, 1975), pp. 91-106. J. P. Sartre, Being and Nothingness (New York: Washington Square Press, 1953), pp. 710-17. H. Marcuse, Eros and Civilization (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966), pp. 177-96. In psychology, see Piaget's work, cited in note no. 7, and J. N. Lieberman, Playfulness: Its Relationship to Imagination and Creativity (New York: Academic Press, 1977) for a resourceful guide and analysis. G. H. Mead's analysis of the "generalized other" in game-like behavior may be seen as a sociological explanation of the learning of norms involving the play of the imagination. G. H. Mead, Mind, Self and Society (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1934).

10. Most writers who compare play to reality do so as a way of showing the permanent "unreality" of play. The unreality of play is discussed in Ehrmann, Game, Play, Literature. Only a few have seen a different reality in play. Of the latter, See Schiller's, Plato's, Ruskin's, Sartre's and Marcuse's works where they discuss play, in note no. 13, below.

11. Sartre, Being and Nothingness.

12. G. W. F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Mind, tr. J. B. Baillie (London: G. Allen & Unwin, 1964).

13. Plato, Laws, Bk. VII, 797-98; also Laws, Bk. I, 643b; Republic, Bk, IV, 424a. Friedrich Schiller, On the Aesthetic Education of Man, tr. Regionald Snell (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1954). Schiller's political argument on the relationship between play, education and liberation cannot be seen, understood fully, or appreciated if only some of his letters in Education are read; the logical coherence and force of his argument are carefully built from letter to letter, and all the letters must be read to appreciate fully his ideas on play (e.g., in letters 14 & 15). John Ruskin, The Works of John Ruskin, ed. E. T. Cook & A. Wedderburn (New York: Longmans, Green, 19803-1912). Marcuse, Eros and Civilization.

14. E. H. Erikson, Play and Development (New York: W. W. Norton, 1972); Erikson, "Toys and Reasons," Childhood

and Society (New York: W. W. Norton, 1950). S. Freud, "Beyond the Pleasure Principle," The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Vol. 18, ed. J. Strachey (London: The Hogarth Press and The Institute of Psychoanalysis, 1955), pp. 7-64. See, also, the pertinent reviews of the relationship between psychoanalysis and play in R. E. Herron & B. S. Smith, Child's Play, pp. 107-84; and S. Millar, The Psychology of Play (Baltimore: Penguin, 1968).

15. Esp. in the Laws and the Republic. See note no. 13, above, for the exact references to Plato's works.

16. See, for example, G. Ardley, "The Role of Play in the Philosophy of Plato," Philosophy, No. 42 (July 1967), pp. 226-44.

17. As Plato put it, "The legislator must somehow find a way of implanting this reverence for antiquity, and I would propose the following way: People are apt to fancy, as I was saying before, that when the plays of children are altered they are merely plays, not seeing that the most serious and detrimental consequences arise out of the change; and they readily comply with the child's wishes instead of deterring him, not considering that these children who make innovations in their games, when they grow up to be men, will be different from the last generation of children, and, being different, will desire a different sort of life, and under the influence of this desire will want other institutions and laws; and no one of them reflects that there will follow what I just now called the greatest of evils to states. . . . Must we not, then, try in every possible way to prevent our youth from even desiring to imitate new modes either in dance or song? nor must anyone be allowed to offer them varieties of pleasures." Laws, Bk, VII, 798b/e. Priests and priestesses, "acting in concert with guardians of the law," will be able to punish severely anyone who does not obey or conform; Laws, Bk. VII, 799b/d (Jowett's translation). Plato's thought on play in the Republic is paternalistic and less punitive, but still interventionist and propaedeutic; Republic, Bk. IV, 422e, 424a; Bk. VII, 537a.

18. Marcuse, Eros and Civilization.

19. Marcuse, Eros and Civilization, pp. 188, 190. Schiller, Aesthetic Education, letters 14, 15.

20. Marcuse, Eros and Civilization, pp. 195, 222-23.

21. For a play theory of mass communication, see W. Stephenson, The Play Theory of Mass Communication (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967).

22. An incisive, philosophic-characteriological analysis of the internalization and preservation by the oppressed of the state of domination may be found in Albert Memmi's well known book Dominated Man (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969).

23. S. Millar, The Psychology of Play, R. E. Herron and B. Sutton-Smith, Child's Play. J. S. Bruner, A. Jolly, and K. Sylva, Play: Its Role in Development and Evolution. J. N. Lieberman, Playfulness: Its Relationship to Imagination and Creativity. In addition to the above works, which have been cited in earlier notes, see, also, J. L. Singer's pioneer work on imaginative play, The Child's World of Make-Believe: Experimental Studies of Imaginative Play (New York: Academic Press, 1973).

24. In his game-like treatise on games and utopia, Bernard Suits concluded his (the grasshopper's) dialogue by asking, stoically, the same question of his readers (other characters in dialogue); B. Suits, The Grasshopper: Games, Life and Utopia.

25. J. Dewey, "Play and Work in the Curriculum," Democracy and Education (New York: The Free Press, 1944), pp. 194-206; Interest and Effort in Education (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1913); esp. his discussion of Froebel, and his analysis of play in pp. 66-89; "Imagination and Play," School and Society; "The Second Stage or Play Period," Middle Works; "Play, Work, and Allied Forms of Activity," How We Think.

26. Dewey, Interest and Effort, pp. 76-80, 86

27. Dewey, School and Society, Middle Works, p. 88.

28. Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 203.

29. Dewey, Experience and Education (New York: Collier, 1963).

30. S. K. Polgar, "The Social Context of Games," Sociology of Education, Vol. 49 (October 1976), pp. 265-71.

31. A. Makedon, "Freedom Education: Toward an Educational Synthesis of Dewey's and Sartre's Philosophies of Freedom," Proceedings of the Annual Conference of the Midwest Philosophy of Education Society 1977, ed. R. Craig and F. C. Neff (Detroit: MWPES, 1978), pp. 34-43.

32. Sartre, Being and Nothingness, p. 711.

33. Sartre, Being and Nothingness, pp. 710-12. Several authors wrote on Sartre's philosophy of play; though Sartre himself did not write extensively on the subject of play, his philosophy of freedom is such that it may be seen as an extension of his theory of play. J. P. Fell, "The Ethics of Play and Freedom: Conversion," Heidegger and Sartre (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979), pp. 129-51. W. L. McBride, "Play," in "Jean Paul Sartre," Existential Philosophers: Kierkergaard to Merleau-Ponty, ed. G. A. Schrader, Jr., (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967), pp. 283-88. R. Netzky, "Playful Freedom: Sartre's Ontology Re-appraised," Philosophy Today (Summer 1974), pp. 125-36.

34. Rules and meta-rules in this game-metaphysic may be compared to H. L. A. Hart's view of law as a combination of primary and secondary rules. H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 1961). Thus, a meta-rule may be compared to a secondary rule or a law in the U. S. Constitution that may not guide action directly in particular circumstances, but is itself the basis for more situation-specific rules or laws.

35. "Bad faith" is Sartre's term of living without acknowledging that one is free. See his chapter on "bad faith" in Being and Nothingness.

36. Makedon, Freedom Education, pp. 40-41.

37. The author designed an instructional role-play game for teaching philosophy of education that allows students to participate as choosers and learners in the course. A. Makedon, "Challenge: An Instructional Game Designed for the Teaching of Philosophy of Education," unpublished monograph.

PERSPECTIVES ON DEFINITIONS IN EDUCATION: TOWARD A CULTUROLOGICAL VIEW

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The literature on the subject of definitions leaves many questions unresolved. This paper represents an attempt to clarify the use, structure, and meaning of definitions both in a general sense and as they are related to the field of education. The conclusions drawn are to be regarded as tentative and exploratory. Part of the problem relates to both the motivation for defining concepts to the point of operationalism and the "felt difficulties" that lead to definitions. At the lowest levels of abstraction, definitions are merely names for objects. At the highest levels they represent equational statements where one symbol is the equivalent of several other symbols or where the relationships may be capable of some kind of empirical verification. Some pertinent questions in relation to definitions are: What is the basis for a definition? Is a language equation mathematical in nature? To what degree do experience and interaction have an impact on definitions?

At the simplest perceptual level a definition is a description of a physical object. The word "chair," for example, has a physical referent. The object may be defined according to the experience of the observer. However, if we move up to a higher level of abstraction, definitions may lose their direct relationship with a physical referent, resulting in less agreement about the definition (or concept) in question. Consider the terms "education," "intelligence," and "matter" as examples. It is because of the higher levels of abstraction that rules and guides for definition development are needed. Indeed, the thrust of scientific inquiry has implicitly fostered the need for a careful defining of objects, terms and concepts. The problem can be stated in another way. Many writers and observers seem to say that by the act of defining we have ordered and structured (even controlled) the phenomena under consideration. Actually, just the opposite may be the case. That is, experience may be the greater influence in terms of the derivation of definitions. Does defining education guide and control our behavior and reactions in the field of education and our attitudes toward education? How we define something though, is important, and, to paraphrase the sociologist W. I. Thomas, things which are defined as real are real in their consequences.

In his monograph, Hempel[1] has stated that a nominal definition is a stipulation that a specified expression (definiendum) is to be synonymous with a certain other expression (definiens). For example, $E_1 = E_2$ is merely a tautological statement. A real definition, in contrast, states the essential characteristics of some entity. This would be similar to the lowest level of definition noted earlier, although it includes the area of empirical analysis, such as x is a living organism if it has essential characteristics a, b, and c. Hempel has stated that the social sciences often overemphasize "the need for 'operational definitions'[2] to the neglect of the requirement of systematic import."[2] This raises a question as to whether or not future research will determine the theoretical importance of definitions. The same observation could be applied to the field of education, with the current emphasis on accountability and the felt need to define concepts operationally. Hempel has concluded that ". . .science will often have to avail itself of the vocabulary[3] of conversational language with all its imperfections."[3]

A. J. Ayer, by comparison, asserts that there are only two kinds of definitions, "explicit" ones and those "in use." Dictionaries contain explicit definitions. A term is defined explicitly when we put forth another term or terms which are synonymous with it.[4] We define a symbol "in use" by showing how the sentences in which it significantly occurs can be translated into equivalent sentences which contain neither the definiendum nor any of its synonyms. This would be the equivalent of synthetic statements, or real definitions, which would require empirical validation to assess their truth or falsehood. It is "in use" definitions that provide clarification and elucidation. Logic itself, according to Ayer, is a study of the syntax and construction of a language which provides the core of philosophical analysis. Interestingly though, Ayer asserts that the "framing of definitions" could be considered a "creative act" when analytic truths are elucidated.

In regard to the relationship and/or importance of definitions to education, Hempel and Ayer have had little to say on the subject. However, Scheffler, in his article "Definitions in Education,"[5] described various types of definitions but concluded by comparing education to art. Definitions have no legal significance but serve only to express changing conceptions of the artist's or educator's task. Scheffler makes the following claims regarding definitions: there are alternate descriptions of things, especially abstractions such as the state, society, or man; there is always the possibility of altering prior usage

to convey a practical program; definitions of social terms do not yield consequences at all, but require contextual supplementation of principles of action.[6] In Scheffler's view there is nothing especially sacred about definitions or the ways in which they are derived. He notes that some definitions may be both descriptive and programmatic, depending upon the context.[7]

Very often, it seems that programs are inaugurated in education and then are further defined after there have been attempts to implement them. The "accountability" movement is an example. The program is implemented and is then refined by more precise definitions. Although definitions can and do provide precision and do require some thinking about a particular subject or program, they have value only in particular contexts. Deriving definitions is not a methodology in itself, nor are definitions devoid of affective content. Scheffler makes reference to persuasive definitions which are emotive, implying feelings and attitudes. Their purpose is to stimulate new responses in the hearer. If we adopt a particular definition it will have consequences; therefore, attention must be given to its practical meaning. This is important for education as well as for other disciplines. If, for example, accountability were to be defined as a system for placing the responsibility for the achievement (by others) of predetermined, measurable goals within a specified time frame, then accountability will imply specified outcomes and modes of behavior.

Definitions could range on a continuum from particularistic (or operational) to holistic. Illich, for example, has promoted the idea of "deschooling" society.[8] From a definitional perspective it is necessary that we know what he means by this term in its most comprehensive sense. However, when it comes time to implement a deschooling process, then the definition must be operationalized. The same holds true for accountability. Deschooling could fall into several of Scheffler's categories, depending on the context and usage.

The point is that definitions should be used for purposes of clarification. Their derivation is not a matter of dogma but, rather, is reflective of creativity and flexibility. Practitioners in the field of education should be able to adopt a particular point of view regarding definitions that suits their particular purposes, intellectual activities, and affective predilections.

Specifically, we should ask, of what importance or

significance are definitions and theories of definitions to education? Their significance is inextricably tied to educational philosophies. There is a relationship between one's Weltanschauung and consequent points of view regarding education. The importance of this cannot be ignored in dealing with educational decision makers who can have a financial and programmatic impact on education. It may be that persons who are holistic in approach may be more inclined to use definitional constructs that are broad in scope, while particularistic definitions may be more strongly associated with bureaucratic and narrowly focused programs. In Anthropology, Benjamin Whorf and Edward Sapir developed the hypothesis, based upon their studies of the Navajo Indians, that words, referents, and meanings of a language will result in each language group having a particular and unique notion of the objective world. Language structures reality and serves as a mediator between the individual language carrier and his/her environment. Consequently, definitions built into syntax will serve, in a sense, as a priori definers of "what's out there."

By studying the language of other cultures we can come to an understanding of what their realities are. We can do the same thing within our own associations. With awareness of definitions that particular individuals or organizations use we are better able to assess the meaning and intent of their actions. Much of this is done, of course, at the common sense level of experience. However, our insights and analyses can be augmented by careful attention to definitional and theoretical constructs of those organizations we are compelled to deal with.

A good deal of organizational malaise can be attributed to either over-defining or under-defining what it is we're talking about. Previous examples in this paper will suffice to illustrate the point. Accountability, as one example, suffers from "over-definition" so that objectives and goals become so narrow that the overall view of what we're trying to accomplish can become lost. In a similar way, definitions, associated with reform movements, remain so unoperationalized that we are left in a quandary as to how to proceed if we attempted to implement some of the ideas. The need, then, is for definitions that are of the "middle range"[9] (to borrow a concept from the sociologist Robert Merton[9]); that is, definitions and concepts that provide an overall understanding of objectives so that we can comprehend the larger view, yet provide implementable procedures for practitioners and students. Those

who call for broad educational reform often leave us wondering what to do on an everyday basis to bring the changes about. At the same time, those bureaucracies that objectify processes can provide nothing more than aggravation and the completion of forms and procedures. The need is for analytical insight that moves up and down levels of abstraction so that definitional concepts and workable programs result.

Economics is divided into "macro" and "micro" concepts as an evaluative tool to analyze market and exchange phenomena. Although this dichotomy may not unify an academic field, applied to definitional considerations in education, it can clarify the problem. If micro-macro, particularistic-holistic represent modes of cognition that are inherent in individual predispositions, then general definitional outcomes (or levels of theoretical concerns) can be anticipated. Consequently, the need in education (and in other fields as well) is for analysis and definitions that incorporate, or at least recognize, the various levels involved.

One final point may illustrate that how we define people, things, situations, etc., is not merely a matter of idle speculation, but is a matter which can have far-reaching consequences in the real world. The case in point is pre-World War II Germany, and the Nazis' attempt to "solve" the Jewish question. "The Nazis perceived a problem - too many people of an undesirable type and a need for labor in a state whose destiny spelled expansion - and they moved to solve it expeditiously. Of course, one can quarrel with their definition of 'problem', but the power to define social reality was theirs, and they used it. No doubt the definition process was just that, a process, and it left open varied options for solutions."[10] To outline the options they chose would only belabor the point.

Although the preceding is, perhaps, an extreme example, it nonetheless points to the conclusion that definitions are reflective of cultural values and goals. If we perceive a widening gap between science and humanism, as some commentators have, then our efforts should be in a direction to insure that our definitions, constructs and programs encourage those values which are consistent with their ideological foundations. It is through careful consideration of both origins and ramifications of conceptual schemata that we are able to develop "a general perspective on a rational basis."[11]

FOOTNOTES

1. Carl G. Hempel, Fundamentals of Concept Formation in Empirical Science, Vol. II, Number 7 (University of Chicago Press, 1964), pp. 2-3.

2. Hempel, p. 47.

3. Hempel, p. 49.

4. A. J. Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic (Dover Publications, New York), pp. 59-60.

5. Israel Scheffler, The Language of Education (Springfield, Ill., C. Thomas, Publishers, 1969), p. 32.

6. Scheffler, p. 33.

7. Scheffler, p. 20.

8. Ivan Illich, Deschooling Society (New York, Harrow Books, 1972), pp. 68-74.

9. Robert Merton advocated sociological theories of the "middle range" that were testable, lending themselves to empirical verification, but yet, were also of theoretical importance. He was reacting to the wide dichotomy in sociology between "grand theory" and narrow empiricism.

10. John K. Roth, "Holocaust Business: Some Reflections on 'Arbeit Macht Frei,'" in The Annals (of the American Academy of Political and Social Science). Vol. 450 (July, 1980), p. 70.

11. Scheffler, p. 5.

THE CASE OF THE RENEGADE PRINCIPAL: COLLECTIVE PERCEPTIONS IN THE ETHICS OF SCHOOL LEADERSHIP

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Introduction

Let us imagine that a school administrator is ordered by his employers to do something quite likely to be socially and developmentally harmful to a group of students. How might he proceed? Is he justified in defying orders from the head office? Does loyalty constrain him to execute the harmful actions and make apologies as he can? And what should he make of strong political forces on either side of the issue?

In unequivocal situations, the ethical course for a school administrator is fairly well-marked. Proper decisions are those accepted by the community and prescribed by experience, common sense, and widely-shared convictions. Note, however, that the opinions of others weigh heavily, and become especially important in cases where doubt is present; then there is often an appeal to established authorities, a search for the conventional wisdom, and is the case of a public servant, even a consideration of political expedience. The person with a hyperactive individual conscience is likely to be seen as running the rapids of public opinion, alarmingly close to personal disaster.

The theme of the righteous (or self-righteous?) individual pitched against the iniquitous crowd is an old and fascinating one. The religious literature of the West abounds with prophets and martyrs who endured persecution for a faith that the masses did not share, at least not with equal intensity. Secular literature, too, has adopted that theme and has given us such classics as Shaw's Saint Joan and Ibsen's An Enemy of the People. Of course, there have been martyrs whose causes did not flourish and whose names remain forgotten or disgraced. Nevertheless, our culture holds up numerous examples to inspire the individual who holds to a conviction and dares the contempt of the masses; then, too, romantic self-concepts sometimes run wild.

Philosophers and social scientists have turned their attention in a more general and abstract way to the problem

of individual conscience and the forces of established principle and mass opinion. The philosophers break into camps: some agree with Kant and R. M. Hare that the rebel, however sincere, damages the social fabric and is a public danger;[1] others suggest human sympathy or situational perceptions as factors capable of overriding the conventional rules of conduct;[2] and some even content that moral dilemmas exist only where there is insufficient information to resolve them.[3] In the meantime, social scientists investigate our reactions to actual situations and find there is a remarkable degree of conformity related to social modeling and a widespread willingness to let others make our decisions. Stanley Milgram, for example, has conducted a stunning series of experiments that expose the average person's tendency to obey an authority figure even when the action required is physically and ethically repulsive.[4]

Such observations, however, are little comfort to our beleaguered administrator who must make a decision that will certainly cause him to be a target of criticism, and may also give him an uneasy conscience. To further complicate matters, it is difficult to avoid a consideration of cultural and historical context. In an overtly authoritarian society (such as Nazi Germany), one could easily predict the acceptable course that a public servant would follow, and the kinds of consequences he would suffer if he did not. But the recent history of our own country has seen the popularity of "civil disobedience," a wave of social consciousness and a concern for the rights of the oppressed, and the mystique of "doing your own thing." In the same era, teachers' unions grew in strength and militancy, no longer cowed by school boards, and students went to court over dress codes and other grievances. Has all of this social turbulence changed the rules by which we are governed? We may grant that a school board might not like to see its mandates ignored, but what would a panel of moral experts now say about a renegade principal prone to conscientious obstinacy?

The situation that has been alluded to is not hypothetical. It is a real case that took place in a small city in the south in 1977, and its outlines are given below. Let us also see what five moralists have said about it.

An Example for the Experts

Mr. K. was the principal of T. High School in a county school system. His school had the highest county-wide percentage of minority-group students, and offered programs that attracted students who had failed elsewhere. Mr. K. had excellent rapport with minority-group students and their parents.

T. High School was widely known for its trophy-winning athletic teams. One year, the school board redistricted the county, and T. High School received new students who had formerly attended other schools. Many of the new students were minority-group members and also excellent athletes. The state high school athletic association had a rule that students who transferred from one school to another could not play in intervarsity competitions for a period of one year after the transfer; this rule existed to discourage coaches from manipulating transfers of athletes.

When Mr. K., aware of the rule, reluctantly announced that the new students would probably not be allowed to play on T. High School's teams, groups of angry parents descended on this office. They saw the transfers as a form of discrimination, and some hinted that racial violence could result. After consideration, Mr. K. gave in to their demands and placed the new students on the teams. The other principals in the county, who did not particularly like Mr. K. in any event, protested loudly. These principals pointed to the transfer rule and refused to let their teams play against T. High School; then they lodged a complaint with the school board. A meeting was called and Mr. K. was ordered to remove the offending athletes from his teams. He refused to do so, and the school board summarily fired Mr. K. and locked him out of his office.

The outraged ethnic minority began a series of sit-ins and protest meetings in support of Mr. K., who retained an attorney preparatory to filing a lawsuit against the school board for breach of contract.

The conclusion of this case will be for the moment withheld, as it was from the five experts who were interviewed in this study and asked to comment on the ethical ramifications of what was before them.

The experts will be referred to only by code letters "A" through "E". Experts A and B are professors of theology at a Chicago-area university; expert C is a professor of philosophy and specialist in the field of business ethics; expert D is a guidance counselor and former principal of a Chicago high school; and expert E is the principal of a Chicago high school. All are mature individuals with considerable experience in their fields.

A very brief summary of the experts' remarks is given below:

> Expert A: This case is difficult. The rule that Mr. K. broke is obviously asinine and discriminatory in the context in which it is being applied;

it was not intended for such cases. (Thus) K. could act ethically in breaking (the rule) and in disobeying the school board. (But) if the school board felt that the rule was legitimate, it could also ethically decide to dismiss him. The two rights tend to cancel each other out. In breaking the rule, K. was probably acting imprudently. Another course would have been to enforce the rule and seek to change it by making it a political issue. In this case, as in others, there is an overriding principle of "justice" which I define as 'giving the other person his due and treating others equally." The case must be closely examined to see where justice or injustice was being done.

Expert B: Mr. K. was confronting a poor regulation, or at least one that did not apply to the current situation. The resolution of the problem should not have rested on Mr. K. The coaches of the schools concerned should have approached the principals, and requested that they take the matter up with the superintendent. The principals who insisted on enforcing the regulation were being unreasonable in that their own schools might have been adversely affected by it. The school board was also being unreasonable and unjust. What was really required was a clarification of the rule. It was counterproductive for K. to violate the regulation as long as it was not clarified. He might have done considerable harm to his school and to himself. He was using the wrong approach in breaking the rule, and the result was the other principals' intransigence. K. should have obeyed the rule while taking other action, such as dealing with the school board, parents' groups, the state athletic association and so forth. Only when other means were exhausted should he have brought the matter into the courts. In a case such as this, it is important to ascertain the facts, and to assume reasonable conduct of other people when they are correctly approached and informed.

Expert C: Mr. K. has risked his job and has thus jeopardized his chance for doing good. He has up to this point been a positive force for good in the school, but now that work stands to be undone. K.'s action in breaking the rule was incautious. Had he not broken it so clearly, we

could applaud his efforts more. Here we must assume that there was a good reason for the rule. If there was a good reason for the rule, then K. made a mistake. The rule that should apply in this situation is that one should try not to act unilaterally. In view of the pressures that were on K., he should have first talked with other principals and explained the situation to them. If they remained adamant, then he could have returned to the angry parents and told them, if they still insisted that the athletes remain on the team, that he would do their bidding but that it would cause him to be fired. Explaining that to do the parents' bidding would cause K. to lose his job would then place the pressure on another point--the school board and the other principals. Considering K.'s defiance of the school board, the board was within its rights to fire him. K.'s resort to the legal process, although arrived at unfortunately, was at least a way of arbitrating the issue. If he won the case, K. might wish to return to his old job, but he might find it easier to deal with parents and principals than with the now hostile school board.

Expert D: I do not have much sympathy for Mr. K. In my opinion, K. is "dead wrong all the way." Mr. K. attempted to play God, and in doing so he cut his own throat. K. should have realized that the state has very strict rules, which he has no jurisdiction to change or act against. If he wished to have the rules changed, he should have appealed to the state athletics board first; perhaps the state would have declared those particular athletes eligible. The state can make individual exceptions. The state is where Mr. K. should have placed the onus; instead, he took the cross on his own shoulders, and in doing so, jeopardized the whole athletics system. The school board was justified in firing Mr. K.; he brought the situation down upon himself. At this point, K. might as well sue the school board, as he has the right to do so, and he is otherwise without protection. In K.'s own view, reinstatement is justifiable, but he will probably find that he will not be reinstated, or he may be "kicked upstairs" to another position. I am most upset by the way in which K. exceeded his authority for the sake of local goods, while failing to preserve the greater good.

> Expert E: Mr. K. was acting neither legally nor ethically in breaking the regulation. Against the fact of K.'s illegal and unethical action, however, the validity of the rule itself must be questioned. Mr. K.'s proper course would have been to try to get the rule waived, as its original meaning does not clearly apply to his situation. The racial tension generated by the rule should have been communicated to the school board; this would have been further evidence against the rule. In order to keep his job, K. should have obeyed the school board's orders. He took action that he knew was against the will of the board, and therefore deserved the consequences. At this point, it was rather futile of him to sue, as a lawsuit could not have accomplished much; his only reason for suing might be a personal desire to gain publicity and be seen as a martyr. Of course, if he sued the school board and won, he might wish to continue in his former position. In the entire affair, K. was guilty of misdirecting his energies. In a larger context, this case illustrates the tendency of educators to try to "Band-Aid" individual situations, whether out of timidity or lack of political consciousness. What educators should be doing is working to change the system that presents unfortunate examples such as this one.

Judging the Experts

Perhaps it would be sufficient to report and comment on what the experts said about Mr. K. and his problem, but philosophers are often accused of being insufficiently empirical. To guard against his own lack of objectivity, the investigator devised a test to provide a certain degree of consensual validation. The interview transcripts were read carefully and what appeared to be the key statements were extracted, paraphrased if necessary, and transferred to coded index-cards.

Five judges were then empaneled and asked to evaluate the statements of the experts. These judges were all persons of good character, high intelligence and literacy, and suffered from no obvious mental disorders. They represented both sexes, three age groups, and five professions. No one was a professional philosopher, theologian, or educator, and none had any acquaintance with Mr. K. or any of the experts. Collaboration was nearly impossible because of physical separation and secrecy of identities.

Each judge was asked to perform his or her tasks individually, and only the general point of the exercise was explained prior to the test. There were fifty-six statements in all, each on a separate index card coded on the reverse side. The first task in the test was for the judge to reach each statement and decide whether it expressed support for Mr. K., adverse criticism of Mr. K., or a neutral or irrelevant observation. The second task was to arrange the supportive (hereafter called "positive") statements in order of apparent strength, and to do likewise with the adverse (hereafter called "negative") statements. Neutral or irrelevant statements were not ranked, as that did not seem to be a useful thing to attempt.

After all five judges had completed their tasks, a rather simple statistical analysis was performed on the data collected. (See Figures 1 and 2.) A discussion of that analysis follows.

Analyzing the Data

The first analysis was a tally of the positive, negative and neutral votes and a calculation of the per cent of statements in each category. Expert A was perceived as positive 29% of the time, negative 18%, and neutral in 53% of the instances; thus he seems heavily neutral, with a slight positive tendency. Expert B was seen as the most positive of all, 35%, but about equally negative and neutral (32% and 33%). Expert C was perceived as more strongly negative (43%), compared to 29% positive and 28% neutral. Expert D was the most negative, 65%, and was only slightly neutral (22%) and weakly positive (13%). Expert E was similarly negative, 58%, and only a bit more neutral or positive (27% and 15%) than D. Thus, three of the experts were perceived as more negative than anything else, and this group included the two practitioners in education. The most positive person was an elderly theologian. The average perception of negative remarks (44%) was almost twice that of positive remarks (24%), and neutral remarks fell in between at 32%. On this tally, the experts did not seem to express much sympathy for Mr. K.

A similar kind of analysis involved calculating the number (expressed as a per cent) of judges who perceived an expert's statement as positive, negative, or neutral. Only one statement of Expert A (A-2: "The rule that Mr. K. broke was obviously asine. . .) was universally perceived as positive and supportive, and no other statement reached this goal. No statement of any expert received an 80% positive vote, and a group of nine falls into the 60% category. (See Figure 2.) In the 60% positive column are

five remarks of Expert B, who again appears as the "most positive" of the experts, at least by comparison. Nine more statements appear in the 40% column; at this point we are recording the agreement of only two out of the five judges. Finally, eighteen more statements were seen as positive by only one judge.

On the table of negative statements, the configuration is quite different. Fully ten statements appear in the 100% negative column. An additional seven are listed as 80% negative, and seven more are in the 60% negative column. This means that twenty-four statements were taken as negative by a majority of the judges, compared to ten taken as positive by a majority. By agreement, then the negative statements outnumber the positive ones by 2.4 to 1. Comparatively fewer statements, sixteen, were understood as negative by a minority of the judges.

A large number of statements, thirty-seven, had at least one neutral vote. Three were seen as neutral by all the judges (A-1: "This case is difficult." A-5: "The two rights tend to cancel each other out." E-11: "What educators should be doing is working to change the system. . ."). Nineteen statements, a third of the total, were perceived as neutral by a majority of the judges, possibly illustrating a tendency of the experts to avoid passing judgment on the immediate situation.

In the matter of ranking and relative strengths, the analysis became more complicated. Averaging ranks could not be done across the board because not all statements received the same number of votes in the positive or negative column. A workable, if somewhat approximative, solution was found by keeping statements separate within the 100%, 80%, 60%, 40% and 20% categories, averaging ranks within each category, and assuming greater strength of remarks in the higher categories. To avoid the confusion of listing decimals and beginning anew at the top of each column, the entire sets of positive and negative statements were serially re-ranked (see Figure 2). In this way it was possible to rank all positive statements from the strongest to the weakest, and do likewise with all negative statements. A few aberrations may have affected the ranking order somewhat, but in general the re-rankings seem to conform well to the original rankings.

The example of the "most positive" statement, A-2, has already been given. The second most positive statement was also from Expert A (A-3: "Thus K. could act ethically in

breaking the rule and in disobeying the school board.") As A's other positive remarks received much lower ratings (36, 23, 24, 30, 26), he is surpassed in positively by the greater concentration of Expert B. The "most negative" statement was perceived as D-2 ("In my opinion, K. is 'dead wrong all the way'."), and Expert D also contributed three other highly-ranked utterances (nos. 2, 6, and 7) to the 100% negative column. Thus D is clearly the most hostile to Mr. K.

The standard deviation of the rankings was calculated for the positive and negative remarks of each expert, and ranged between 5.43 and 9.26. The differences indicate something less than close agreement, and are particularly noticeable in view of the relatively small number of statements (total of 56).

The re-ranking of the statements, referred to in Figure 1 and 2 as "strength ratings," is indicated in two ways. Figure 2 shows the serial re-ranking of all statements considered positive or negative, as subdivided by the pre cent of judges placing them in that category. Figure 1 lists each statement, identified by the expert who uttered it, and shows the per cent of judges perceiving it as positive, negative, or neutral, and includes the statement's strength rating as either a positive or negative statement (or in some cases, as both). These tables show at a glance how each set of statements was perceived, and they tend to confirm the inferences drawn from the preceding analyses.

Discussion

It may seem strange to apply social science methodologies to what is essentially a philosophical question; but if the aim of philosophy is disclosure, no helpful techniques deserve to be overlooked. No claim is being made that the methods or statistics used here are unassailable, or that they have resulted in any great or final revelation. Their limitations are evident to the investigator (small sample, possible bias in item selection, possibly misunderstood directions, problems in calculation, to name a few). Still, some interesting results emerge.

The most unexpected finding was an apparent age-difference in perceptions. Not only was the oldest expert, B, seen as most sympathetic to K., but the two oldest judges were the most likely to interpret statements as positive! Perhaps aging inclines one to kindliness and charitability; either that, or youth is pessimistic. Also interesting was the fact that the two school administrators, D and E, were the most severe on their colleague K., who in his situation

received no peer support. He was probably seen as violating standards of professional conduct.

Essentially, the figures confirm what many of us might have suspected: that despite the furore over social justice and individual freedoms, society remains largely authoritarian and conservative, and this tendency is reflected in the thinking of peers and leaders in the various fields.

Even so, the differences in the figures emphasize that there is no perfect agreement on what actions are wrong or right, nor even any consensus by literate, intelligent persons on the import of judgmental statements. In this inconsistency, perhaps, lies a glimmer of hope for the individual; perhaps the rebel may find an advocate.

It is not suggested here that the rights and wrongs of a situation can be determined by taking a vote. If a large number of people do a stupid thing, it is still a stupid thing. But the opinions of others have a certain weight in our actions. We are often reminded that we do not judge ourselves alone; we are judged by others as well. If that is the case, then it is certainly useful to know what our peers are thinking, and how they are likely to react to what we do. Had Mr. K. kept that in mind, he might have started looking for a new job sooner than he did.

Mr. K.'s lawsuit against the school board proceeded successfully. After much delay, the athletes were returned to their teams, and Mr. K. was reinstated as principal of T. High School. It was a hollow victory, however, for after a year of harassment and non-cooperation by the school board and by his colleagues, Mr. K. resigned, not only from T. High School, but from the teaching profession.

Even with the weight of a court decision on his side, a prophet may be without honor in his own country.

FOOTNOTES

1. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. F. Max Muller (New York: Doubleday Anchor, 1966), p. 78; R. M. Hare, "Rules of War and Moral Reasoning." Philosophy and Public Affairs, 1 (Winter, 1972): 175.

2. Jonathan Bennett, "The Conscience of Huckleberry Finn," Philosophy, 49 (April, 1974): 133-34.

3. John Dewey, Theory of the Moral Life, (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1932), p. 6.

4. Stanley Milgram, Obedience to Authority: An Experimental View, New York: Harper and Row, 1974.

CHARIOTS OF THE CLODS: PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION AND THE AESA STANDARDS*

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Introduction

By now nearly everyone is familiar with Erich von Daniken's best-selling book Chariots of the Gods in which von Daniken[1] sets forth a rather novel explanation of the human race. In that book he argues that Earth was visited in the distant past by superhuman spacemen who interbred with Earth's inhabitants and were thereby responsible for human intellectual development. Von Daniken claims that this theory is verified by various myths such as those surrounding the Greek gods, certain biblical passages dealing with angels, and so on. In addition, he maintains that certain natural phemonena such as the pyramids of Egypt and the great stone statues on Easter Island were quite beyond the capabilities of ancient man and therefore must be legacies of these ancient astronauts. Recently, von Daniken's theories and his so-called "hard" evidence have been exposed as questionable at best and in some cases clearly fraudulent. Very few people take von Daniken's ideas seriously anymore.

It is the thesis of this paper that von Daniken's theory, although seriously flawed, has been rejected too quickly. With the addition of just two minor modifications, I will demonstrate that this theory possesses an explanatory power so great that none can doubt its truth and accuracy. The first modification concerns the timing of the arrival of the invading astronauts. Here von Daniken made a slight miscalculation of a few thousand years. Instead of landing in the distant past, it is quite evident that the invasion occurred roughly ten or twenty years ago; perhaps around 1960, although it is impossible to pin-point the exact date.

The second minor modifications required to prefect von Daniken's theory involves the mental abilities of the alien astronauts. Von Daniken thought of them as vastly superior in every way to mortal man. Here he was quite wrong. In fact, the visiting astronauts are vastly inferior and could be characterized as approximately at the sub-cretin level in

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mentality. Thus, instead of being intellectual giants they are in reality mental dwarfs. This then explains my title, "Chariots of the Clods". Now, in nearly every other detail von Daniken was correct. That is, the invaders are interbreeding with humans, are responsible for our recent intellectual evolution, and have left a number of physical signs attesting to their presence amongst us. I will mention just a few examples of confirming data for this new theory. A theory of sub-cretin invaders would explain, for instance, the recent decline in SAT scores. Surely, you have all noticed the effects of sub-cretin interbreeding on your students.

Let me suggest an empirical experiment for those of you who are still skeptical. First, hire a helicopter or small plane and fly over any reasonably large city in the world. For our purposes here, let us imagine we are over New York City. Now ease the plane down and take a close look. What do you see? Smog, garbage, crime, illiteracy, bankruptcy, and on and on. Surely no one would claim that New York City is the result of intelligent beings. Only sub-cretins could possibly be behind such a phenomenon. I will leave it to you to identify other equally blatant signs that sub-cretins are gradually taking control of our entire world (e.g., Iran, the current Presidential contest, and so on).

On first reflection you might think that scholarly organization such as the Philosophy of Education Society would be a bastion of resistance to sub-cretinism. Recent events, however, have raised serious doubts in my mind. It may well be that PES has been infiltrated by sub-cretin undercover agents. Let me discuss just one example with you and then I will let you be the final judge.

The Case of the AESA Standards

At the 1979 conference of the Philosophy of Education Society the following resolution was approved by an overwhelming majority of the members of the Society with virtually no discussion:

> Be it resolved that (1) the Philosophy of Education Society endorse the Standards for Academic and Professional Instruction in Foundations of Education formulated by the American Educational Studies Association and published in the Winter 1977-78 edition of Educational Studies; (2) that it be understood that these standards do not supercede (sic) and are to be supplemented by

> the Philosophy of Education standards; (3) that the Philosophy of Education Society have its name listed as an endorser on future printings of the standards.[2]

The AESA Standards referred to in the resolution are intended as a supplement to evaluation criteria currently used by national, regional, and state accreditation agencies (e.g., NCATE) and establish in a more detailed manner accreditation standards in foundations of education. There can be no doubt that the Standards were sorely needed. The steady erosion of requirements, not to mention jobs, in the foundations area was in part due to the absence of just such a document. However, I will attempt to demonstrate that the PES resolution is yet another example of sub-cretin agents at work. More exactly, I will show that the PES resolution (1) contains a logical contradiction, and (2) is probably not even in the best political interests of the Society. To do this I need only examine Standard Six which is just one of the seven standards that make up the AESA Standards.

Standard Six, which is devoted to the question of the preparation of faculty in foundations of education, states:

> Doctoral programs in Foundations of Education, Educational Studies, or Educational Policy Studies offer concentrated, advanced preparation in at least one of the following disciplines or areas of study and general preparation in at least two others: history, philosopby, sociology, politics, and economics of education; religion and education; anthropology and education; educational psychology; comparative and international education; educational studies; and educational policy studies. The minimum number of academic staff in Foundations of Education, Educational Studies, or Educational Policy Studies in institutions offering doctoral degrees in these specializations should be the full-time equivalency of at least five faculty members who meet the qualifications of this standard and represent concentrations in at least three of the disciplines or areas of study listed above.[3]

The thrust of this Standard is, no doubt, commendable. It attempts to ensure that not just anyone, regardless of credentials, can be assigned to teach foundations courses. Few would deny that foundations courses should be taught by faculty who are trained in foundations. Notice that I did

not say no one would deny this. A colleague at a major state university informs me that, despite state certification requirements in foundations, the College of Education at his institution requires no courses in foundations of education. In fact, there aren't even any undergraduate foundations courses in their catalog. When questioned about this by accrediting agencies the official response was that all of their education courses had foundations components, although none of the instructors had any training in foundations. This kind of subterfuge would presumably not be allowed if Standard Six were implemented. I say "presumably" because the aforementioned state university was in fact granted full accreditation just last year. I might add as an aside that this kind of reasoning and action by accrediting agencies is proof positive that they are controlled by sub-cretin agents. The situation is so bad in this particularly area that many sub-cretins don't even bother to go undercover. I am sure you can all recall encounters with sub-cretin accrediting agencies and/or agents.

In any event, the Standards were created in part to insure that only qualified foundations experts are allowed to teach foundations (not just anyone as is the case at the university just mentioned). However, in this attempt to guarantee that foundations courses are taught by faculty with degrees in foundations another problem has been created. That is, it is possible to be qualified under Standard Six to teach foundations courses without even taking a course in a parent discipline outside of education. Thus, for example, a person with a doctorate in foundations who has taken absolutely no coursework in history, philosophy, etc., is qualified under Standard Six to teach foundations courses, including philosophy of education. It is my opinion that this person is not really qualified at all. The discussion following Standard Six states that

> The distinctive focus on the programs is the interpretive, normative, and critical examination of education through the framework of the following disciplines or areas of study; history, philosophy, religion, sociology, anthropology, political science, economics, psychology, comparative and international education, educational studies, and educational policy studies.[4]

While some of the above passage might be construed as an answer to my concern, it would seem important for those who teach philosophy of education to not just study education "through" philosophy (i.e., take a course in philoso-

phy of education), but in addition to study philosophy qua philosophy. The language of the passage quoted above does not seem sufficiently clear to guarantee that doctoral programs in foundations must contain the necessary prerequisite coursework in the parent discipline(s). In point of fact, during a panel devoted to an explanation of the Standards at the 1977 AESA conference in Philadelphia a member of the Task Force argued that doctoral candidates in foundations could receive sufficient exposure to parent discipline(s) in their foundations coursework alone. I would like to point out that this sounds suspiciously like the aforementioned College of Education which argued that undergraduate education students could receive sufficient exposure to foundations in other education courses without ever taking any courses in foundations. Thus, it is quite possible that I had discovered a sub-cretin agent in the very midst of AESA. How else could we explain this preference for inconsistent arguments? On the one hand, AESA wants to prohibit programs that claim to offer foundations through non-foundations courses, but on the other hand to allow programs that claim to offer parent disciplines through non-discipline courses.

The discussion following Standard Six goes on to state that doctoral candidates in foundations

> be prepared with more than a single perspective. A minimum qualification would be concentrated preparation at a level appropriate to doctoral programs in at least one of the aforementioned disciplines or areas of study (e.g., history of education, philosophy of education, etc.) and general preparation in at least two others.[5]

However, depending on the definitions of "concentrated" preparation and "general" preparation, requiring three areas of preparation in foundations of education seems to leave precious little space for preparation in the parent discipline(s). For example, if "concentrated" preparation was conservatively defined as 50% of the coursework and "general" preparation was even more conservatively defined as 20% of the coursework (two general areas are required), this would leave a maximum of 10% for the parent discipline (s) and electives. In a doctoral program of 60 semester hours of coursework, this would amount to a maximum of 6 semester hours or approximately 2 courses in the parent disciplines (assuming virtually no electives). Thus, the Standards are promoting doctoral programs that are generalist in nature and nearly devoid of preparation in the disciplines.

Regardless of whether or not you think that these are desirable programs (I happen to think they are not), it appears that programs like these are logically incompatible with Section III of the guidelines adopted by PES in 1969.

III. Philosophy of Education at the level of Doctoral degrees.

1. A doctoral candidate in Philosophy of Education (or in Education with a major in Philosophy of Education) must be able to demonstrate a comprehensive knowledge of the theory and practice of education . . . the degree program must include at least the following:

A. A major concentration in Philosophy of Education representing no less than half the graduate credits required for the doctoral degree.

A.1. At least half the course work in the major should consist of courses, seminars, or directed study especially designed for doctoral majors in Philosophy of Education. That is, no more than one half of the major may be built upon courses designed primarily for the master's level, or for students with majors in other than Philosophy of Education.

A.2. The instructional personnel teaching the advanced courses and seminars and directing dissertations in the major should be able to meet the standards for "Fellow" status established by the Philosophy of Education Society; and the major portion of the time of such personnel should be spent in teaching or research in the field of Philosophy of Education.

A.3. The number of advanced graduate students in the doctoral program should not exceed the number of qualified instructional personnel (as in A.2.) by a ratio of more than 4 to 1.

B. A minor concentration in general philosophy that meets all institutional criteria by which graduate school minors are approved.

B.1. The minor in general philosophy must be offered by a department of philosophy authorized to offer doctoral programs in general psychology.[6]

Thus, if we reserve 50% of the coursework (30 hours) for philosophy of education and 25% of the coursework (15 hours) for a minor in philosophy, only 15 hours is left to acquire a "general" preparation in at least two additional foundations areas.

It seems to me that to call taking six or seven or even nine hours in an area "general" preparation seems a bit bombbastic. Why even have a label like "general" preparation unless it refers to a significant block of coursework? On the other hand, at the 1977 AESA conference in Philadelphia at least one member of the Task Force argued that "general" preparation might be satisfied without taking any specific courses in the area but by exposure to the area in several "related" courses. This again sounds like the College of Education argument about getting foundations from other education sources. Clearly, I had encountered another subcretin agent within AESA. By now you can recognize their fondness for inconsistency.

In addition, it also seems clear that the PES resolution contains a contradiction. How can PES support the AESA Standards which virtually eliminate parent doctrines in doctoral programs and at the same time maintain the PES Standards which require a full minor in philosophy? This can only have been the work of sub-cretins who have infiltrated PES itself.

There are some philosophers of education who might dismiss all the preceding with the comment that Standard Six just concerns the preparation of doctoral candidates in foundations of education. This does not, they might continue, affect the main interest of PES which is the preparation of doctoral candidates in philosophy of education. In fact, this attitude is not only dangerously provincial, but politically naive as well. Those very same philosophers of education will be the first to complain about bureaucratic subcretinism when the AESA Standards are used to declare them and their students unqualified to teach foundations of education courses. This might seem a rather unlikely event to some, but I would direct your attention to the second sentence of Standard six which declares that faculty members involved in the preparation of doctoral candidates in foundations of education must themselves "meet the qualifications of this standard and represent concentrations in at least three of the disciplines or areas of study listed above."

This could mean simply that foundations doctoral programs must be staffed by at least five faculty members representing at least three foundations areas (e.g., one philosopher of education, one historian of education, one sociologist of education). However, this standard could be interpreted to mean that each of the five faculty members must themselves be trained in at least three foundations areas. (This interpretation is made plausible by the phrase "and represent" signifying that the following phrase (three areas) is an additional requirement for meeting the qualifications of the standard.) It hardly needs to be pointed out that this latter interpretation (each faculty needs to have three areas) would preclude a number of distinguished philosophers of education from preparing doctoral candidates in foundations of education. Clearly, this is not in the best interests of PES. Perhaps this second interpretation will never be utilized, but past experience with accreditation teams and the emphasis in Standard Six on preparation in at least three areas for foundations doctoral candidates does not generate great confidence that this will never occur. Sub-cretins are notorious for their convoluted interpretations of accreditation standards.

Conclusion

It is my contention that PES should rescind the resolution supporting the AESA Standards until they[7] can be modified to be consistent with the PES Standards. (This is doubly important when we remember that we have only looked[8] at one of the seven standards in the AESA document.) The impetus for the PES resolution was no doubt political. Most members saw it as an expedient move since AESA (by virtue of its larger membership) has more clout than PES. When dealing with essentially political entities such as accrediting agencies clout is in fact of paramount importance. Thus, even though the PES resolution contains a proviso that the AESA Standards do not supersede (whatever[9] that means) the PES Standards, the very fact that PES is listed as an endorser of the AESA Standards gives them even greater clout. Thus, the net political effect may be a sell-out of the discipline-oriented PES Standards for[10] the generalist-oriented AESA Standards.

Perhaps it would have made more sense for PES to join[11] forces again with the American Philosophical Association. Surely, historians and historians of education would also support the necessity of parent disciplines in doctoral programs. The same should be true for sociologists and sociologists of education. Clearly, the persons who stand

to gain the most from the AESA Standards are educational foundations generalists. Perhaps this is an indication that the AESA Standards is not really a cross-discipline document for philosophers, historians, and sociologists of education, but rather primarily an anti-discipline document favoring generalists in educational foundations who have little or no in-depth training in any discipline. Such a document is clearly not in the best interests of PES.

I can only conclude from the foregoing discussion that the future looks grim indeed. Sub-cretin agents have not only invaded PES, as indicated by the overwhelming support of the AESA Standards resolution at the 1979 PES meeting, but have actually gained control. What can be done, you might ask? From personal experience it appears that the answer to that question is -- virtually nothing. For example, a previous version of this paper was not accepted for presentation at the 1979 PES conference. Thus, I suggest that the program committee is already controlled by sub-cretins. There also seems to be a great deal of evidence that many PES members are in fact sub-cretin agents. How many times have you listened to a paper at PES and thought to yourself, "This paper doesn't make any sense at all." And how many of you have found yourself trapped into a conversation with a PES member and commented later to your friends that you never understood a single word that person said?

I will end by giving you one price of advice that will not affect the final outcome of this invasion of sub-cretins but may make it more bearable temporarily. It is a well-known fact that aliens always differ in some small but perceptible way from humans. Sometimes it is a lack of emotions as in the movie "Invasion of the Body Snatchers;" sometimes it is a little finger that won't bend as in the 1960's TV serial "The Invaders." In this case, in addition to their use of inconsistent arguments sub-cretins can be positively identified by their refusal to accept the theory I have outlined here tonight. If you encounter someone who challenges the theory, beware of an alien sub-cretin. Your best course of action is simply to refuse to listen to anything uttered by such a being. This, of course, will <u>not</u> stop the spread of sub-cretinism. The invasion is, unfortunately, too widespread to reverse. However, this tactic may result in sparing you from possible contamination. Yes, horrible as it may seem, I am afraid that sub-cretinism may be contagious. So, take a good look around you and if you have any doubts about the person sitting next to you, change seats immediately. It is your only hope.

FOOTNOTES

1. Erich von Daniken, Chariots of the Gods (New York: G. P. Putnam, 1970).

2. "Minutes of the Business Meeting of the Thirty-fifth Annual Meeting of the Philosophy of Education Society," Toronto, Ontario, Canada, April 21, 1979, p. 4.

3. AESA Task Force on Academic Standards, "Standards for Academic and Professional Instruction in Foundations of Education, Educational Studies, and Educational Policy Studies," Educational Studies, 8 (Winter, 1978), pp. 340-1.

4. Ibid., p. 341.

5. Ibid.

6. "Guidelines for Accreditation of the Philosophy of Education Component of Teacher Education Programs," Educational Theory, 20:1 (Winter, 1970), p. 64.

7. My suggestion is to reduce the number of general preparations required in the AESA Standards from two to one.

8. Standards 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 all mention and are inextricably interwoven with Standard 6. Thus, if Standard 6 is interpreted in the way I suggest it could be, philosophers of education without two other areas of preparation in educational foundations could barred not only from training educational foundations doctoral students but also from teaching, conducting, supervising, evaluating, or developing any course or programs (pre-service or in-service, undergraduate or graduate) associated with educational foundations. Needless to say, this would put a lot of educational philosophers (including myself) out of work.

9. It seems to me that the concept of 'supersede' makes sense in cases where the PES Standards are more specific and/or entail additional requirements than the AESA Standards. For example, the AESA Standards require that all teacher education programs contain a certain amount of coursework in educational foundations while the PES Standards require coursework in philosophy of education specifically. In cases where the two standards are logically incompatible, however, it just doesn't make sense to both "endorse" the AESA Standards and maintain that they don't "supersede" the PES Standards.

10. The membership of PES is presently voting on a new set of PES Standards, which would, among other things, (1) replace the requirement of a minor in philosophy with "substantial grounding in a general philosophy"; (2) replace the requirement of a major in philosophy of education with "intensive study in philosophy of education"; (3) require "work in social-behavioral sciences"; and (4) require "foundational studies." These new PES Standards are clearly more generalist-oriented than the present standards.

11. The PES Standards are based on a statement, The Place of Philosophy in Teacher Education, jointly prepared and adopted by The American Philosophical Association and The Philosophy of Education Society.

MIDWEST PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION SOCIETY

Officers:

President:	Adrian M. Dupuis Marquette University
Vice-President:	George Kizer Iowa State University
Secretary-Treasurer:	Ronald Swartz Oakland University

Executive Committee:

Rosemary Donatelli	Loyola University
Philip L. Smith	The Ohio State University
Arthur Brown (ex officio). .	Wayne State University

Program Committee:

Philip L. Smith . . . . . Chairman	The Ohio State University
Charles Litz	Kansas State University
Ralph Page	University of Illinois
Jerry Popp	Southern Illinois University at Edwardsville

Business Meeting Minutes, November 15, 1980

Old Business

1. The meeting was called to order by President Adrian Dupuis at 12.00. He announced the death of Rosemary Donatelli, and expressed the regrets of the Society.

2. The President expressed thanks to all who helped make the Society function during his tenure as President--especially George Kizer who performed duties of both Vice-President and Secretary-Treasurer.

3. President Dupuis announced that 150 copies of the 1977 and 1978 Proceedings remain, and asked for suggestions as to what to do with them.

   Merritt: Circulate to academic libraries; contact Educational Theory and Educational Studies for free ads.

   M. Smith: Encourage use of Proceedings in philosophy of education classes.

   R. Riegel: Contact Executive Board of PES for announcement of availability.

4. The President directed the Secretary-Treasurer to send letters of appreciation for services rendered by officers of the Society and by members of the Program and Arrangements Committees to institutional officials of these members.

5. President Dupuis asked for a report of the Nominating Committee, Charles Litz, Chair. The recommendations were:

   Michael Smith and Wilma Miranda, Executive Committee.
   Adrian Dupuis, ex officio, Executive Committee.
   Byron Radebaugh, Secretary-Treasurer.
   Philip Smith, Vice-President.
   George Kizer, President.

   There were no nominations from the floor, and the above officers and members of the Executive Committee were elected.

   (New Officers took over at this point.)

New Business

1. President Kizer accepted an invitation from Loyola University, Chicago, to hold the 1981 Conference at that location on November 13 and 14. Walter Krolikowski will serve as Arrangements Committee, chair.

2. There was discussion regarding when to begin and end the next Conference. Suggestions included: a 9:30 or 10:00 beginning, scheduling the business meeting on Friday; extending the conference later on Saturday; using a topical format; and planning opportunities for the audience to pursue ideas with presenters beyond the usual reaction time.

3. The President appointed Wilma Miranda, Northern Illinois University, chair of the 1981 Program Committee. Wilma will select the other members of the Program Committee.

4. It was moved, seconded, and passed that the Society contribute $50 to Educational Theory.

5. There was discussion of the 1980 Proceedings. Philip Smith is working on this task and Charles Litz is handling the production. It was suggested the Society consider a scaled down run. The 1980 Proceedings are due for publication in the Spring, 1981, and will be sent to members whose 1980 dues are paid.

6. Appreciation was expressed to Adrian M. Dupuis for his excellent service as President.

7. Meeting adjourned at 12:50 P.M.

Byron F. Radebaugh
Secretary-Treasurer

Treasurer's Report

Balance November 13, 1980		$446.59
Dues collected at Ames meeting		110.00
Collected for banquet at Ames meeting		275.15
Dividend		5.49
		$837.23

Expenses:

Gateway Center for luncheon and dinner Ames meeting	$296.90	
Balance December 9, 1980 and transferred by George Kizer to Byron Radebaugh		$540.33
Donation, Wayne State University PDK		100.00
Dues		5.00
Banquet payment (late)		12.10
Payment for 1977 Proceedings		6.00
Balance December 22, 1980 (deposited in MWPES Account No. 23788-1, DeKalb Savings and Loan Association, DeKalb, Illinois)		$663.43

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